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1.1 Motivational background of the thesis 
Financial markets are an indispensable part of a functioning economy that benefits its 
participants. An efficiently running financial market requires transparent financial information 
(Akerlof 1970). Throughout the world, governmental bodies have implemented regulatory 
systems that require firms to periodically prepare and disclose information. As one aspect of 
such mandatory disclosure frameworks, firms have to disclose financial information prepared 
in accordance with certain regulations, including comprehensive sets of accounting standards. 
After a worldwide adoption of International Financial Accounting Standards (IFRS) in the 
2000s in most major economies but the United States, two accounting systems are of 
international importance: IFRS and the United States Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (US GAAP) (Pacter 2015). The developers and issuers of the two accounting 
systems, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) for IFRS and the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) for US GAAP have increasingly extended their 
cooperation through a bilateral convergence program in recent years. While IFRS and US 
GAAP are already conceptually similar, the goal of the convergence program is to erase 
remaining differences between the two regulations (Van der Meulen et al. 2007). 
Governmental bodies have expressly supported this initiative in the past (G20 2013). 
Potential benefits of globally uniform accounting standards are subject of a large body 
of prior literature and not tackled by this thesis (Rezaee et al. 2010). However, competition 
has been helping develop several efficient frameworks, for example, for corporate charters, 
banking, maritime shipping, university accreditation, and stock exchanges (Sunder 2002). The 
absence of such competition in accounting standards regulation presents a strong case for 
regulation that is based on comprehensive evidence, not least in an era of “post-truth” 
(Drezner 2016). Academic research can provide such evidence (see e.g. Schipper 2010; 
Schipper 1994) and accounting standard setters particularly demand researchers’ support 
(Leuz and Wysocki 2016; Ewert and Wagenhofer 2012). Specifically, research on accounting 
and financial markets can help evaluate whether standard setters’ objectives are served by the 
standards they have issued (Kothari 2001). 
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The objective of financial reporting for both standard setters, IASB and FASB is the 
so-called “decision usefulness”. It implies that the primary goal of financial accounting 
information as prepared under IFRS and US GAAP is to “provide information to help present 
and potential investors and creditors and other users in assessing the amounts, timing, and 
uncertainty of prospective cash receipts” (FASB 1978). Therefore, the straightforward 
approach to evaluating accounting regulation is to test whether the regulation is able to 
provide information that is decision useful for market participants. Financial accounting 
research can provide such evidence on two levels. On an aggregate (market) level, financial 
markets research can ascertain whether the adoption of an accounting regime in an economy 
provides informational benefits relative to the old regime. On a detailed (accounting standard) 
level, financial markets research can provide evidence on the informational benefits of 
introductions or alterations of individual standards in existing accounting regimes (Kothari 
2001). 
This thesis seeks to contribute to the critical evaluation of international accounting 
standard setting on both levels. Specifically, it takes issue with the informational benefits of 
recent changes in accounting regulation concerning IFRS and US GAAP. 
1.2 Objective of the thesis 
This thesis comprises three studies. The first study investigates informational benefits of 
introducing a worldwide uniform set of accounting standards geared at providing decision 
useful information. Consequently, the study examines informational benefits on an aggregate 
(market) level. As a research setting, the study tests the effects of the worldwide mandatory 
IFRS adoption on financial market liquidity. For this, the study replicates a seminal study 
(Christensen et al. 2013) that finds liquidity benefits through mandatory IFRS adoption and 
other regulation changes. Challenging the findings of Christensen et al. 2013, the study 
introduces a measure for changes in the underlying sample composition as a potential 
correlated omitted variable in the test setting. The study thereby aims to increase our 
knowledge about and possibly adjust our expectations of the informational benefits that 
mandatory adoption of the IFRS accounting regime provides. 
 The second study examines informational benefits of accounting regulation, too, this 
time on a detailed, accounting standard level. Specifically, it tests informational benefits from 
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a fair value accounting item that was recently introduced in IFRS and US GAAP accounting 
regulation (IASB 2014a; FASB 2007). Fair values are in a sense the epitome of international 
standard setters’ claim to produce high quality, informative standards (Hitz 2007). 
Accordingly, both IASB and FASB express their intention to expand the use of fair values in 
financial accounting (IASB 2014a; FASB 2007). Therefore, testing the decision usefulness of 
recent fair value accounting items should make a meaningful and lasting contribution to the 
literature on accounting regulations’ informational benefits. Specifically, I analyze the 
informational properties of debt value adjustments due to a change in credit risk (DVAs). 
DVAs have stirred up a large public debate in which critics claim that DVAs are “junk 
income” (Dash 2009) and just “paper profits” (Eavis 2008). Against this background, my 
second study investigates the value relevance of DVAs with a focus on the moderating role of 
reliably measured related fair value assets. The study seeks to improve our understanding of 
the required informational environment in which seemingly “counterintuitive” (IASB 2009) 
DVAs contain value relevant information for investors. 
As the second study, the third study researches informational benefits of recent 
accounting changes on a detailed, accounting standard level. Again, the focus of the study lies 
on informational properties of controversial debt value adjustments at fair value. Unlike the 
first two studies, this study does not employ market-based measures of informational benefits, 
but narrative disclosure-based measures. Specifically, the third study investigates the DVA 
relational information that managers and the financial press provide. For this, I collect and 
analyze the contents of quarterly earnings press releases and financial press articles by hand. I 
particularly test the claim that managers emphasize negative DVAs, in line with an attempt 
“to trick the media and investors” (Milstead 2012). The study aims to enhance our 
understanding of leeway that managers use when providing information to financial markets. 
Regarding the press, it also seeks to improve our knowledge of the role of the financial press 
as an intermediary of decision useful information. Following, I describe the embedding of the 
studies in prior literature in more detail. Figure 1.1 summarizes the objective and research 








Study 1: Identifying consequences of mandatory IFRS adoption: The role of selection effects 
As “the worldwide adoption of IFRS is arguably one of the largest regulatory events in 
accounting history” (Leuz and Wysocki 2016) it has spawned a large literature of its intended 
and unintended consequences (Brueggemann et al. 2013). While few studies focus on real 
effects such as increased cross-border labor migration (Bloomfield et al. 2017), the majority 
of research is focused on the informational properties of IFRS accounting and their impact on 
financial markets. A central research question is whether financial statements prepared under 
IFRS have informational benefits relative to financial statements prepared under the 
respective preceding local accounting systems. In this regard, an increased market liquidity is 
a common proxy for such informational benefits as researchers and standard-setters broadly 
agree that it is “intrinsically desirable” (Schipper 2010).  
Prior literature indeed finds evidence for such positive financial market effects 
surrounding IFRS adoption (e.g. Daske et al. 2008). However, research that directly 
investigates the properties of IFRS financial statements fails to show conclusive evidence that 
IFRS financial statements provide superior earnings quality or improve cross-country 
comparability (Brueggemann et al. 2013). Against this background, a recent study of 
Christensen et al. 2013 finds that positive effects of mandatory IFRS adoption are limited to 
countries from the European Union, specifically, to six countries that simultaneously adopted 
stricter accounting enforcement regulation (EC 2002). The authors argue that it is impossible 
to disentangle the effects from IFRS adoption from the effects of enforcement regulation 
changes and therefore to attribute the found positive financial market effects solely to IFRS. 
In conclusion, the authors state that financial market effects surrounding IFRS adoption “have 
been extensively studied, but their sources are not yet well understood” (Christensen et al. 
2013, p. 147). 
The first study of the thesis seeks to contribute to our understanding of this matter. It 
uses an international setting to study firms’ decisions to stay in or opt out of the financial 
market following mandatory IFRS adoption in different countries. Afterwards, it tests whether 





Study 2: The role of proportion and reliability of fair value assets on informational properties 
of DVAs 
Shifting the focus from the aggregate level to the detailed level, financial market research can 
increase our knowledge regarding informational properties of specific accounting items. A 
feasible, market-based approach to test informational benefits of newly introduced or altered 
accounting standards is to test the value relevance of the additional information from the 
accounting regulation change (Schipper 2010). While value relevance is not a criterion 
explicitly mentioned by accounting standard setters, it is a common way in academic 
literature to operationalize the two central criteria for information to be decision useful, as 
stated by IASB and FASB (IASB 2010; FASB 1978): relevance and reliability (Barth et al. 
2001). To quantify the value relevance of accounting information, researchers measure its 
statistical association with share prices or share returns (Kothari 2001). 
Within the value relevance literature, the value relevance of fair values is of special 
interest. The reason for this is a long-standing debate about the trade-offs between fair values’ 
relevance and reliability. Proponents argue that fair values have high relevance and better 
reflect real volatility. Opponents argue that fair values are less verifiable and more prone to 
estimation errors and managerial discretion and that this threatens fair values’ reliability 
(Song et al. 2010). A theoretical analysis of Hitz 2007 finds support for the decision 
usefulness of fair values, but only for those derived from liquid markets. Accordingly, 
empirical research finds mixed evidence on the value relevance of fair values (see e.g. Barth 
1994; Eccher et al. 1996; Carroll et al. 2003). 
Debt value adjustments due to a change in credit risk, or DVAs, are a special kind of 
fair value income. They arise from derivative liabilities or when firms choose to apply a fair 
value option to their own liabilities. Such fair value options had more than rocky 
introductions in both, IFRS accounting (the European Union effectively made the IASB 
change its original fair value option regulation, see Brackney and Witmer 2005) and US 
GAAP accounting (two of the seven FASB members dissented with the fair value option’s 
issuance, see FASB 2007). Later, the net income effects of DVAs came under heavy criticism 
because critics perceive them as “counterintuitive” (Chasteen and Ransom 2007) “accounting 
voodoo” (Carver 2012b) to which investors “rightly don’t ascribe much value” (Eavis 2008). 
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Still, the informational properties of DVAs are open empirical questions. A recent 
study of Cedergren et al. 2015 finds evidence that DVAs can, in fact, convey value relevant 
information if certain criteria regarding the respective firms’ informational environment are 
met. My second study seeks to broaden our knowledge in this regard by investigating the role 
of proportion and reliability of fair value assets on informational properties of DVAs. 
Study 3: “Some fuzzy math”- relational information on debt value adjustments by managers 
and the financial press 
Related to the second study, my third and final study on the informational benefits of 
accounting standards investigates the informational effects of the introduction of DVAs in 
accounting regulation from a narrative perspective. I draw motivation for the study from the 
ongoing DVA debate. Here, critics regularly accuse managers of reporting DVAs’ effect on 
net income asymmetrically, potentially to exploit DVAs’ unique “counterintuitive” (Chasteen 
and Ransom 2007) properties. Specifically, critics argue that “banks have been more than 
happy to highlight these losses in their earnings releases, while being a lot more circumspect 
when valuation gains boost earnings” which “makes it looks like they are trying to trick the 
media and investors” (Milstead 2012). 
The investigation of the DVA relational information that managers and the financial 
press provide to financial market participants requires a different approach of measuring 
informational properties than the first two studies. Instead of measuring information 
properties with aggregated market measures, I hand-collect managers’ quarterly earnings 
press releases and financial press articles and perform a manual content analysis. As Leuz and 
Wysocki (2016) point out, the “qualitative, text-based, and narrative” nature of such 
disclosures makes it difficult to work with them. They argue that in consequence, this 
measurement approach is “fairly new” but has the benefits of enabling researchers to 
construct measures with an otherwise difficult to obtain informativeness dimension. 
By providing comprehensive descriptive evidence on narrative DVA disclosures by 
managers and the financial press, my third paper seeks to contribute to the young but growing 
literature on the informational properties of a recent and rather “quirky” (Eavis 2009b) 




1.3 Content of the thesis 
The thesis is structured as follows: Section 1 outlines the motivational background and the 
objective of the thesis. Section 2, 3, and 4 present the three empirical studies. The last section 
concludes. 
Section 2: Identifying consequences of mandatory IFRS adoption: The role of selection effects 
The study in this section investigates the role of selection effects inherent in the research 
designs commonly used in studies examining economic or accounting effects of mandatory 
IFRS adoption. The worldwide adoption of IFRS in several countries at different points in 
time offers an interesting setting because it diminishes concerns of confounding events of 
economic significance. In particular, it enables researchers to more clearly identify 
informational benefits of the mandatory IFRS adoption in the respective economies. A typical 
way to measure informational benefits in this regard is to test for an increased market 
liquidity. Exploiting this setting, prior literature finds evidence for informational benefits 
through mandatory IFRS adoption (e.g. Daske et al. 2008). However, Christensen et al. (2013) 
challenge the notion that found improvements in market liquidity are attributable to 
informational benefits from IFRS adoption only. Specifically, they include changes in 
enforcement regulation as a potential correlated omitted variable in their tests and 
demonstrate that it is able to partly explain increased liquidity after IFRS adoption. In our 
study, we introduce another potential correlated omitted variable – systematic opt outs of 
firms out of the IFRS mandate. To test its economic effect, we fully replicate the study of 
Christensen et al. 2013. Using a sample of 727,293 firm-quarters from 56 countries, we 
construct a “Selection Exposure Index” to measure country’s exposure to systematic opt-outs 
and not-materialized opt-ins. Adding the Selection Exposure Index to the tests of Christensen 
et al. (2013), we find that it, too, is able to explain liquidity benefits beyond the explanatory 
factors from prior literature. 
 The findings from this study provide evidence on a potential channel through which 
concurrent IFRS accounting and enforcement regulation possibly translate into higher market 
liquidity. Specifically, the findings challenge the notion that liquidity benefits found by prior 
literature are fully attributable to informational benefits from greater accounting transparency 
through the adoption of IFRS or a stricter accounting enforcement. Instead, the results imply 
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that the increased regulation from these events lead to higher regulatory costs for firms in the 
respective countries. This, in turn, systematically changed the underlying sample composition 
in these countries because smaller, less liquid firms systematically opted-out of or never 
opted-in the regulated market, resulting in overall market liquidity improvements. The study 
thereby further clarifies the informational benefits of the worldwide mandatory adoption of 
the IFRS accounting regime. Or conversely, it sheds light on a factor whose omission by prior 
literature potentially induced overestimation of IFRS accounting standards’ decision 
usefulness in the past. 
Section 3: The role of proportion and reliability of fair value assets on informational 
properties of DVAs 
This study examines the informational properties of debt value adjustments due to a change in 
own credit risk, short: DVAs. It does so from a financial market and an accounting 
perspective. More precisely, it investigates the role of proportion and reliability of related fair 
value assets for the value relevance, the market pricing, and the persistence of DVAs. The 
informational properties of DVAs are an interesting research topic because DVAs have rather 
unique characteristics that critics perceive as “counterintuitive” and “dangerous” (Crooch and 
Upton 2001). Specifically, DVAs produce net income gains when a firm’s own credit risk 
deteriorates and produce net income losses when a firm’s own credit risk improves. This 
particular feature has stirred up a public debate after DVAs’ introduction in IFRS and US 
GAAP accounting in 2006 and 2007 respectively. Within the debate, the potential of DVAs to 
blur investors’ view on firm performance is a key concern of critics including the IASB and 
FASB members themselves (IASB 2009; FASB 2007). Experimental literature backs this 
concern (Gaynor et al. 2011; Lachmann et al. 2015). However, recent empirical literature 
finds that DVAs contain decision useful information when firms are transparent in the sense 
that they only have few unrecognized intangible assets (Cedergren et al. 2015). Directly 
adding to the study of Cedergren et al. (2015), I consider a different factor that potentially 
influences investors’ understanding of DVAs: the proportion and reliability of related fair 
value assets. Asset valuation that transparently reflects the sources of credit risk changes 
which underlie DVAs should enhance markets’ perception of DVAs. 
For a sample of 617 firm-quarters of US banks that adopted the fair value option for 
liabilities between 2007 and 2014, I hand-collect information on the amount of reliably and 
less reliably measured fair value assets on the banks’ balance sheets. I find that higher 
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proportions of fair value assets are associated with more value relevant DVAs, but only if the 
fair value assets are measured reliably, i.e. if they reflect quoted market prices. Conversely, a 
high proportion of less reliably measured fair value assets do not improve related DVAs’ 
value relevance. Furthermore, the presence of a high proportion of less reliably measured fair 
value assets is associated with a too conservative pricing of DVAs. For high proportions of 
reliably measured fair value assets, I do not find this relation. Finally, DVAs’ persistence is 
moderated by the amount of potentially less reliably measured fair value assets. Taken 
together, the findings are consistent with DVAs providing decision useful information for 
capital markets when the related fair value assets reflect the sources of the underlying changes 
in credit risk transparently. 
The findings enhance our understanding of the necessary preconditions for DVAs to 
provide decision useful information. Against the background of recent DVA disclosure 
regulation changes in both accounting regimes, IFRS and US GAAP, that shift DVAs’ 
recognition from net income to other comprehensive income, they should be of special 
interest (IASB 2014b; FASB 2016). They also add to the ongoing DVA debate held by 
researchers (“clearly confusing and counterintuitive”, see Chasteen and Ransom 2007), 
applicants of the standard (“one of the more ridiculous concepts that’s ever been invented in 
accounting”, see Rapoport 2012), rating agencies (“an accounting standard that we find 
particularly unhelpful”, see Rapoport and Lucchetti 2011), analysts (“abomination”, see 
Keoun and Henry 2010), financial blogs (“Dumb and Dumber”, see Tchir 2012), and the 
financial press (“some fuzzy math”, see Dash 2009). 
Section 4: “Some fuzzy math”- relational information on debt value adjustments by managers 
and the financial press 
As the second study, this study also takes issue with the informational properties of DVAs, 
but from a disclosure perspective. In the ongoing DVA debate, critics argue that DVAs could 
blur investors’ view on firm performance, for example, when “artificial” (Keoun 2008) DVA 
gains increase net income. Furthermore, critics raise concerns that managers could exploit the 
fact that DVAs are potentially prone to misinterpretation by emphasizing only the losses from 
DVAs in their financial reporting relative to DVA gains. If DVA relational information 
provided by managers followed such a scheme, this could potentially compromise the 
informational benefits of this accounting standard as strived for by its standard setters. 
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Using a sample of 353 firm-quarters of 15 US financial firms that report DVAs 
between 2007 and 2014, I find that managers, indeed, provide more DVA relational 
information in quarterly earnings press releases in firm-quarters with large negative DVAs 
relative to large positive DVAs. Furthermore, managers provide relatively more DVA 
information in firm-quarters in which they have opportunistic incentives to do so, for 
example, when a negative DVA turned a net profit into a loss. This documented reporting 
pattern is consistent with concerns voiced in the DVA debate. Analyzing DVA relational 
information provided by the financial press on 202 firm-quarters, I find that the press picks up 
managers’ reporting spin. Specifically, a more comprehensive DVA reporting in a firm’s 
quarterly press release is associated with a higher probability of financial press reporting of 
the DVA. Still, the press enhances DVA information by providing new DVA information and 
by assuming a critical tone towards DVAs, especially in firm-quarters in which managers 
provide less DVA information and when DVAs improve firms’ income. These findings are 
consistent with the financial press disseminating and enhancing DVA information, thereby 
potentially increasing the informational benefits from this accounting regulation for investors. 
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2 Identifying consequences of mandatory IFRS adoption: The 
role of selection effects 
 
Joerg-Markus Hitz, Sebastian Kaumanns, and Nico Lehmann1 
 
 
Abstract: This paper documents potential selection effects inherent in the research designs 
that are typically used in studies investigating economic or accounting effects of mandatory 
IFRS adoption. Replicating prior work by Christensen, Hail, and Leuz (2013), we show that 
one particular selection effect, the IFRS treatment selection effect, which owes to systematic 
opt outs of firms out of the IFRS mandate, explains prior findings on positive liquidity effects 
of IFRS adoption. The paper’s implications are twofold. First, we offer a novel explanation 
how mandatory IFRS adoption and enforcement regulation translate into capital market 
benefits. Second, we point out limitations of the EU mandatory IFRS adoption setting for 
testing empirically the effects of mandatory IFRS adoption. We outline research strategies 
and methodological issues to address those research design and identification challenges.  
 
JEL codes: C52, M41, M48 
Keywords: Mandatory IFRS adoption, delistings, downlistings, oupt-outs, sample 
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2.1 Introduction 
This paper contributes to the ever growing literature on the effects of mandatory adoption of 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). We identify potential selection effects 
inherent in the research designs typically used in this literature and show how one particular 
selection effect, driven by systematic opt outs of firms from IFRS and enforcement regulated 
markets, might explain prior findings on positive liquidity effects around mandatory IFRS 
adoption. Hence, we provide conceptual reasoning and empirical evidence that prior evidence on 
positive capital market effects, that coincided with mandatory IFRS adoption and with concurrent 
enforcement regulation, can be explained by selection effects, that is, systematic changes in the 
underlying sample and market structure.2 We also discuss research implications. 
Characteristically, empirical studies on the effects of mandatory IFRS adoption employ a 
differences-in-differences (DiD) design to identify the causal impact of the IFRS adoption 
treatment on market, accounting, or other economic outcome variables, incremental to a control 
group of non-IFRS firms (for overviews, see, e.g., Brueggemann et al 2013; Pope and McLeay 
2011). Broadly, this literature provides three main findings. First, there is rich evidence of 
positive capital market effects (e.g. higher liquidity, lower cost of capital) coinciding with the 
IFRS mandate (e.g., Daske et al. 2008). Second, and somewhat in contrast, the evidence on 
accounting outcomes, such as earnings quality, or comparability, is fairly inconclusive. Hence, 
there is still no thorough understanding about the potential channels through which the IFRS 
mandate affects said positive capital market benefits (e.g., Brueggemann et al. 2013; Florou and 
Pope 2012). Third, the recent paper by Christensen, Hail and Leuz (2013) (CHL 2013) identifies 
one such potential channel by documenting a clustering of liquidity benefits in EU countries 
which concurrent with the IFRS mandate adopted EU-mandated changes in their enforcement 
mechanisms, setting up institutions that conduct random-selection based reviews of financial 
statements, and penalize non-compliance. CHL (2013) conclude that the positive market effects 
of IFRS reporting, as documented by prior literature (e.g., Armstrong et al. 2010; Byard et al. 
                                                 
2 A more recent paper by Gutierrez et al. (2017) provides cross-country evidence on the determinants of voluntary 
and forced delistings of IFRS firms in the post-IFRS period. Revisiting our findings on potential selection effects 
in the setting of mandatory IFRS adoption, the authors show a higher probability of delistings in strong IFRS 
enforcement jurisdictions.  
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2011) might actually be driven by solitary or bundled effects of enforcement regulation. At the 
same time, CHL (2013) caution that there may be other, and enforcement related, correlated 
variables that may explain their findings. In addition, Barth and Israeli (2013) point out that the 
findings presented in CHL (2013) are incomplete to the extent that they cannot fully distinguish 
between effects of changes in enforcement from effects of mandatory IFRS adoption. Overall, 
this discussion illustrates that the channels and drivers of positive liquidity effects observed 
around the IFRS mandate are still somewhat of an open question.  
The motivation of our analyses, which provide a new angle on the said IFRS adoption 
literature, is an empirical phenomenon illustrated in Figure 2.1, which document the coverage of 
listed firms by the Worldscope database for the period between 1995 and 2014. We categorize 
firms according to the country clusters used by CHL (2013). Figure 2.1 illustrates that the number 
of firms is relatively stable in IFRS countries outside the EU and in countries without IFRS 
adoption (CONTROL cluster) after 2005–the year of mandatory IFRS adoption in the EU and in 
most non-EU treatment countries covered by CHL (2013). In contrast, there is a rather steady 
decline in the number of IFRS firms domiciled in the EU, and this decline is particularly 
pronounced for firms from EU countries that adopted or improved enforcement mechanisms 
concurrent with IFRS adoption in 2005. For the latter firms (the IFRS_EU_ENF cluster), we 
observe a significant decline in the number of firms of 27.95% in the period between 2005 and 
2014, compared to a quite moderate decline in the number of control firms of only 0.43%. 
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Figure 2.1 Worldscope Coverage and CHL (2013) Country-Clusters 
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treatment group relative to control firms in the post-IFRS period. Put differently, the database 
coverage effect potentially introduces a time trend into the liquidity of control firms which 
violates the common trends assumption that underlies DiD techniques (e.g., Angrist and Pischke 
2015). 
Second, we argue that the patterns in Figure 2.1 might also reflect potential selection 
effects in the treatment group. We know from prior economic and accounting literature that in the 
course of regulatory interventions firms may engage in strategies to avoid the regulation (for an 
overview, see Leuz and Wysocki 2016, pp. 536, 555-556). Possible avoidance strategies include, 
among other things, switching to less regulated exchange segments (“going dark”, or 
downlistings), delistings, as well as threshold management in cases the regulation and its 
adoption require a financial threshold that has to be met. Overall, this literature extensively 
highlights the role of firm-level selection effects in regulatory settings, that is, systematic changes 
in the composition of the treatment and control groups as a result of the treatment (e.g., Angrist 
and Pischke 2008; Leuz and Wysocki 2016). The IFRS literature, however, remains surprisingly 
silent on whether firm-level selection effects and avoidance strategies might occur in the 
aftermath of mandatory IFRS adoption. Yet, in a recent study, Hitz and Mueller-Bloch (2016) 
document that since 2005 a substantial number of listed firms in Germany dispensed with their 
listing in the regulated market, effectively opting out of the IFRS and enforcement mandates. The 
authors show that firms that opt out, on average, are relatively small, have relatively little 
profitability, low liquidity, and have more likely been censured by the enforcement institutions 
for preparing erroneous financial statements. Hence, we propose that the relative decline of listed 
IFRS firms compared to listed non-IFRS firms as documented in Figure 2.1 might reflect 
economic externalities of increased accounting and enforcement regulation. In other words, 
assuming that IFRS and enforcement regulation systematically affect the probabilities of 
delistings or downlistings, we would expect to observe systematic differences in the number of 
listed firms across IFRS and non-IFRS markets following the regulatory event. Moreover, as 
these systematic changes are induced by specific firms with specific firm characteristics 
(presumably small and less liquid firms), cross-country IFRS research might become prone to a 
correlated omitted variable (i.e., treatment selection effect). In essence, treatment selection means 
that the IFRS treatment assignments become less random as remaining IFRS firms effectively 
select themselves (ex-post) into the treatment group by choosing not to dispense with IFRS 
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through opt-outs. We thus concur that this treatment selection effect renders it more likely to find 
liquidity benefits in the post-treatment period compared to a randomized treatment group. 
Besides this core treatment selection effect, we further expect that the mere changes in the 
sample composition of the treatment group (i.e., the decrease in sample size in post-IFRS period 
due to size and liquidity related opt-outs and exits) might additionally foster the documented 
treatment effect in prior IFRS research. As both treatment selection effects differ in terms of 
research design remedies and the self-selection component, we label the former as “treatment self 
selection effect” and the latter as “treatment sample selection effect”.  
In terms of research design remedies, we expect that two standard econometric 
techniques— separate time fixed effects for the treatment and control group or a balanced sample 
approach—should mitigate the control group and part of the treatment group selection effect (i.e., 
treatment sample selection effect) in a DiD design. However, both techniques do not seem to play 
a prominent role in prior research on mandatory IFRS adoption. As to our knowledge, only CHL 
(2013) employ a variant of combined treatment and time fixed effects. In addition, our reading of 
the 25 recent IFRS studies discussed by Brueggemann et al. (2013) reveals that only six studies 
appear to employ a balanced sample approach. Regarding our treatment self selection effect, the 
ex-post firm-level self selection into the treatment group by choosing not to dispense with the 
IFRS mandate, we expect that the aforementioned econometric techniques will be of limited use. 
The reason is that this self selection effect constitutes a classical correlated omitted variable 
inherent in the setting of mandatory IFRS adoption that standard econometric techniques are 
unable to address. 
To empirically examine our proposed three-fold selection effect, we conduct a series of 
analyses to assess the presence as well as the magnitude of these selection effects. In essence, 
these analyses involve three main steps. Our first set of analyses revisits Figure 2.1 and examines 
the relative decline in the number of listed firms as documented in Worldscope database within a 
multivariate (country-level) DiD design comprising country and year fixed effects as well as 
variation in the sample period. The corresponding findings are fully in line with the casual 
inferences from Figure 2.1 suggesting a significant and systematic decline of IFRS firms from 
EU countries with concurrent enforcement changes compared to non-IFRS firms.  
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Our second set of analyses addresses firm-level characteristics of firms that are potentially 
affected by our documented selection effects. Assuming that database providers are biased 
towards large firms (Garcia Lara et al. 2006) and that especially small and poor performing firms 
tend to trade off costs and benefits of regulatory interventions (Leuz and Wysocki 2016; Hitz and 
Mueller-Bloch 2016), we expect the sample of firms leaving and entering the market (or 
Worldscope coverage) to be biased towards certain characteristics such as firm size or 
profitability. We examine this rationale by estimating different determinants models for firms 
being affected by our documented sample changes (e.g., firms leaving IFRS or firms becoming 
covered by Worldscope during our sample period). In essence, we find evidence consistent with 
prior literature, suggesting that especially small and poor performing firms are entering or leaving 
the market. 
Our third and final set of analyses addresses whether the documented selection effects are 
sufficiently large to explain the liquidity findings documented in prior IFRS research. This final 
set involves three steps, and it is based on the benchmark study CHL (2013). To establish 
meaningful outcome differences, we first replicate the original analyses, that is, CHL’s main 
liquidity regressions, and discuss potential selection effects in the light of the CHL (2013) 
research design. Consistent with our replication approach, our univariate and multivariate results 
are fully in line with CHL (2013). In addition, we outline that the CHL (2013) research design 
with separate time fixed effects for non-IFRS and IFRS countries should effectively control for 
any control group selection effects due to systematic changes in the database coverage. However, 
we further argue that their research design fails to address our treatment sample selection effect 
as well as our treatment self selection effect. 
Therefore, we rerun—in a second step—the main liquidity analyses in CHL (2013), this 
time explicitly addressing our treatment selection effects. We do so by augmenting the CHL 
(2013) models by non-overlapping indicator variables that reflect the exposure to our selection 
effects. To that end, we introduce and validate a country-level selection exposure index that 
comprise systematic sample size changes in the treatment countries during the post-IFRS period. 
Overall, our findings document that treatment countries with a high selection exposure index (and 
thus with a high exposure to our selection effects) experience significantly higher liquidity 
benefits in the course of mandatory IFRS adoption than their counterparts (i.e., treatment 
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countries with a low exposure to our selection effects). We further observe that our selection 
exposure index is able to explain liquidity effects above and beyond the documented IFRS and 
EU as well as IFRS, EU and enforcement variation (e.g., IFRS_EU_ENF countries with a high 
selection exposure index benefit stronger from mandatory IFRS adoption than their counterparts 
with a low exposure index). Thus, our findings suggest that systematic sample and market 
changes as reflected in our selection exposure index, and with that, the self and sample selection 
of treatment firms in the post-IFRS period, might explain the liquidity findings as documented in 
CHL (2013).  
Third, we differentiate between our two treatment group selection effects—the treatment 
self selection effect and the treatment sample selection effect—by re-estimating our augmented 
model for a balanced sample. In particular, we document that our treatment self selection effect 
(i.e., the quasi self selection of IFRS firms into the treatment group by choosing not to dispense 
with IFRS through opt-outs) appears to be the driving force behind our findings.  
Overall, our paper contributes to the extant literature in several ways. Our findings 
directly extend the CHL (2013) findings and the Barth and Israeli (2013) discussion on the 
market liquidity effects around bundled IFRS and enforcement regulation. Specifically, we 
provide evidence on one potential channel through which concurrent IFRS accounting and 
enforcement regulation potentially translate into higher market liquidity, namely due to 
potentially regulation (treatment) induced systematic changes and selections in the underlying 
sample composition. With that, our findings might further dissolve the perceived inconsistency in 
the literature on mandatory IFRS adoption, which so far has not been able to fully reconcile 
evidence on positive capital market benefits (e.g., market liquidity) with inconclusive findings on 
accounting quality improvements (e.g., Brueggemann et al., 2013). In contrast to the conceptual 
level of most prior studies on the economic consequences of mandatory IFRS adoption, including 
CHL (2013), our capital market findings do not inevitably require improvements in accounting or 
reporting quality as an implicit assumption or precondition for their internal validity. Also, our 
findings provide a methodological, research design related perspective on the extant IFRS 
literature, and points out potential research design remedies and avenues to take this literature 
further. In addition to these research (design) implications, our findings are also of potential 
interest to regulators, in particular, supra-national regulators such as the EU or the IASB, as we 
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demonstrate that prior research potentially overstates the benefits of mandatory IFRS adoption. 
More importantly, our findings highlight potential unintended economic consequences of 
accounting and enforcement regulation.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we discuss potential 
selection effects inherent in mandatory IFRS adoption settings. In Section 2.3, we empirically 
document the presence of said effects in this setting. In Section 2.4, we test the economic 
magnitude of these selection effects by replicating and extending the CHL study and discuss 
research design implications. Section 2.5 concludes. 
2.2 Research on mandatory IFRS adoption and potential selection effects  
2.2.1 Studies on economic consequences of mandatory IFRS adoption 
IFRS research is plentiful, providing insights into various accounting, capital-market and other 
economic effects around the mandatory adoption of IFRS. Brueggemann et al. (2013), De George 
et al. (2016), and Leuz and Wysocki (2016) provide comprehensive surveys of this literature. All 
three surveys jointly note that there is abundant evidence of positive capital market effects upon 
mandatory IFRS adoption, for example, increases in liquidity, or decreases in companies’ cost of 
equity and debt capital. On the other hand, evidence on the effects of IFRS adoption on desirable 
accounting properties such as earnings quality or comparability is rather mixed and inconclusive. 
In addition and especially for market-based outcome variables, the literature on IFRS adoption 
demonstrates that country-level measures of “enforcement”, such as the quality of the judicial 
system or the level of corruption, are associated with the effects of IFRS adoption, meaning that 
enforcement quality appears to facilitate positive IFRS adoption outcomes.  
More recently, evidence in particular by CHL (2013) provides a different angle on prior 
findings from the mandatory IFRS adoption literature. The authors detail the role that the 
installment of enforcement institutions played in shaping IFRS adoption outcomes. The pertinent 
regulation, that is, the EU’s IAS / IFRS directive and ensuing regulation, mandated EU member 
states to create such enforcement institutions to oversee IFRS compliance by conducting reviews 
of financial statements on a random basis, and imposing penalties upon non-compliance. CHL 
(2013) find that these enforcement mechanisms may have indeed played an important role in 
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establishing positive market effects (i.e., liquidity increases) upon IFRS adoption. Specifically, 
the authors conclude that this enforcement effect may represent one (of potentially various) 
correlated omitted variable in the prior IFRS literature. Yet, CHL (2013) do not claim that 
changes in enforcement alone explain the observed liquidity effects. Rather, they caution that 
other reasons (economic or research design related) might (also) explain part of their documented 
findings. Specifically, CHL (2013, p. 172) note that  
“[W]hile our research design rules out many concerns about omitted variables and 
alternative explanations, we acknowledge that other changes to financial reporting (e.g., audit 
reforms) that are closely aligned with the concurrent enforcement changes could play into our 
findings. If such other factors exist, they do not alter the main message of this study – there still is 
a correlated omitted variable problem around IFRS adoption. But it implies that we cannot simply 
attribute the documented liquidity effects to enforcement changes either.” 
In addition, Barth and Israeli (2013, p. 186) point out that the findings presented in CHL (2013) 
are incomplete to the extent that they cannot fully distinguish between effects of changes in 
enforcement from effects of mandatory IFRS adoption. Given this ongoing debate, our study 
directly follows up on CHL (2013) and the discussion by Barth and Israeli (2013), by 
investigating the role of potential correlated omitted variables in the course of mandatory IFRS 
adoption and enforcement regulation. It is important to note that the purpose of our paper and 
research design is not to disentangle liquidity effects from enforcement changes to effects from 
mandatory IFRS adoption. Rather, we are more generally interested whether and how regulatory 
intensity (e.g., IFRS adoption in the European Union with concurrent enforcement regulation) 
and other features of the common mandatory IFRS adoption setting might induce potential 
correlated omitted variables that are able to explain part of the positive capital market benefits as 
documented in this literature.   
2.2.2 Research design challenges in studies on mandatory IFRS adoption 
While the IFRS literature is still growing and maturing, so far only little emphasis has been given 
to methodological aspects. Yet, the three aforementioned surveys on IFRS literature summarize 
and discuss some of the central research design issues and implications (Brueggemann et al. 
2013; De George et al. 2016; Leuz and Wysocki 2016). In addition, recent empirical studies tend 
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to improve in terms of research design and identification power (e.g., Daske et al. 2008; CHL 
2013). In essence, four research design topics are outlined in this literature. First and more 
generally, prior research highlights research design challenges with respect to the identification of 
“causal” effects of IFRS adoption, comprising topics such as correlated omitted variables and 
misspecified regression models (e.g., Barth and Israeli 2013; Brueggemann et al. 2013; 
Soderstrom and Sun 2007; CHL 2013; Leuz and Wysocki 2016). Second and in a related vein, 
prior research discusses the suitability of benchmark samples (e.g., Brueggemann et al. 2013, 
Daske et al. 2008; De George et al. 2016). Research on mandatory IFRS adoption, in particular, 
cross-country studies, typically employ a DiD design to investigate the causal impact of the IFRS 
adoption treatment on market, accounting, or other economic outcome variables, incremental to a 
control group of non-IFRS firms. In the standard DiD design, the outcome variable (e.g., cost of 
capital) is regressed on an indicator variable for treatment firms (IFRS), on an indicator variable 
for firm years after IFRS adoption across treatment and control firms (POST), on the interaction 
of these two variables, and on a set of control variables (including different fixed effect 
structures):  
Outcomeit =  γ1 + γ2IFRSit + γ3POSTit + γ4IFRS × POSTit + γ5Controls + ε (1) 
In this specification, the coefficient estimate on the interaction term (γ4) captures the presumably 
causal impact of the IFRS treatment. Figure 2.2 gives a graphical illustration of this identification 
strategy, using cost of capital as the outcome variable. In essence, in such a DiD design, 
benchmark firms serve an important role as counterfactuals to mitigate concerns that concurrent 
and confounding events affect the inferences for treatment firms. So far, prior literature 
documents that the inferences on IFRS adoption effects potentially vary with the composition of 
the benchmark sample (e.g., Daske et al. 2008). 
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Figure 2.2  Differences in Differences Identification Strategy in Research on Mandatory 
  IFRS Adoption 
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Third, prior research also points out that even the identification of the respective reporting 
standard, and especially the identification of IFRS reporting, deserves some attention. 
Specifically, prior research primarily used the Worldscope item “wc07536” (accounting standard 
followed) to identify the respective accounting standard. However, as outlined by Daske et al. 
(2013, pp. 535-539), there is some (firm-level) discretion involved when coding this variable 
(e.g., Worldscope item “wc07536” indicates various different GAAP standards, e.g., local 
GAAP, IFRS, US GAAP, but also various types of “International Standards” with consistency 
with IFRS). Fourth, Brueggemann et al. (2013) is one of the few papers that hint at potential 
selection biases because professional financial databases, which provide the basis for these 
studies, tend to focus on covering larger firms, which are the very firms which are more likely to 
benefit from the IFRS mandate. 
Apart from IFRS research, prior studies, especially in the fields of economics and public 
finance, provide a rich discussion on merits and research design challenges of DiD estimation in 
the context of regulatory events (e.g., Abadie 2005; Bertrand et al. 2004; Clair and Cook 2015). 
In essence, this research suggests that the validity of a DiD design to estimate economic 
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consequences of regulatory events hinges, among other things, on the exogeneity of the 
regulatory interventions themselves (e.g., randomized country-level treatment selection vs. 
country-level self selection) as well as the suitability of counterfactuals (e.g., parallel trends 
between treatment and control group). With respect to the former, Angrist and Pischke (2008, p. 
241) also highlight the role of firm-level selection effects, that is, “when the composition of the 
treatment and control groups changes as a result of the treatment”, as a potential pitfall in this 
context.  
2.2.3 Three-fold selection effect and mandatory IFRS adoption 
In this paper, we refine and expand two points of the methodological discussion as outlined in 
Section 2.2.2, that is, (1) the suitability of counterfactuals (control group selection effect) and (2) 
firm-level selection effects (two-fold treatment group selection effect), to research on the 
economic consequences of mandatory IFRS adoption. Figure 2.3 provides a graphical summary 
of our expected selection effects. 
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Figure 2.3 Three-fold Selection Effects in Research on Mandatory IFRS Adoption 
Panel A. Control group selection effect (CGSE) 
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2.2.3.1 Control group selection effect 
Prior research on database coverage conducted by Garcia Lara et al. (2006) documents that 
professional vendors of financial data choose quite different levels of coverage and that two 
major determinants of coverage decisions are firm size and the perceived relevance of the 
respective market for the database vendor’s clients. Thomson Reuters, the provider of the 
Worldscope database, reports, for example, that their coverage decision varies with specific firm 
and country characteristics such as market capitalization, the coverage by global indices from 
FTSE, MSCI, S&P, and Dow Jones, or with the country’s general state of development. 
Accordingly, most developed countries received full market coverage since 1999/2003, whereas 
most of the developing countries obtained partial coverage in the years afterwards and in some 
cases full coverage only recently. Hence, the observed relative decline of IFRS firms in Figure 
2.1 (Section 2.1) may reflect coverage changes over time in response to a growing or declining 
demand by the customers of Thomson Reuters.3 Such a coverage effect which is systematically 
linked to certain firm or country characteristics—most importantly firm size and the country’s 
state of development—potentially biases findings of prior IFRS research in different ways. As 
Brueggemann et al. (2013) already note, the likely bias of database providers towards covering 
large firms potentially overstates the positive effects of mandatory IFRS adoption, as these 
effects are expected to increase with firm size.  
However, the potential bias of database providers towards large firms and especially 
developed markets might additionally affect cross-country IFRS research, if the treatment 
assignments (i.e., the selection of IFRS treatment countries versus non-IFRS control countries) in 
the DiD design are systematically correlated with firm and country characteristics. In such cases, 
coverage changes by database providers can induce control group selection effects in research on 
mandatory IFRS adoption. In fact, based on the treatment and control country selection in CHL 
(2013), we observe that most IFRS treatment countries have developed markets with full and 
stable Thomson Reuters’ Worldscope coverage, whereas most non-IFRS control countries are 
less developed with only partial and increasing coverage (see Appendix 2.1 on Worldscope 
                                                 
3 As documented in Appendix 2.1, the demand for Thomson Reuters’ Worldscope database services is stimulated 
by varies with client groups. Among others, money management firms, investment banks, corporations, 
consulting firms, and academic institutions are clients of Worldscope. Thus, the coverage by Worldscope is not 
randomized but rather follows the information demand by their clients. 
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coverage pattern over time). Consequently, it is plausible to assume that a potentially biased time 
trend in the control group, biased by the increasing database coverage of (presumably small and 
less liquid) second- and third-tier firms over time, mechanically decreases the average liquidity 
within the control group in the post-treatment period. This in turn renders it more likely to find 
(relative) liquidity benefits for treatment firms in the DiD design. Panel A of Figure 2.3 illustrates 
this control group selection effect.  
2.2.3.2 Two-fold treatment group selection effect 
Prior research on accounting and economics commonly acknowledges that in the course of 
regulatory interventions firms may engage in strategies to avoid the regulation (for an overview, 
see Leuz and Wysocki, 2016, pp. 536, 555-556). In particular, small firms in the market tend to 
trade-off cost and benefits of the capital market regulation. Possible avoidance strategies include, 
among other things, going dark behavior (e.g., switch to a less regulated exchange segment), 
delistings, as well as threshold management in cases the regulation and its adoption require a 
financial threshold that has to be met.  
Going back at least to empirical studies on the economic effects of the US Securities Act 
of 1933 and the US Exchange Act of 1934, the literature already outlines the role of potential 
selection and composition effects in mitigating the validity of the documented treatment effects. 
Specifically, Benston (1969, p. 527) and Simon (1989, p. 313), among others, argue that the US 
regulations in the 1930s might have pushed riskier securities to less regulated markets and that 
this in turn might have biased the average treatment effect as documented in this literature. In 
other words, these studies imply that findings on the economic consequences of the respective 
regulations might be affected by firm-level selection effects in the treatment group. In particular, 
Simon (1989, p. 313) notes that 
“In fact, the 1933 Act and subsequent regulation contributed to the growth of the Over-
the-Counter market as issuers sought lower costs, unregulated markets. Excluding the OTC from 
this study imparts a selection bias on the findings. The extent to which SEC regulation shifted 
riskier securities to unregulated markets is an important issue to be addressed in future research.” 
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In a similar vein, more recent studies on the economic consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(SOX) provide evidence consistent with the notion that firms tend to trade off cost and benefits of 
the SOX regulation. Leuz et al. (2008), for example, document a significant increase in firms, 
especially small and poor performing firms, which deregister with the Security and Exchange 
Commission after the introduction of the SOX in the US in 2002. Overall, prior research in 
economics and accounting provides rich evidence consistent with firm-level incentives to avoid 
regulatory consequences. More importantly, as noted in Leuz and Wysocki (2016, p. 556), “[t]his 
discussion [also] highlights the importance of controlling for firms’ responses to the regulation, 
which can result in sample composition changes in the postperiod.” 
The IFRS literature, however, remains surprisingly silent on whether firm-level avoidance 
strategies might occur in the aftermath of mandatory IFRS adoption and concurrent enforcement 
regulation. Yet, in a recent study, Hitz and Mueller-Bloch (2016) document that since 2005 a 
substantial number of listed firms in Germany dispensed with their listing in the regulated 
market, effectively opting out of the IFRS and enforcement mandates. The authors show that 
firms that opt out, on average, are relatively small, have relatively little profitability, low 
liquidity, and have more likely been censured by the enforcement institutions for preparing 
erroneous financial statements.  
In a similar vein, a recent study conducted by Fiechter et al. (2016) documents that IFRS 
firms may choose to change their reporting standards without altering listing status. Although 
such an explicit choice of reporting standard is at odds with the notion of mandatory IFRS 
adoption, the authors document that in Switzerland, such an explicit option has recently been 
introduced. The authors show that on the Swiss Stock Exchange, a recent rule change which 
allows firms to opt-out of IFRS in favor of local Swiss GAAP was embraced in particular by 
small firms. Official press releases by these firms make it evident that they did not see sufficient 
benefits of the increased transparency that presumably comes with IFRS reporting. Hence, 
similar to the Hitz and Mueller-Bloch (2016) findings, specific firms that benefited little from the 
IFRS mandate decided to opt-out. 
A more recent study by Gutierrez et al. (2017) provides evidence on the determinants of 
voluntary and forced delistings of IFRS firms in the post-IFRS period. Supporting the findings of 
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Hitz and Mueller-Bloch (2016) at a cross-country level, the authors show a higher probability of 
delistings in strong IFRS enforcement jurisdictions.4 
Given this evidence, we thus propose that the relative decline of listed IFRS firms 
compared to listed non-IFRS firms as documented in Figure 2.1 (Section 2.1) might reflect 
economic externalities of increased accounting and enforcement regulation. In other words, 
assuming that IFRS and enforcement regulation systematically affects the probabilities of 
delistings or downlistings, we would expect to observe systematic differences in the number of 
listed firms across IFRS and non-IFRS markets following the regulatory event. Moreover, as 
these systematic changes are induced by specific firms with specific firm characteristics (e.g., as 
outlined by prior research, small and poorly performing firms with low liquidity are more likely 
to choose to delist or downlist following capital market regulation), cross-country IFRS research 
might become prone to a correlated omitted variable (i.e., treatment selection effect). If a study 
investigates, for example, transparency effects of mandatory IFRS adoption, it is likely that over 
time, IFRS firms will do better in terms of measures of transparency benefits than non-IFRS 
firms, as they select not to dispense with IFRS by not choosing to delist or downlist for that very 
reason. From an econometrician’s perspective, treatment selection means that the IFRS treatment 
assignments become less random as remaining IFRS firms effectively select themselves (ex-post) 
into the treatment group by choosing not to dispense with IFRS through opt-outs. They do so 
based on their own net benefit expectation of the IFRS treatment (e.g., expected net benefits due 
to improved liquidity upon IFRS adoption).  
We concur that this treatment selection effect renders it more likely to find liquidity 
benefits in the post-treatment period compared to a randomized treatment group. Moreover, it is 
important to note that we expect this treatment selection effect to be generally contingent on 
regulatory intensity and costs. At face value, the treatment selection effect should be stronger in 
IFRS countries with concurrent EU or enforcement regulation compared to those countries that 
“only” witnessed IFRS regulation. Besides this core treatment selection effect, we further 
expect—in line with the underlying mechanics of the control group selection effect—that the 
                                                 
4 In a related study, Pownall and Wieczynska (2017) provide evidence on the non-adoption of IFRS in the EU by 
documenting that not all firms from IFRS mandating EU countries eventually adopt IFRS in the post IFRS 
period. The authors show that especially small firms with less analyst following and less new debt and equity 
issuances are more likely to not adopt IFRS in the post IFRS adoption period.  
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mere changes in the sample composition of the treatment group (i.e., the decrease in sample size 
in post-IFRS period due to opt-outs and exits of potentially small and less liquid firms) might 
additionally foster, rather mechanically, the documented treatment effect in prior research on 
mandatory IFRS adoption. Similar to the control group selection effect, this second treatment 
selection effect does not inevitably require the underlying firm-level self selection component as 
described above (e.g., that treatment firms choose to dispense or not to dispense with IFRS 
reporting). It rather relies on aggregated (forced or voluntary) sample changes in the post-
treatment period and requires these sample changes to be correlated with the treatment event. As 
both treatment selection effects differ in terms of research design remedies and the self-selection 
component as outlined above, we label the former and core treatment selection effect as 
“treatment self selection effect” and the latter, rather mechanical second treatment effect as 
“treatment sample selection effect”. Panel B of Figure 2.3 illustrates this two-fold treatment 
group selection effect.   
2.2.3.3 Research Design Remedies 
Table 2.1 summarizes our three-fold selection problem, that is, the control group selection effect 
and the two treatment group selection effects, and outlines potential research design remedies. 
With respect to the former, we expect that two standard econometric techniques should mitigate 
this selection effect. First, separate time fixed effects for the treatment and control group should 
control for any liquidity effects induced by changes in the control group composition over time. 
Second, a balanced sample approach should likewise control for this control group selection 
effect.  
However, both standard econometric techniques do not seem to play a prominent role in 
prior research on mandatory IFRS adoption. In fact, as to our knowledge, only CHL (2013) 
employ combined treatment and time fixed effects (e.g., two quarter-year trends for IFRS 
treatment countries and non-IFRS control countries). In addition, based on the 25 recent IFRS 
studies, which are discussed by Brueggemann et al. (2013), only six studies appear to consider a 
balance sample approach.5 Nevertheless, both research design remedies come with potential costs 
                                                 
5 Ahmed et al. (2013) explicitly introduce a balanced sample approach. Five additional studies seem to rely on a 
balanced sample approach as well without noting it explicitly (i.e., Callao and Jarne 2010; Aharony et al. 2010; 
Byard et al. 2011; Beuselinck et al. 2010; DeFond et al. 2011). 
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or more severe setting requirements. In the former case, the combined fixed effect structure 
requires the regulatory intervention to have within treatment group variation of the treatment 
timing (e.g., calendar year variation across countries and/or firm-level fiscal year end variation of 
IFRS adoption as exploited in CHL 2013). In the latter case, the balanced sample approach 
induces the classical survivorship bias (Brueggemann et al. 2013).  
An alternative approach to address our control group selection effect might employ a 
matching strategy to select control countries with a treatment-like database coverage pattern and 
country-level state of development. However, this approach naturally requires sufficient variation 
in the control group regarding the matching parameters. Given the non-randomized and ever 
growing geographical extension of IFRS accounting around the world, this variation might be 
limited (e.g., De George et al. 2016, p. 82). In fact, 114 out of 138 jurisdictions worldwide 
require IFRS accounting standards in 2015 for most of their public firms (IFRS Foundation, 
2015). 
Regarding our two treatment selection effects, we expect that the aforementioned 
econometric techniques might be of limited use to constrain both selection problems. Although 
combined treatment-time fixed effects and a balanced sample structure should—in principle—
control for the treatment sample selection effect, our core treatment selection effect, that is, the 
ex-post firm-level self selection into the treatment group by choosing not to dispense with the 
IFRS mandate, will remain part of the DiD design. 
For a regulatory setting—apart from the mandatory IFRS adoption setting—to be robust 
to self selection concerns in the course of post regulatory avoidance behavior, one of the two 
following and more general setting requirements has to be met. The expected outcome effects 
(i.e., liquidity effects due to the regulation) materialize faster than potential self selection effects 
(i.e., liquidity effects due to treatment self selection). In that case, the researcher’s sample period 
choice might consider a shorter post-treatment period that primarily includes the expected 
outcome effects and excludes potential self selection effects. Alternatively, the regulatory setting 
itself does not allow for any avoidance behavior (e.g., by legally prohibiting any ex-post 
avoidance of the regulatory action). However, in most firm-level capital market or accounting 
regulation settings, both requirements are rather unlikely to expect or find. For example, 
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transition periods, learning effects, and short- versus long-term effects might constrain the former 
requirement, whereas managerial discretion, global capital market and firm (MNE) structures, 
and more generally the freedom of contract—and thus the freedom to change the legal status of a 
company—might constrain the latter. In Section 2.4, we will extend this methodological 
discussion to the CHL (2013) research design. 
Table 2.1 Three-fold Selection Effect and Research Design Remedies 
Panel A. Summary of the three-fold selection effect 
TGSE1 Treatment firms that are more likely to benefit from the IFRS treatment select themselves (ex-
post) into the treatment by choosing not to dispense with the IFRS mandate. This in turn 
inflates the average treatment effect. In other words, it increases the likelihood of observing 
positive treatment effects for the remaining, self selected treatment firms. 
❖ Firm-level self-selection effect within the treatment group. 
TGSE2 Systematic changes in the sample composition of the treatment group, that is, the decrease in 
sample size in post-IFRS period due to opt-outs and exits of presumably small and less liquid 
treatment firms, inflates the average treatment effect in a DiD design. In other words, it 
increases the likelihood of observing positive treatment effects within a DiD design. 
❖ Systematic sample composition effect within the treatment group. 
CGSE Systematic changes in the sample composition of the control group, that is, the increase in 
sample size due to an increasing database coverage of small and less liquid (second- and third-
tier) control firms over time, inflates the average treatment effect in a DiD design. In other 
words, it increases the likelihood of observing positive treatment effects within a DiD design. 
❖ Systematic sample composition effect within the control group. 
Panel B. Research design remedies: Fixed-effect (FE) and/or balanced sample approach 
 DiD research design as commonly used in research on mandatory IFRS adoption with … 
(e.g., CHL 2013 with 35 IFRS treatment countries and 21 non-IFRS control countries) 
 … unbalanced sample (Models 1 to 4) … balanced sample 
 Plain Vanilla  
(w/o FE structure) 
Control Group 
matching 
Time and / or 
country FE 
Separate time FE for 
treatment & control 
From Plain Vanilla 
to separate time FE 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
TGSE1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
TGSE2 Yes Yes Yes No No 
CGSE Yes No Yes No No 
Notes: CGSE = Control Group Selection Effect, TGSE1 = Treatment Group Self Selection Effect, TGSE2 = 
Treatment Group Sample Selection Effect. 
2.3 Presence of selection effects around mandatory IFRS adoption 
To empirically examine our proposed three-fold selection effect, we develop a series of analyses 
in Sections 2.3 and 2.4 comprising tests to assess the presence as well as the magnitude of these 
selection effects. In essence, these analyses involve three main steps (two in Section 2.3 and one 
in Section 2.4).  
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2.3.1 Worldscope coverage of IFRS and non-IFRS firms 
Our first set of analyses revisits Figure 2.1 and examines the relative decline in the number of 
listed firms as documented in Worldscope database within univariate as well as multivariate 
(country-level) DiD design comprising country and year fixed effects as well as variation in the 
sample period. Table 2.2 presents the respective results. In response to Figure 2.1, Panel A of 
Table 2.2 details the number of firms listed across different IFRS and non-IFRS country-clusters 
between the years 1996 and 2014. Specifically, we follow CHL (2013) and employ the following 
country-clusters: IFRS countries, EU IFRS countries, EU IFRS countries with concurrent 
enforcement changes, EU IFRS countries without concurrent enforcement changes, non-EU IFRS 
countries, and non-IFRS (control) countries (Appendix 2.2 details the respective country-cluster 
composition).6 In line with Figure 2.1, we observe a substantial decline in listed IFRS firms in 
EU countries, which concurrently changed their enforcement regulation in 2005, by 28% (3,277 
listed firms in 2005 compared to 2,361 in 2014). In comparison, Panel A of Table 2.2 reveals 
more moderate or even positive changes in the number of listed firms over the same time period 
(1) for EU countries that introduced the IFRS mandate without concurrent enforcement regulation 
(-17%, with 3,106 listed firms in 2005 compared to 2,578 in 2014), (2) for non-EU countries that 
mandate IFRS (+1.7%, with 3,534 listed firms in 2005 compared to 3,594 in 2014), as well as (3) 
for countries which did not adopt the IFRS mandate (-0.4%, with 18,536 listed firms in 2005 
compared to 18,457 in 2014). 
  
                                                 
6 For all analyses considering a sample period between 2001 and 2009, we follow the control group composition as 
suggested by Christensen et al. (2013). For all analyses considering the complete sample period (1995-2014), we 
use an adjusted control group comprising only countries without mandatory IFRS adoption until 2014 (for details, 
see Appendix 2.2).  
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Table 2.2 Worldscope Coverage and CHL (2013) Country-Clusters 
Panel A. Distribution of number of listed firms across CHL Country-Clusters 
Year 
CONTROL  IFRS IFRS_EU  IFRS_EU_ENF  IFRS_EU_nonENF  IFRS_nonEU  
#Firms ∆ in # F #Firms ∆ in # F #Firms ∆ in # F #Firms ∆ in # F #Firms ∆ in # F #Firms ∆ in # F 
1996 10971 15.4% 3069 8.1% 2400 7.0% 1276 6.2% 1124 8.0% 669 12.4% 
1997 12280 11.9% 3339 8.8% 2552 6.3% 1359 6.5% 1193 6.1% 787 17.6% 
1998 15172 23.6% 3766 12.8% 2847 11.6% 1546 13.8% 1301 9.1% 919 16.8% 
1999 16193 6.7% 4245 12.7% 3130 9.9% 1670 8.0% 1460 12.2% 1115 21.3% 
2000 16389 1.2% 5550 30.7% 3933 25.7% 2005 20.1% 1928 32.1% 1617 45.0% 
2001 16508 0.7% 6485 16.8% 4310 9.6% 2233 11.4% 2077 7.7% 2175 34.5% 
2002 16595 0.5% 7437 14.7% 4997 15.9% 2594 16.2% 2403 15.7% 2440 12.2% 
2003 17014 2.5% 7996 7.5% 5404 8.1% 2816 8.6% 2588 7.7% 2592 6.2% 
2004 17484 2.8% 8717 9.0% 5833 7.9% 3046 8.2% 2787 7.7% 2884 11.3% 
2005 18536 6.0% 9917 13.8% 6383 9.4% 3277 7.6% 3106 11.4% 3534 22.5% 
2006 20000 7.9% 10357 4.4% 6572 3.0% 3419 4.3% 3153 1.5% 3785 7.1% 
2007 20334 1.7% 10402 0.4% 6468 -1.6% 3357 -1.8% 3111 -1.3% 3934 3.9% 
2008 20268 -0.3% 10271 -1.3% 6237 -3.6% 3173 -5.5% 3064 -1.5% 4034 2.5% 
2009 20421 0.8% 9978 -2.9% 5959 -4.5% 2954 -6.9% 3005 -1.9% 4019 -0.4% 
2010 20449 0.1% 9854 -1.2% 5795 -2.8% 2833 -4.1% 2962 -1.4% 4059 1.0% 
2011 20317 -0.6% 9760 -1.0% 5700 -1.6% 2785 -1.7% 2915 -1.6% 4060 0.0% 
2012 20049 -1.3% 9367 -4.0% 5447 -4.4% 2660 -4.5% 2787 -4.4% 3920 -3.4% 
2013 19425 -3.1% 8959 -4.4% 5214 -4.3% 2513 -5.5% 2701 -3.1% 3745 -4.5% 
2014 18457 -5.0% 8533 -4.8% 4939 -5.3% 2361 -6.0% 2578 -4.6% 3594 -4.0% 
∆ since 2005 -0.43%  -13.96%  -22.62%  -27.95%  -17.00%  1.70% 
Panel B. Median change in number of firms across pre- & post IFRS sample period 
 CONTROL  IFRS IFRS_EU  IFRS_EU_ENF  IFRS_EU_nonENF  IFRS_nonEU  
∆ 1996-2004 .0727 .0888 .08 .0714 .0836 .1270 
∆ 2001-2004 .0835 .0888 .0836 .0718 .0853 .1036 
∆ 2005-2009 .0247 .0182 0 -.0211 0 .0385 
∆ 2005-2014 .0009 -.0114 -.0183 -.0322 -.0160 .0083 
Panel C. Significance tests on median change Diff in # firms across pre- & post-IFRS period 
P-Value 
Sample period I: 1996-2004 (above the diagonal) and sample period II: 2005 and 2014 (below the diagonal) 
CONTROL IFRS IFRS_EU IFRS_EU_ENF IFRS_EU_nonENF IFRS_nonEU 
CONTROL 1 0.0391 0.1399 0.2968 0.1655 0.0135 
IFRS 0.0001 1 0.0595 0.3948 0.2626 0.0595 
IFRS_EU 0.0000 0.0001 1 0.8124 0.8124 0.0595 
IFRS_EU_ENF 0.0000 0.0049 0.0873 1 0.8124 0.1097 
IFRS_EU_nonENF 0.0000 0.1406 0.0873 0.0873 1 0.0934 
IFRS_nonEU 0.8244 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0010 1 
Panel D. Country-year DiD and all CHL country clusters  
 Dependent Variable: zCOUNT_DATA (#firms per year and country, standardized over 2005 value) 
 Sample Period: 1995-2014 Sample Period: 2001-2009 
 Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 Column 6 
(1) IFRSPOST -0.2547   -0.1141   
 (-1.42)   (-0.96)   
(2) IFRS_EU POST  -0.3337*   -0.1410  
  (-1.84)   (-1.09)  
(3) IFRS_nonEU POST  -0.0812 -0.0812  -0.0507 -0.0507 
  (-0.42) (-0.42)  (-0.40) (-0.39) 
(4) IFRS_EU-Enf POST   -0.4507**   -0.2822** 
   (-2.51)   (-2.42) 
(5) IFRS_EU-nonEnf POST   -0.2949   -0.0943 
   (-1.57)   (-0.65) 
F-test for Diff. (p-value)  (2) vs. (3) (3) vs. (4)  (2) vs. (3) (3) vs. (4) 
  0.0270 0.0013  0.4119 0.0158 
   (4) vs. (5)   (4) vs. (5) 
   0.1125   0.1050 
Year & Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered SE (country) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 898 898 898 491 491 491 
Adj. R-squared 0.6313 0.6474 0.6507 0.4672 0.4690 0.4760 
Notes: For the underlying sample / country composition, see Appendix 2. For Panel D, t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 
0.01. 
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Panel B of Table 2.2 provides complimentary information on median changes in the number of 
firms across the pre- and post-IFRS sample period. In particular, we observe that the average 
country-level change in the number of listed firms after 2005 is most pronounced for the 
IFRS_EU_ENF country-cluster (-2.11% for the period between 2005 and 2009, and -3.22% for 
the period between 2005 and 2014). In comparison, the corresponding changes across our 
CONTROL and IFRS_nonEU country-clusters are positive with 0.09% for the period between 
2005 and 2014 (2.47% for the period between 2005 and 2009) and 0.83% for the period between 
2005 and 2014 (3.85% for the period between 2005 and 2009), respectively. In addition, Panel C 
of Table 2.2 reveals that most of the country-cluster changes are significantly different from each 
other in the post-IFRS period, whereas the development across countries and country-clusters in 
the pre-IFRS period appears to be to some extent similar. Specifically, the differences between 
the changes in the CONTROL country-cluster and the different IFRS country-clusters are in 
almost all cases statistically significant for the post-IFRS period (with the only exception being 
the CONTROL and IFRS_nonEU pair in the post-IFRS period with a p-value of 0.8244). In 
contrast, the corresponding differences in the pre-IFRS period are in most cases insignificant 
(especially the pre-2005 changes in the average number of listed firms across the CONTROL and 
the different European IFRS country-clusters are statistically insignificant, with p-values ranging 
from 0.14 to 0.30). 
Panel D of Table 2.2 reports results from using multivariate analyses to explore the 
reported cluster trends. Specifically, we estimate the following country-level DiD regression with 
year and country fixed effects: 
zCOUNT_DATAit =  γ1 + γ2IFRS_nonEU × POSTit + γ3IFRS_EU_Enf × POSTit
+ γ4IFRS_EU_nonEnf × POSTit + γ5COUNTRY FE + γ6YEAR FE + ε (2) 
For a given variable of interest (i.e., zCOUNT_DATA), regression model (2) compares the 
changes in the treatment group (IFRS-adopting countries) around the “exogenous” event 
(mandatory adoption of IFRS in 2005) to the corresponding changes in the “non-treated” control 
group (non-IFRS adopting countries). In line with our descriptive analyses, we use as our 
dependent variable zCOUNT_DATA, which measures the relative change in number of firms per 
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year and country (i.e., zCOUNT_DATA is scaled by the respective absolute values on total 
number of listed firms per country in 2005). IFRS_nonEU, IFRS_EU_Enf, IFRS_EU_nonEnf 
reflect the different country-clusters as defined in CHL (2013) (see Appendix 2.2 for further 
information). COUNTRY FE and YEAR FE represent country and year fixed effects. This fixed-
effect structure controls for the underlying main effects of the DiD regression as well (i.e., POST 
and IFRS Treatment group).7 In all reported regression models, the standard errors are 
heteroskedasticity robust (White, 1980) and one-way clustered at the country-level (Gow et al., 
2010; Petersen 2009).  
Corroborating our descriptive findings, we observe that especially IFRS_EU-ENF 
countries experience a significant decline in the number of firms listed in the period after 2005 
(see column 3, Panel D, Table 2.2). These findings hold for different sample windows (columns 1 
to 3 refer to the sample period 1995-2014, and columns 4 to 6 consider a sample period between 
2001 and 2009). 
Taken together, our descriptive analyses underscore that there is a significant relative 
decline of IFRS_EU_ENF firms, in particular, compared to those firms which are typically used 
as control firms in contemporary DiD designs. As outlined in Section 2.2, this relative decline 
might represent selection effect issues if it is non-random. Moreover, it might provide novel 
insights into the economic effects of mandatory IFRS adoption (e.g., unintended consequences of 
mandatory IFRS regulation). Thus, we are interested in whether firms with specific 
characteristics, for example, firms with potential firm-level benefits (costs) of IFRS adoption, are 
systematically selected into or (out of) respective treatment and control groups. 
2.3.2 Firm-level characteristics and changes in Worldscope coverage 
In Section 2.2, we argue that the documented changes in the number of listed firms across the 
different IFRS and non-IFRS country clusters—as reflected in Figure 2.1 (Section 2.1)—are 
driven by revised coverage decisions on behalf of Worldscope (e.g., increasing coverage for 
countries with partial coverage status) and / or by real effects such as firm-level changes in the 
delisting, downlisting or IPO behavior (i.e., post regulation avoidance behavior). Following this 
rationale, we expect the sample of firms leaving IFRS (getting covered by Worldscope) to be 
                                                 
7 POST is a dummy variable indicating with 1 the sample period after 2005 (IFRS period). 
Identifying consequences of mandatory IFRS adoption: The role of selection effects 
37 
biased towards certain characteristics such as firm size or profitability. We examine this rationale 
by estimating determinants on the firms being affected by our documented sample changes (e.g., 
firms leaving the IFRS coverage or firms becoming covered by Worldscope during our sample 
period). In essence, we estimate the following two determinant models: 
SURVIVORSHIPit =  γ1 + γ2Log_TAit + γ3ROEit + γ4LOSSit + γ5COUNTRY FE + γ6YEAR FE + ε (3) 
GAAP_SWITCHit =  γ1 + γ2Log_TAit + γ3ROEit + γ4LOSSit + γ5COUNTRY FE + γ6YEAR FE + ε (4) 
Where SURVIVORSHIP represents a dummy variable indicating with one if a firm is constantly 
part of the respective sample period under investigation. In contrast, GAAP_SWITCH indicates 
whether an IFRS-adopting firm turns back to local GAAP during the respective sample period 
(i.e., GAAP_SWITCH is a dummy variable assigning the value of one to all firm-year 
observations of firms switching back to local GAAP from IFRS based on Worldscope item 
“wc07536”, and zero otherwise). In addition, Log_TA stands for log of firm’s total assets 
(measured in US Dollar), ROE is return-on-equity, and LOSS is a dummy variable indicating 
firm-periods with negative net income. COUNTRY FE and YEAR FE represent country and year 
fixed effects. In all reported regression models, the standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust 
(White, 1980) and one-way clustered at the firm-level (Gow et al., 2010; Petersen 2009). It is 
important to note that both models (Models 3 and 4) do not claim to examine these market and 
coverage changes “causally”. Instead, they intend to provide descriptive evidence on the line of 
argument put forward in Section 2.2—with respect to potential Worldscope coverage changes 
and post regulation avoidance behavior in the setting of mandatory IFRS adoption—and 
complement our country-level analysis as discussed in Section 2.3.1.  
With respect to our first determinant model (Model 3), we estimate a classical 
survivorship bias by comparing firm characteristics across firms staying in the market (coverage) 
to firms leaving or entering the market (coverage). Assuming that database providers are biased 
towards large firms (e.g., Garcia Lara et al., 2006) and that especially small and poor performing 
firms are leaving the market—either forced by mergers or bankruptcies or voluntarily by 
choosing to delist or downlist (e.g., Leuz et al., 2008)—we expect to find positive (negative) and 
significant coefficient estimates on Log_TA and ROE (LOSS). Note, however, that this first 
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determinant model does not distinguish between different sources of coverage changes and thus 
rather provides an aggregated perspective on firm-level determinants in our setting.  
With respect to our second determinant model (Model 4), we assess firm-level differences 
between firms adopting IFRS and staying with this reporting standard compared to firms 
adopting IFRS in the first place but turning back to local GAAP afterwards (and thus leaving 
IFRS coverage as well). In contrast to our first and more general determinant model, this analysis 
explicitly considers coverage changes induced by the supply side of professional database 
providers (e.g., corporate events, such as delistings or downlisting). As noted earlier, Hitz and 
Mueller-Bloch (2016) already provide single-country evidence on this firm-level (going-gray) 
behavior. Recall that the authors examine firms that choose to downlist from the German EU-
regulated market to an exchange-regulated market, and thereby dispense with various compliance 
requirements, among them the mandate to prepare IFRS financial statements, but also supervision 
by the external enforcement mechanism, as stipulated by the EU IFRS regulations. Hitz and 
Mueller-Bloch (2016) find evidence that a substantial number of firms embraced this opportunity, 
in particular small, less profitable firms, and firms that had previously been censured by the 
enforcement mechanism for materially erroneous accounting. In line with these findings, we 
predict negative (positive) and significant coefficient estimates for Log_TA and ROE (LOSS). 
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Table 2.3 Changes in Worldscope Coverage and Firm-Level Characteristics 
Panel A. Survivorship Bias (constantly covered firms vs. firms that entry / exit the market) 
 Dependent Variable: SURVIVORSHIP 
(dummy variable indicating with 1 if the firm is constantly part of the sample during the respective sample period) 
 IFRS FIRMS NON-IFRS FIRMS 
 ALL 2001-2009 2005-2014 2005-2009 ALL 2001-2009 2005-2014 2005-2009 
 Column 1 Column 1 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 Column 6 Column 7 Column 8 
Log_TA 0.2333*** 0.1283*** 0.1057*** 0.0835*** 0.2316*** 0.1474*** 0.1254*** 0.1126*** 
 (38.78) (29.02) (26.15) (18.76) (45.97) (44.13) (42.57) (39.36) 
ROE -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001* -0.0000*** -0.0002 -0.0000 -0.0001 
 (-1.00) (-0.72) (-1.17) (-1.86) (-3.37) (-1.20) (-0.10) (-1.63) 
LOSS -0.2094*** -0.0356** -0.1397*** -0.1132*** -0.1446*** -0.0834*** -0.0947*** -0.0393*** 
 (-11.39) (-2.32) (-9.38) (-6.30) (-10.03) (-6.67) (-7.81) (-2.72) 
Year and Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered SE (firm) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 222897 115935 134032 69574 418767 210411 256431 128362 
Pseudo r2 0.2001 0.1037 0.0699 0.0597 0.2285 0.1586 0.1302 0.1301 
Additional Information         
# Survivorship firms 
(p.a.) 
2236 6806 8365 10957 4288 12250 14967 19072 
# Survivorship firm-
years 
44720 61254 83650 54785 85760 110250 149670 95360 
% Survivorship firm-
years 
20.06% 52.83% 62.41% 78.74% 20.48% 52.40% 58.37% 74.29% 
Panel B. IFRS-Local GAAP Switch (IFRS firms vs. firms that switch back to local GAAP) 
 Dependent Variable: GAAP_SWITCH 
(dummy variable indicating with 1 if the firm switches back from IFRS to local GAAP) 
















 Column 1 Column 1 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 Column 6 Column 7 Column 8 
Log_TA -0.2664*** -0.2895*** -0.3545*** -0.1956*** -0.1076*** -0.1449*** -0.2043*** -0.0411** 
 (-12.09) (-6.81) (-6.59) (-6.19) (-8.75) (-5.71) (-6.73) (-2.33) 
ROE 0.0001 -0.0014 0.0002*** 0.0063 0.0001 0.0031 0.0005 0.0000 
 (1.19) (-0.71) (2.71) (0.91) (0.28) (1.40) (0.47) (0.11) 
LOSS 0.2417*** 0.4058*** 0.1200 0.2315*** 0.0591 0.1651** 0.0283 0.0293 
 (4.98) (4.46) (1.31) (2.90) (1.49) (2.20) (0.39) (0.48) 
Year and Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered SE (firm) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 46670 16224 14543 15803 60949 16546 15607 28616 
Pseudo r2 0.3505 0.4336 0.3360 0.3333 0.3631 0.2426 0.1626 0.4913 
Additional Information         
# GAAP-switch firm-
year 
8274 1497 1545 5232 4428 851 829 2748 
% GAAP-switch f-y 17.73% 9.23% 10.62% 33.11% 7.27% 5.14% 5.31% 9.60% 
Notes: This table displays changes in the Worldscope database’s coverage (Panel A) and switches from IFRS to local GAAP by firms (Panel B). 
Table 2.3 reports the corresponding results. Specifically, we observe in Panel A of Table 2.3 that 
firm size as measured by log of total assets and profitability as measured by loss reporting obtain 
the expected signs and become highly significant in the respective models (e.g., t-values for log 
of total assets range between 18.76 and 45.97). This survivorship bias prevails in both the 
treatment group and the control group and does not vary with the underlying sample period. 
Corroborating these findings, Panel B of Table 2.3 documents—in line with Hitz and Mueller-
Bloch (2016)—that switching firms are significantly smaller and less profitable than their 
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counterparts. These findings are consistent across different time periods and different treatment 
groups.  
In sum, our first two analyses indicate a systematic and size-related selection effect across 
IFRS and non-IFRS countries in the course of mandatory IFRS adoption in 2005. From a 
statistical perspective, this in turn might suggest that—in line with Section 2.2—empirical 
research on mandatory IFRS adoption is prone to selection effects as the so far documented IFRS 
/ enforcement market benefits might be driven by the systematic variation in the underlying 
sample composition. 
2.4 Economic magnitude of selection effects around mandatory IFRS adoption 
Our third set of analyses addresses whether the predicted and documented selection effects are 
meaningful and sufficiently large to explain the outcomes of extant IFRS studies. For this 
purpose, we move on to fully replicate our benchmark study on mandatory IFRS adoption, 
namely, the study by CHL (2013).  
2.4.1 CHL (2013) replication 
We first start with all firm-quarter observations from countries included in the CHL (2013) 
sample for the period between 2001 and 2009. Following the selection steps as reported by CHL 
(2013), we yield a final (bid-ask spread) sample comprising 727,293 firm-quarter observations 
(in comparison, CHL (2013) report a final bid-ask spread sample of 613,752 firm-quarter 
observations).8 Although our sample size is slightly higher compared to CHL (2013), our 
descriptive analysis documents a similar sample pattern for our main dependent and independent 
variables. Specifically, we observe a median bid-ask spread of 0.011 (vs. 0.010), median lagged 
market value of 117.47 (vs. 126), median lagged share turnover of 0.001 (vs. 0.001), and median 
lagged return variability of 0.026 (vs. 0.025). Table 2.4 summarizes our main sample selection 
steps, provides a descriptive analysis of our main variables, and presents correlation coefficients 
between these variables. 
                                                 
8 Appendix 2.3 details country-level differences between our sample and the CHL (2013) sample. One reason for 
the sample difference might be the time lag in data download. As noted by Thomson Reuters, the database 
provider of Worldscope and Datastream, back-filing occasionally takes place over time in the process of 
increasing coverage.  
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Table 2.4 Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics for the CHL (2013) replication (Section 2.4) 
Panel A. Sample Selection 
Selection Criteria  Observations 
Start (All firm-quarters from Worldscope country lists of countries included in CHL 2013 from 2001-2009)  2,696,760 
Bid-ask data, liquidity data, or accounting standards data unavailable -1,815,796 880,964 
Firms following U.S.GAAP outside the United States -14,068 866,896 
Firms trading on unregulated markets  -13,955 852,941 
Firms with average market value below US$ 5 million -47,938 805,003 
Firms without fiscal year end data during mandatory IFRS adoption period -16,816 788,187 
Firm-quarters of IFRS adopters without IFRS adoption in the mandatory adoption period -235 787,952 
Truncation of all continuous variables (1% level) -60,390 727,562 
Obs. within country-quarters with less than five observations (Bid-Ask Spread Sample) -269 727,293 
Panel B. Descriptive Statistics 
 N Mean Std. Dev P1 P25 Median P75 P99 
Bid-Ask Spreadt 727,293 0.029 0.049 0.001 0.004 0.011 0.030 0.264 
Zero Returnst 713,571 0.253 0.227 0.030 0.077 0.167 0.364 0.908 
Price Impactt 720,139 4.462 18.413 0.000 0.012 0.128 1.276 91.827 
Liquidity Factort 660,793 0.072 1.481 -0.991 -0.797 -0.481 0.353 6.428 
Market Valuet-4 727,293 1050.988 5879.694 2.374 32.066 117.472 494.008 17113.236 
Share Turnovert-4 727,293 0.006 0.228 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.004 0.053 
Return Variabilityt-4 727,293 0.034 0.466 0.006 0.018 0.026 0.040 0.126 
Panel C. Pearson's Correlation Coefficients 
 
Zero Returns Price Impact Liquidity Factor Market Value Share Turnover Return Variability 
Bid-Ask Spreadt 0.6668 0.5987 0.9082 -0.0681 -0.0110 0.0200 
Zero Returnst 
 
0.4112 0.8260 -0.1021 -0.0137 0.0063 
Price Impactt 
  
0.7857 -0.0361 -0.0057 0.0134 
Liquidity Factort 
   
-0.0803 -0.0122 0.0160 
Market Valuet-4 
    
-0.0014 -0.0000 
Share Turnovert-4 
     
0.0004 
Notes: Bid-Ask Spread is the quarterly median quoted spread (i.e., the difference between bid and ask price scaled by the mid-point calculated at the end of each trading day). Zero Returns is the fraction 
of trading days without daily stock returns out of all potential trading days in a given quarter. Price Impact is the quarterly median of the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure (i.e., daily absolute stock 
return divided by the stock’s trading volume in US$).The Liquidity Factor represents an aggregation of the above three liquidity measures. It equals the scores of a single factor extracted from a factor 
analysis of Bid-Ask Spread, Zero Returns, and Price Impact. Market Value is market capitalization measured at the end of the quarter. Share Turnover represents the quarterly median of the daily 
turnover (i.e., trading volume in US$ scaled by market value at the end of each trading day). Return Variability is the standard deviation of daily stock returns in a given quarter. We report Market Value, 
Share Turnover, and Return Variability for the Bid-Ask Spread sample. All correlation coefficients are significant at the 1% level except for the coefficients between Market Value and Share Turnover, 
Market Value and Return Variability, and Share Turnover and Return Variability. All variables are truncated at the 1st and 99th percentile. The subscripts t and t-4 indicate the calendar quarters of 
variable measurement. 
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To establish meaningful outcome differences, we first replicate the main DiD liquidity analysis 
by CHL (2013, pp. 162-163, Table 3). In line with the original DiD models, we estimate the 
following firm-quarter level regression models for all available observations from 54 IFRS and 
non-IFRS countries between 2001 and 2009, whereas Model (7) constitutes the main model: 
LnBAit =  γ1 + γ2IFRSit + ∑ γ3CONTROLSit + ∑ γ4FE + ε (5) 
LnBAit =  γ1 + γ2IFRS_EUit + γ3IFRS_nonEUit + ∑ γ4CONTROLSit + ∑ γ5FE + ε (6) 
LnBAit =  γ1 + γ2IFRS_EU_ENFit + γ3IFRS_EU_nonENFit + γ4IFRS_nonEUit + ∑ γ5CONTROLSit
+ ∑ γ6FE + ε 
(7) 
Where LnBA represents log of bid-ask spreads (as quarterly median quoted bid-ask spreads), and 
IFRS, IFRS_EU, IFRS_nonEU, IFRS_EU_ENF, IFRS_EU_nonENF stand for different 
interaction terms as defined in CHL (2013) (see CHL, 2013, pp. 155 ff). CONTROLS comprises 
log of market value, log of return variability, and log of share turnover (all three variables lagged 
by a four quarter period). FIXED_EFFECTS stands for different fixed effects. In line with CHL 
(2013), we consider country, industry, and different quarter-year fixed effect specifications. 
These fixed effects also control for the underlying main effects (treatment group and post 
effects). Likewise, we employ robust standard errors which are two-way clustered at country and 
quarter level. Following CHL (2013), we expect that liquidity effects upon mandatory IFRS 
adoption are most pronounced for firms from EU countries with concurrent enforcement 
regulation in 2005 (i.e., a significant and negative coefficient estimate on IFRS_EU_ENF in 
Model (7)).  
Table 2.5 summarizes the respective findings. In particular, we observe that our different 
DiD model specifications replicate and reproduce the liquidity findings of CHL (2013). 
Specifically, IFRS_EU and, more importantly, IFRS_EU_ENF turn out to be significant across 
the different model specifications (at a one percent level). It is worth to note that most of the 
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coefficient estimates and significance levels across the different IFRS treatment as well as control 
variables are fairly comparable with the findings documented in CHL (2013, p. 162, Table 3).
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Table 2.5 Liquidity Effects around mandatory IFRS Adoption and Selection Effects: Replication of CHL (2013) 
 Dependent Variable: Ln(Bid-Ask Spread) 
 
Global IFRS EU vs. non-EU IFRS 
IFRS in EU with vs. without bundled Δ 
enforcement 














 Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 Column 6 Column 7 
(1) IFRS -0.0052       
 (-0.05)       
(2) IFRSEU  -0.2242*** -0.2326*** -0.2655*** -0.2530***   
  (-3.33) (-3.43) (-3.89) (-5.49)   
(3) IFRSEU_ENF      -0.3988*** -0.3226*** 
      (-4.00) (-4.14) 
(4) IFRSEU_nonENF      -0.0272 -0.1755** 
      (-0.26) (-2.41) 
(5) IFRSnonEU  0.2464** 0.2464** 0.0902** 0.2432** 0.2464** 0.0902** 
  (2.39) (2.39) (1.97) (2.31) (2.39) (1.97) 
Ln(Market Valuet-4) -0.3525*** -0.3519*** -0.3519*** -0.3522*** -0.3473*** -0.3520*** -0.3521*** 
 (-25.98) (-25.68) (-25.70) (-26.60) (-22.85) (-25.68) (-26.59) 
Ln(Return Variabilityt-4) -0.3422*** -0.3427*** -0.3428*** -0.3468*** -0.3125*** -0.3429*** -0.3468*** 
 (-13.35) (-13.38) (-13.39) (-13.33) (-22.94) (-13.40) (-13.33) 
Ln(Share Turnovert-4) 0.4051*** 0.4033*** 0.4032*** 0.3899*** 0.3447*** 0.4044*** 0.3903*** 
 (13.40) (13.21) (13.19) (13.09) (11.41) (13.47) (13.17) 
MAD   -0.1958***     
   (-4.12)     
TPD   -0.2512**     
   (-2.03)     
Country & industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter-year FE Global & IFRS 
countries 
Global, IFRS & 
EU countries 
Global, IFRS & 
EU countries 
For each country 
separately 
IFRS & EU 
countries 
Global, IFRS & 
EU countries 
For each country 
separately 
Adj. R-squared 0.7536 0.7558 0.7561 0.7823 0.7244 0.7565 0.7823 
Observations 727293 727293 727293 727293 245044 727293 727293 
F-test for differences:   (2) vs. (5) (2) vs. (5) (2) vs. (5) (2) vs. (5) (3) vs. (4) (3) vs. (4) 
[p-value]  [0.0002] [0.0001] [0.0000] [0.0001] [0.0148] [0.1216] 
TG (self) Selection 1 (TGSE1) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
TG (sample) Selection 2 (TGSE2) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CG Selection (CGSE) No No No No No No No 
Notes: This table displays regression results from the replication of Christensen et al. (2013, Table 3, Panel A). All variables and fixed effects are specified in accordance with CHL (2013). Specifically, 
IFRS is an indicator variable for firm-quarters with IFRS reporting that equals ‘1’ in each calendar quarter following the first fiscal-year end after IFRS became mandatory in the respective country. We 
identify firms without IFRS adoption after the mandate by Worldscope item “accounting standards followed” (wc07536). Following CHL (2013), we partition the IFRS observations using non-
overlapping indicator variables: For Column 2 to Column 5, we distinguish between IFRS firms from EU countries (IFRS_EU) and IFRS firms from outside the EU (IFRS_nonEU). For Column 6 and 7, 
we further distinguish between firms from EU countries with concurrent IFRS adoption and substantive enforcement changes (IFRS_EU_ENF), and firms from EU countries without concurrent 
enforcement changes (IFRS_EU_nonENF). MAD is an indicator variable indicating adoption of the Market Abuse Directive (MAD) in a given firm-quarter. TPD is an indicator variable indicating 
adoption of the Transparency Directive (TPD) in a given firm-quarter. For a description of the remaining variables see Table 2.4. As in CHL (2013), the regression models include country-, Campbell 
(1996) industry-, and quarter-year-fixed effects (globally, for IFRS countries, EU countries, or each country separately, as indicated). We use standard errors clustered by country and calendar quarter. 
We further report p-values from Wald tests measuring the statistical significance of the differences across coefficients on the IFRS indicator variables. We indicate which of the selection effects discussed 
in this paper are present in which model specification. ***, *, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed). 
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In addition to the replication body of the table, we indicate at the bottom of the table whether we 
expect our selection effects to be present in the respective CHL (2013) model specifications. 
Given the specific CHL fixed effect structure and the unbalanced sample approach, we expect the 
CHL (2013) research design—across all seven model specifications—to be prone to our two-fold 
treatment group selection effect. In essence, their separate time fixed effect structure for non-
IFRS and IFRS countries effectively controls for any control group selection effects due to 
systematic changes in the database coverage. However, CHL’s research design comprising 
different fixed effect specifications fails to address our treatment sample selection effect as well 
as our treatment self selection effect.  
With respect to the former, CHL’s separate time fixed effect specifications for IFRS and 
non-IFRS countries (i.e., two-quarter-year trends, three-quarter-year trends, and within country 
estimation) do not (fully) control for the average liquidity variation in the underlying treatment 
group (or underlying country-level treatment groups). The reason is that CHL (2013) employ 
non-IFRS adopters in IFRS countries as control firms. This research design specification 
generates treatment and control group variation within IFRS countries. Consequently, any 
correlated omitted treatment-level variation within a specific quarter-year—for example, a 
treatment-country-level increase in liquidity due to systematic sample changes in the course of 
opt-outs of small and less liquid IFRS treatment firms in a specific post-IFRS quarter-year (i.e., 
treatment sample selection effect)—is not absorbed by CHL’s fixed effect structure.  
With respect to the latter, we do not expect the CHL’s research design to be useful to 
address our treatment self selection effect. In fact, we expect—as already detailed in Section 
2.2—this self selection effect to be a classical correlated omitted variable in the setting of 
mandatory IFRS adoption which standard econometric techniques are unable to address.  
2.4.2 CHL (2013) setting, selection effects, and Selection Exposure Index 
To examine the magnitude of our treatment group selection effects in the CHL (2013) setting, we 
start off by developing an empirical construct that is likely to reflect the exposure to these 
selection effects. In essence, we argue that systematic country-level changes in the number of 
firms around mandatory IFRS adoption—as documented in Figure 2.1 (Section 2.1)—should in 
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principle reflect country-level exposure to systematic sample changes and self selection behavior. 
In this subsection, we thus delineate a country-level variable (GROWTH RANK) capturing 
changes in the number of firms around mandatory IFRS adoption. Based on that variable, we 
further estimate different country-level indices—the Selection Exposure Index (SEI) and four 
Abnormal Selection Exposure Indices (ASEI_1 to ASEI_4)—which we deem to be suitable to 
extend the CHL (2013) research design. Table 2.6 summarizes this empirical approach and 
details each of our selection exposure indices. 
Table 2.6 CHL (2013) Sample, Selection Effects, and the (Abnormal) Selection Exposure Index 
Panel A. Country-quarter-level DiD and CHL country clusters 
Sample Period: 2001-2009 
Dependent Variable: zCOUNT_DATA  
(#firms per year and quarter, standardized over Q42005 value) 
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 
(1) IFRSPOST -0.1864**   
 (-2.51)   
(2) IFRS_EUPOST  -0.2242***  
  (-2.71)  
(3) IFRS_nonEUPOST  -0.1040 -0.1044 
  (-1.38) (-1.38) 
(4) IFRS_EU-ENFPOST   -0.2921*** 
   (-3.23) 
(5) IFRS_EU-nonENFPOST   -0.1974** 
   (-2.08) 
F-test for Differences  (2) vs. (3) (3) vs. (4) 
[p-value]  [0.0918] [0.0170] 
   (4) vs. (5) 
   [0.3391] 
Year-Quarter & Country FE Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered SE (country) Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.4612 0.4715 0.4754 
Observations 1380 1380 1380 
Panel B. Descriptive Analysis: Change in number of firms (GROWTH RANK) and Country-level Indicator 
Variables 
N=52 Mean SD No. 1 2 3 4 5 
GROWTH RANK 25.83 15.59 1 1     
(p-value)    -     
GDP 844.56 1939.28 2 -0.2289 1    
(p-value)    (0.1027) -    
RQI 0.86 0.77 3 -0.3176 0.0505 1   
(p-value)    (0.0218) (0.7224) -   
DEVC 0.54 0.50 4 -0.4138 0.3316 0.7699 1  
(p-value)    (0.0023) (0.0163) (0.000) -  
COMMLAW 0.27 0.45 5 -0.1286 0.0376 0.2095 0.2141 1 
(p-value)    (0.3637) (0.7915) (0.1361) (0.1275) - 
VOIFRS 391.88 842.58 6 -0.354 0.3726 0.2574 0.2945 -0.006 
(p-value)    (0.01) (0.0065) (0.0654) (0.0341) (0.9661) 





Dependent Variable: GROWTH RANK 
(Country-level variable based on changes in number of firms between IFRS adoption—or 2005 for non-IFRS control 
countries—and the year 2009 which presents the sample end of CHL 2013) 
IFRS and non-IFRS countries (CHL 2013) IFRS IFRS EU 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
GDP -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
 (-0.70) (-0.36) (-0.28) (-0.17) (-1.33) (-1.21) 
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Table 2.6 (continued) 
RQI -5.9557* -0.1824 -0.1911 -0.4076 1.4192 -27.6317* 
 (-1.90) (-0.04) (-0.04) (-0.08) (0.15) (-1.95) 
DEVC  -11.7811 -11.5350 -9.6716 -4.6084 6.3226 
  (-1.59) (-1.59) (-1.31) (-0.40) (0.48) 
COMMLAW   -1.4513 -2.9379 -3.5965 -2.4139 
   (-0.27) (-0.52) (-0.56) (-0.28) 
VOIFRS    -0.0034* -0.0012 -0.0014 
    (-1.96) (-0.54) (-0.39) 
Pseudo r2 0.0116 0.0189 0.0191 0.0231 0.0108 0.0471 
Observations 52 52 52 52 33 22 
Est. residuals ASEI_1 ASEI_2 ASEI_3 ASEI_4 - - 
Panel D. Country-level Overview of Selection Exposure Indices 
  Different specifications of the Selection Exposure Index Common country-level Determinants 
 Growth 
rank 
SEI ASEI_1 ASEI_2 ASEI_3 ASEI_4 GDP ‘05 RQI ‘05 DEV COMML VOIFRS 
  IFRS EU ENF COUNTRIES  
Finland 8 -8 12.7 12.3 12.7 14.4 204 1.76 1 0 205 
Germany 14 -14 7.1 5.7 6.2 -2.7 2861 1.42 1 0 3439 
Iceland 42 -42 -20.6 -21.7 -21.2 -18.9 17 1.66 1 0 0 
Netherl. 3 -3 17.8 17.2 17.7 19.4 679 1.70 1 0 194 
Norway 32 -32 -9.6 -11.7 -11.2 -9.1 309 1.47 1 0 94 
UK 12 -12 8.4 7.7 6.9 7.2 2419 1.58 1 1 217 
Median 13 -13 7.7 6.7 6.6 2.3 494 1.62 1.00 0.00 199.50 
 IFRS EU NON-ENF COUNTRIES 
Austria 21 -21 0.8 -0.7 -0.2 -0.6 315 1.56 1 0 816 
Belgium 19 -19 4.4 1.3 1.8 1.9 387 1.29 1 0 707 
Denmark 6 -6 15.0 14.3 14.7 14.9 265 1.71 1 0 657 
Estonia 39 -39 -16.1 -6.8 -6.6 -6.1 14 1.41 0 0 0 
France 5 -5 18.4 14.9 15.4 14.4 2204 1.10 1 0 1101 
Greece 52 -52 -26.1 -31.6 -31.1 -28.6 248 0.88 1 0 0 
Hungary 1 -1 23.6 31.2 31.4 30.9 113 1.12 0 0 342 
Ireland 7 -7 14.7 13.3 12.3 13.2 211 1.59 1 1 0 
Italy 22 -22 2.9 -2.0 -1.4 -9.8 1853 0.89 1 0 3264 
Lithuania 27 -27 -2.3 5.2 5.4 6.0 26 1.11 0 0 0 
Luxemb. 2 -2 18.6 18.3 18.8 21.1 37 1.79 1 0 0 
Poland 34 -34 -7.6 -1.8 -1.6 -1.6 304 0.79 0 0 205 
Portugal 17 -17 7.1 3.4 3.9 5.9 197 1.20 1 0 121 
Slovenia 40 -40 -13.5 -7.7 -7.5 -6.8 36 0.81 0 0 0 
Spain 13 -13 10.3 7.1 7.6 10.2 1157 1.23 1 0 0 
Sweden 23 -23 -1.0 -2.7 -2.2 -0.5 389 1.53 1 0 181 
Median 20 -20 3.6 2.4 2.8 3.9 256 1.22 1.00 0.00 151.00 
 IFRS NON-EU COUNTRIES 
Abu Dhabi 49 -49 -20.3 -16.7 -16.5 -15.7 181 0.42 0 0 0 
Australia 26 -26 -4.8 -5.8 -6.8 -7.6 693 1.62 1 1 523 
Hong K. 36 -36 -15.7 -15.7 -16.7 -17.4 182 1.84 1 1 460 
Israel 16 -16 10.2 4.5 3.5 4.5 143 0.85 1 1 8 
New Zeal. 9 -9 12.3 11.3 10.3 11.2 115 1.68 1 1 0 
Pakistan 1 -1 33.8 31.5 30.3 29.6 110 -0.59 0 1 61 
Philippines 29 -29 2.6 3.4 3.6 4.4 103 -0.05 0 0 36 
Singapore 38 -38 -17.5 -17.7 -18.7 -20.5 127 1.80 1 1 789 
South Afr. 28 -28 0.3 4.3 3.1 1.4 258 0.48 0 1 277 
Switzerl. 11 -11 11.3 9.3 9.8 0.1 408 1.47 1 0 3578 
Turkey 15 -15 15.0 17.3 17.5 11.6 483 0.18 0 0 2019 
Median 26 -26 2.6 4.3 3.5 1.4 181 0.85 1.00 1.00 277.00 
 NON-IFRS COUNTRIES 
Argentina 48 -48 -13.0 -15.5 -15.3 -14.3 221 -0.64 0 0 0 
Brazil 35 -35 -4.5 -2.8 -2.5 -1.6 892 0.05 0 0 0 
Canada 53 -53 -31.6 -32.9 -33.9 -33.0 1169 1.54 1 1 22 
Channel 
Is. 45 -45 - - - - 9 - 1 1 0 
Chile 51 -51 -28.3 -18.9 -18.6 -18.1 124 1.43 0 0 0 
China 33 -33 -1.5 -1.1 -0.8 -1.9 2269 -0.26 0 0 649 
Egypt 37 -37 -3.0 -4.5 -4.3 -3.7 90 -0.46 0 0 108 
India 30 -30 2.1 2.3 1.1 0.5 834 -0.21 0 1 0 
Indonesia 18 -18 16.0 14.5 14.7 15.6 286 -0.48 0 0 0 
Japan 4 -4 17.5 15.3 15.9 18.7 4572 1.17 1 0 35 
Malaysia 10 -10 18.1 10.5 9.5 10.6 144 0.52 1 1 0 
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Table 2.6 (continued) 
Mexico 20 -20 8.9 12.2 12.4 13.3 866 0.32 0 0 0 
Morocco 47 -47 -13.7 -14.5 -14.3 -13.4 62 -0.33 0 0 0 
Qatar 46 -46 -16.7 -13.6 -13.4 -12.7 45 0.33 0 0 0 
Russia 41 -41 -8.2 -8.7 -8.4 -8.3 764 -0.33 0 0 240 
Saudi Ar. 43 -43 -12.0 -10.7 -10.4 -9.6 328 0.02 0 0 0 
S. Korea 31 -31 -4.9 -10.7 -10.2 -7.6 898 0.79 1 0 0 
Sri Lanka 50 -50 -17.4 -17.5 -17.3 -16.4 24 -0.21 0 0 0 
Taiwan 44 -44 - - - - - 1.08 0 0 0 
Thailand 24 -24 4.8 8.3 7.1 6.3 189 0.41 0 1 30 
US 25 -25 -11.1 -8.0 -8.4 -6.3 13100 1.54 1 1 0 
Median 37 -37 -4.9 -8.0 -8.4 -6.3 307 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Notes: This table displays statistics on sample selection effects, and the (Abnormal) Selection Exposure Index. Panel A displays results from a 
regression of the number of firms on different country-clusters. zCOUNT_DATA is the number of firms per year and quarter, standardized over 
the respective value in the 4th quarter of 2005. IFRS, IFRS_EU, IFRS_nonEU, IFRS_EU-ENF, and IFRS_EU-nonENF are indicator variables 
indicating that a country falls in the respective CHL (2013) country-cluster. Panel B displays descriptive statistics on the change in number of 
firms and country-level variables. GROWTH_RANK represents the rank of a country in a ranking of the percentage change in listed firms for 52 
sample countries. GDP is the gross domestic product in billion US dollar of a given country in 2005 (Source: Worldbank). RQI equals the 
regulatory quality index in 2003 of a given country as measured by Kaufmann et al. (2009). DEVC indicates a country with a developed capital 
market. COMMLAW indicates a country with common law as opposed to code law (both measures: Brown et al. (2014). VOLIFRS equals the 
number of voluntary IFRS adopters in a given country (see CHL 2013). Panel C displays the results of a determinant analysis of 52 sample 
countries’ ‘GROWTH_RANK’. The residuals from Model 1 to 4 represent different specifications of a measure for abnormal exposure to sample 
selection (ASE_I 1 to ASE_I 4). Panel D displays the values of different specifications of the Selection Exposure Index (SEI) for the sample 
countries. SEI equals GROWTH_RANK multiplied with (-1). ASEI_1 to ASEI_4 equal the inverse residuals from the regression models 1 to 4 in 
Panel C. 
2.4.2.1 CHL (2013) setting and changes in the number of firms. 
To validate this proposed empirical approach, we first revisit the sample patterns as documented 
in Figure 2.1 (Section 2.1) in the light of the CHL (2013) sample selection. Note that Figure 2.1 
and the corresponding analyses in Section 2.3 are based on a sample selection process comprising 
firm-year level observations without any substantial sample reduction due to specific data 
requirements.9 In contrast and as already outlined in Table 4, CHL (2013) sample selection 
includes, among other things, firm-quarter-year level observations, data requirements with 
respect to their main outcome variable, liquidity, and their control variables (e.g., missing values 
and truncation), as well as country-level requirements (e.g., country-quarter with at least five 
observations). Consequently and similar to Table 2.2 (Section 2.3), we re-estimate the following 
country-level DiD analysis with quarter-year and country fixed effects within the CHL (2013) 
liquidity setting: 
zCOUNT_DATAit =  γ1 + γ2IFRS_nonEU × POSTit + γ3IFRS_EU_ENF × POSTit
+ γ4IFRS_EU_nonENF × POSTit + γ5COUNTRY FE + γ6QUARTER × YEAR FE + ε (8) 
                                                 
9 Minimum data requirements in Worldscope: ISIN (wc06008), fiscal year (wc05350), country of firm domicile 
(wc06026), accounting standard followed (wc07536), total assets (wc02999), book value of equity (wc03501), 
and net income (wc01751). 
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In particular, we use zCOUNT_DATA as our dependent variable, which measures the relative 
change in number of firms per quarter-year and country (i.e., zCOUNT_DATA is scaled by the 
respective absolute values on total number of listed firms per country in Q4 2005). In addition, 
IFRS_nonEU, IFRS_EU_ENF, IFRS_EU_nonENF reflect the different country-clusters as 
defined in CHL (2013) (see Appendix 2.2 for further information). COUNTRY FE and 
QUARTER×YEAR FE represent country and quarter-year fixed effects. This fixed-effect 
structure controls for the underlying main effects of the DiD regression as well (i.e., POST and 
IFRS Treatment group). In all reported regression models, the standard errors are 
heteroskedasticity robust (White 1980) and one-way clustered at the country-level (Gow et al. 
2010; Petersen 2009).  
Panel A of Table 2.6 documents the main findings. Corroborating Figure 2.1 and Table 
2.2, we observe that the IFRS, IFRS_EU, and IFRS_EU_ENF treatment groups in the different 
model specifications exhibit a significant and relative decline in the sample size in the period 
after 2005. More importantly, we further observe that these systematic sample changes are most 
pronounced for the IFRS_EU_ENF countries (Column 3). Overall, these findings highlight 
(again) a systematic decline in the number of listed firms that adopt IFRS (especially in EU 
countries with bundled enforcement regulation) in the CHL (2013) liquidity setting.10 
2.4.2.2 CHL (2013) setting, growth rank and selection exposure indices. 
As we observe similar systematic sample changes around mandatory IFRS adoption in the CHL 
(2013) setting, compared to our previous firm-year analyses in Sections 2.1 and 2.3 (e.g., Figure 
2.1), we proceed with estimating a country-level variable capturing the severeness of these 
sample changes. In doing so, we rank all 54 CHL (2013) countries along their sample changes in 
the CHL (2013) post-IFRS period (i.e., the period between IFRS adoption, or the end of 2005 in 
the case of a control country, and the end of the sample period in 2009). We label the resulting 
variable as GROWTH RANK (with smaller ranks for higher sample declines). Panel D of Table 
2.6 outlines the distribution of this rank variable across the different countries. In addition, Panels 
B and C of Table 2.6 document univariate and multivariate correlations between this country-
level rank variable and other country-level variables which are commonly used in the 
                                                 
10 Appendix 2.4 outlines the distribution of number of listed firms across CHL country clusters within the CHL 
setting. 
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(accounting) literature to assess the market structure / quality of the respective countries. For 
example, Panel B of Table 2.6 suggests that our rank variable GROWTH RANK negatively 
correlates with Kaufman’s regulatory quality index (RQI), with the country’s state of 
development (DEVC), as well as with the presumably firm-level incentives to voluntarily adopt 
IFRS (VOIFRS). At face value, this implies that IFRS countries with high RQI, high DEVC, and 
high VOIFRS are thus more likely to observe severe sample declines (and with that a higher 
selection exposure) in the post-IFRS adoption period.  
  To empirically exploit our GROWTH RANK variable in the CHL (2013) setting, we 
delineate different selection exposure indices from this rank variable. First, we take the inverse of 
GROWTH RANK as our primary measure of country-level selection exposure, SELECTION 
EXPOSURE INDEX (SEI). Thus, higher values of SEI indicate higher exposure to our expected 
selection effects. In addition, we estimate four different abnormal selection indices to control for 
sample changes which are rather driven by other market characteristics such as high regulatory 
quality. To that end, we explicitly attempt to disentangle our selection exposure index from pre-
existing differences in the legal system, the regulatory quality of the respective countries, and 
other related market characteristics. This is important as empirical studies, which aim to test 
benefits of IFRS adoption contingent on country-level partitioning variables, have to ensure that 
the documented variation in the treatment effect is incremental to previously documented effects 
(Barth and Israeli, 2013). Thus, we take the residuals of the regression models in Columns 1 to 4 
in Panel C of Table 2.6—with GROWTH RANK as the dependent variable and different country-
level variables such as Kaufman’s regulatory quality index (RQI) as independent variables—as 
our abnormal proxies for the selection exposure (ASEI_1 to ASEI_4). Again, for the sake of 
readability, we take the inverse of the residuals to derive exposure indices that indicate higher 
selection exposure risk with higher values.  
Panel D of Table 2.6 summarizes all country-level variables, including our different 
selection indices, across all 54 CHL (2013) countries. In line with the empirical motivation of our 
estimation approach (Figure 2.1) and the line of argument put forward in Section 2.2, we observe 
that each of our selection exposure indices is increasing with the regulatory intensity within the 
mandatory IFRS adoption setting. In other words, IFRS_EU_ENF countries appear to have on 
average the highest selection exposure indices, and thus the highest exposure risk to our selection 
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effects, followed by countries from the IFRS_EU_nonENF, and IFRS_nonEU clusters. It is also 
interesting to note—on a rather anecdotal level—that the only non-IFRS control country with a 
constantly high selection exposure index is Japan (e.g., SEIJapan = –4 vs. SEINon-IFRS_COUNTRIES = –
37) which was affected by comprehensive enforcement changes in 2005 and for which CHL 
(2013, p. 170, Table 6) document significant liquidity effects in the post 2005 period as well.   
2.4.3 CHL (2013) extension and (Abnormal) Selection Exposure Index 
To finally assess the magnitude of our two-fold treatment selection effect within the CHL (2013) 
liquidity setting, we extend the original models proposed by CHL (2013) and introduce additional 
interaction terms based on our different selection exposure indices (starting with our baseline 
SELECTION EXPOSURE INDEX – SEI). Specifically, we estimate the following firm-quarter 
level regression models for all available observations from 54 IFRS and non-IFRS countries 
between 2001 and 2009: 
LnBAit =  γ1 + γ2𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆_𝑆𝐸𝐼_𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑖𝑡 + γ3𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆_𝑆𝐸𝐼_𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑡 + ∑ γ4CONTROLSit + ∑ γ5FE + ε (9) 
LnBAit =  γ1 + γ2𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆_𝐸𝑈_𝑆𝐸𝐼_𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑖𝑡 + γ3𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆_𝐸𝑈_𝑆𝐸𝐼_𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑡 + γ4IFRS_nonEUit
+ ∑ γ5CONTROLSit + ∑ γ6FE + ε (10) 
LnBAit =  γ1 + γ2𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆_𝐸𝑈_𝐸𝑛𝑓_𝑆𝐸𝐼_𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑖𝑡 + γ3𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆_𝐸𝑈_𝐸𝑛𝑓_𝑆𝐸𝐼_𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑡 + γ4IFRS_EU_nonEnfit
+ γ5IFRS_nonEUit + ∑ γ6CONTROLSit + ∑ γ7FE + ε (11) 
Where LnBA, IFRS_nonEU, IFRS_EU_nonENF, CONTROLS, and FIXED EFFECTS are 
defined as for the original CHL models (Models 5 to 7). IFRS_SEI_High and IFRS_SEI_Low are 
two non-overlapping variables indicating a high versus low SELECTION EXPOSURE INDEX 
within the IFRS treatment group (based on median sample splits). In the same logic, 
IFRS_EU_SEI_High and IFRS_EU_SEI_Low (IFRS_EU_Enf_SEI_High and IFRS_EU_Enf_-
SEI_Low) represent non-overlapping variables indicating a high versus low SELECTION 
EXPOSURE INDEX in the IFRS_EU treatment group (IFRS_EU_Enf treatment group). In line 
with the treatment selection effects as discussed in Section 2.2, we expect to observe higher 
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liquidity benefits for treatment groups with a high SELECTION EXPOSURE INDEX, and thus 
with a high exposure risk to our selection effects. Table 2.7 summarizes the respective findings. 
Panel A of Table 2.7 provides the extended CHL (2013) DiD analysis based on our baseline 
selection proxy, SEI, whereas Panels B to E re-estimate these extended CHL analyses for each of 
our abnormal selection exposure index (i.e., ASEI_1 to ASEI_4).  
Across all panels and specifications, we observe that our additional interaction terms 
based on the different selection exposure indices explain the CHL (2013) liquidity results above 
and beyond the IFRS_EU and IFRS_EU_ENF variation. Specifically, we observe that treatment 
groups with a high (ABNORMAL) SELECTION EXPOSURE INDEX (e.g., “_SEIHigh” or 
“ASEIHigh”) experience significantly higher liquidity benefits in the course of mandatory IFRS 
adoption than their counterparts (e.g., treatment groups with “_SEILow” or “ASEILow”). These 
results are highly consistent with t-values on the different “_(A)SEIHigh” coefficient estimates 
ranging between –1.74 (for the mere IFRS disaggregation) and –10.51 (for the IFRS_EU_ENF 
disaggregation). Overall, these findings suggest that our two-fold treatment selection effect is 
indeed sufficiently large to moderate the liquidity findings as provided by CHL (2013). 
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Table 2.7 Liquidity Effects around mandatory IFRS Adoption and the (Abnormal) Selection Exposure Index: Extension of CHL (2013) 
Panel A. CHL (2013) Liquidity Findings and Selection Exposure Index (SEI) 
 Dependent Variable: Ln(Bid-Ask Spread) 
 High vs. low Selection Exposure Index (SEI) 
Countries with high selection exposure (high sample decline) vs. countries with low selection exposure (low sample decline) 
 
Global IFRS EU vs. non-EU IFRS 
IFRS in EU with vs. without bundled Δ 
enforcement 














 Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 Column 6 Column 7 
(1) IFRS_SEIHigh -0.1918*       
 (-1.74)       
(2) IFRS_SEILow 0.2419***       
 (2.81)       
(3) IFRSEU_ SEIHigh  -0.3061*** -0.3041*** -0.2877*** -0.3355***   
  (-4.01) (-4.00) (-4.12) (-5.88)   
(4) IFRSEU_ SEILow  0.0235 -0.0058 -0.1354* -0.0058   
  (0.22) (-0.07) (-1.68) (-0.05)   
(5) IFRSEU_ENF_ SEIHigh      -0.5234*** -0.3874*** 
      (-7.85) (-10.51) 
(6) IFRSEU_ENF_ SEILow      -0.1281* -0.1655*** 
      (-1.73) (-3.08) 
(7) IFRSnonEU   0.2464** 0.2464** 0.0902** 0.2431** 0.2464** 0.0902** 
  (2.39) (2.39) (1.97) (2.31) (2.39) (1.97) 
(8) IFRSEU_nonENF      -0.0275 -0.1754** 
      (-0.26) (-2.41) 
Ln(Market Valuet-4) -0.3521*** -0.3519*** -0.3519*** -0.3521*** -0.3471*** -0.3520*** -0.3522*** 
 (-25.81) (-25.66) (-25.67) (-26.59) (-22.83) (-25.66) (-26.58) 
Ln(Return Variabilityt-4) -0.3423*** -0.3427*** -0.3428*** -0.3468*** -0.3122*** -0.3426*** -0.3467*** 
 (-13.36) (-13.38) (-13.39) (-13.33) (-23.27) (-13.37) (-13.32) 
Ln(Share Turnovert-4) 0.4046*** 0.4039*** 0.4038*** 0.3900*** 0.3463*** 0.4053*** 0.3907*** 
 (13.37) (13.35) (13.33) (13.12) (11.77) (13.65) (13.23) 
MAD   -0.2025***     
   (-3.60)     
TPD   -0.1770**     
   (-2.30)     
Country & industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter-year FE Global & IFRS 
countries 
Global, IFRS & 
EU countries 
Global, IFRS & 
EU countries 
For each country 
separately 
IFRS & EU 
countries 
Global, IFRS & 
EU countries 
For each country 
separately 
Adj. R-squared 0.7551 0.7563 0.7564 0.7823 0.7261 0.7569 0.7823 
Observations 727293 727293 727293 727293 245044 727293 727293 
F-test for differences:  (1) vs. (2) (3) vs. (4) (3) vs. (4) (3) vs. (4) (3) vs. (4) (5) vs. (6) (5) vs. (6) 
[p-value] [0.0029] [0.0338] [0.0233] [0.1221] [0.0323] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
TG (self) Selection 1 (TGSE1) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
TG (sample) Selection 2 (TGSE2) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CG Selection (CGSE) No No No No No No No 
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Table 2.7 (continued) 
Panel B. CHL (2013) Liquidity Findings and High vs. Low Abnormal Selection Exposure Index (ASEI_1) 
 Dependent Variable: Ln(Bid-Ask Spread) 
 Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 Column 6 Column 7 
(1) IFRS_ASEI_1High -0.1918*       
 (-1.74)       
(2) IFRS_ ASEI_1Low 0.2419***       
 (2.81)       
(3) IFRSEU_ ASEI_1High  -0.3061*** -0.3041*** -0.2877*** -0.3355***   
  (-4.01) (-4.00) (-4.12) (-5.88)   
(4) IFRSEU_ ASEI_1Low  0.0235 -0.0058 -0.1354* -0.0058   
  (0.22) (-0.07) (-1.68) (-0.05)   
(5) IFRSEU_ENF_ ASEI_1High      -0.5234*** -0.3874*** 
      (-7.85) (-10.51) 
(6) IFRSEU_ENF_ ASEI_1Low      -0.1281* -0.1655*** 
      (-1.73) (-3.08) 
(7) IFRSnonEU   0.2464** 0.2464** 0.0902** 0.2431** 0.2464** 0.0902** 
  (2.39) (2.39) (1.97) (2.31) (2.39) (1.97) 
(8) IFRSEU_nonENF      -0.0275 -0.1754** 
      (-0.26) (-2.41) 
Control variables, country & industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter-year FE Global & IFRS  Global, IFRS & 
EU  
Global, IFRS & 
EU  
Country-level IFRS & EU  Global, IFRS & 
EU  
Country-level 
Adj. R-squared 0.7551 0.7563 0.7564 0.7823 0.7261 0.7569 0.7823 
Observations 727293 727293 727293 727293 245044 727293 727293 
Panel C. CHL (2013) Liquidity Findings and High vs. Low Abnormal Selection Exposure Index (ASEI_2) 
 Dependent Variable: Ln(Bid-Ask Spread) 
 Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 Column 6 Column 7 
(1) IFRS_ASEI_2High -0.2122*       
 (-1.89)       
(2) IFRS_ ASEI_2Low 0.2134**       
 (2.26)       
(3) IFRSEU_ ASEI_2High  -0.3101*** -0.3082*** -0.2891*** -0.3393***   
  (-4.04) (-4.04) (-4.18) (-5.85)   
(4) IFRSEU_ ASEI_2Low  0.0277 0.0001 -0.1282 -0.0020   
  (0.26) (0.00) (-1.60) (-0.02)   
(5) IFRSEU_ENF_ ASEI_2High      -0.5234*** -0.3874*** 
      (-7.85) (-10.51) 
(6) IFRSEU_ENF_ ASEI_2Low      -0.1281* -0.1655*** 
      (-1.73) (-3.08) 
(7) IFRSnonEU   0.2464** 0.2464** 0.0902** 0.2431** 0.2464** 0.0902** 
  (2.39) (2.39) (1.97) (2.31) (2.39) (1.97) 
(8) IFRSEU_nonENF      -0.0275 -0.1754** 
      (-0.26) (-2.41) 
Control variables, country & industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter-year FE Global & IFRS  Global, IFRS & 
EU  
Global, IFRS & 
EU  
Country-level IFRS & EU  Global, IFRS & 
EU  
Country-level 
Adj. R-squared 0.7550 0.7563 0.7564 0.7823 0.7262 0.7569 0.7823 
Observations 727293 727293 727293 727293 245044 727293 727293 
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Table 2.7 (continued) 
Panel D. CHL (2013) Liquidity Findings and High vs. Low Abnormal Selection Exposure Index (ASEI_3) 
 Dependent Variable: Ln(Bid-Ask Spread) 
 Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 Column 6 Column 7 
(1) IFRS_ASEI_3High -0.2099*       
 (-1.80)       
(2) IFRS_ ASEI_3Low 0.2120**       
 (2.52)       
(3) IFRSEU_ ASEI_3High  -0.3101*** -0.3082*** -0.2891*** -0.3393***   
  (-4.04) (-4.04) (-4.18) (-5.85)   
(4) IFRSEU_ ASEI_3Low  0.0277 0.0001 -0.1282 -0.0020   
  (0.26) (0.00) (-1.60) (-0.02)   
(5) IFRSEU_ENF_ ASEI_3High      -0.5234*** -0.3874*** 
      (-7.85) (-10.51) 
(6) IFRSEU_ENF_ ASEI_3Low      -0.1281* -0.1655*** 
      (-1.73) (-3.08) 
(7) IFRSnonEU   0.2464** 0.2464** 0.0902** 0.2431** 0.2464** 0.0902** 
  (2.39) (2.39) (1.97) (2.31) (2.39) (1.97) 
(8) IFRSEU_nonENF      -0.0275 -0.1754** 
      (-0.26) (-2.41) 
Control variables, country & industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter-year FE Global & IFRS  Global, IFRS & 
EU  
Global, IFRS & 
EU  
Country-level IFRS & EU  Global, IFRS & 
EU  
Country-level 
Adj. R-squared 0.7551 0.7563 0.7564 0.7823 0.7262 0.7569 0.7823 
Observations 727293 727293 727293 727293 245044 727293 727293 
Panel E. CHL (2013) Liquidity Findings and High vs. Low Abnormal Selection Exposure Index (ASEI_4) 
 Dependent Variable: Ln(Bid-Ask Spread) 
 Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 Column 6 Column 7 
(1) IFRS_ASEI_4High -0.2208*       
 (-1.86)       
(2) IFRS_ ASEI_4Low 0.1898**       
 (2.01)       
(3) IFRSEU_ ASEI_4High  -0.3471*** -0.3438*** -0.3268*** -0.3784***   
  (-4.38) (-4.42) (-5.54) (-6.51)   
(4) IFRSEU_ ASEI_4Low  -0.0261 -0.0494 -0.1288*** -0.0538   
  (-0.27) (-0.63) (-2.88) (-0.52)   
(5) IFRSEU_ENF_ ASEI_4High      -0.5234*** -0.3874*** 
      (-7.85) (-10.51) 
(6) IFRSEU_ENF_ ASEI_4Low      -0.1281* -0.1655*** 
      (-1.73) (-3.08) 
(7) IFRSnonEU   0.2464** 0.2464** 0.0902** 0.2431** 0.2464** 0.0902** 
  (2.39) (2.39) (1.97) (2.31) (2.39) (1.97) 
(8) IFRSEU_nonENF      -0.0275 -0.1754** 
      (-0.26) (-2.41) 
Control variables, country & industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter-year FE Global & IFRS  Global, IFRS & 
EU  
Global, IFRS & 
EU  
Country-level IFRS & EU  Global, IFRS & 
EU  
Country-level 
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Table 2.7 (continued)        
Adj. R-squared 0.7550 0.7563 0.7565 0.7823 0.7264 0.7569 0.7823 
Observations 727293 727293 727293 727293 245044 727293 727293 
Notes: This table displays regression results for five extensions of CHL (2013). Each extension employs one of five different specifications of the Selection Exposure Index: SEI (Panel A), ASEI_1 
(Panel B), ASEI_2 (Panel C), ASEI_3 (Panel D), and ASEI_4 (Panel E). For further information on the (remaining) variables and the regression model specifications, see Table 2.5. 
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2.4.4 CHL (2013) selection effects and balanced sample approach  
As outlined in Section 2.2, a balanced sample approach across the treatment and the control 
group mitigates the control group selection as well as part of our treatment selection effect (i.e., 
the treatment sample selection effect). Yet, most of prior research on mandatory IFRS adoption 
(including CHL, 2013) does not consider a balanced panel approach. Based on the 25 recent 
IFRS studies, which are discussed by Brueggemann et al. (2013), only six studies seem to 
consider a balance sample approach.11 However, as likewise outlined in Section 2.2, a balanced 
sample approach does not mitigate our core treatment selection effect (i.e., treatment self 
selection effect). To disentangle our two treatment group selection effects as documented in 
Section 2.3, we thus repeat our extended CHL (2013) DiD analyses for a balanced sample.  
Results are reported in Table 2.8. First, Panel A of Table 2.8 shows that the initial 
findings of CHL (2013) prevail when using a balanced sample, yet on a comparably lower lever 
with respect to the economic as well as statistical significance of the respective main coefficient 
estimates (e.g., IFRS_EU_ENF). Among other things, this might indicate the magnitude of our 
treatment sample selection effect. Second, as expected, findings in Panel B of Table 2.8 show that 
our treatment self selection effect prevails, as the positive liquidity findings are still clustered in 
countries with a high SELECTION EXPOSURE INDEX (SEI). We take this as evidence that the 
degree of ex-post self selection into the treatment group, inherent in the different treatment group 
specifications, still explains liquidity effects above and beyond EU and enforcement variation. 
                                                 
11 Ahmed et al. (2013) explicitly introduce a balanced sample approach. Five additional studies seem to rely on a 
balanced sample approach as well without outlining it explicitly (i.e., Callao and Jarne 2010; Aharony et al. 2010; 
Byard et al. 2011; Beuselinck et al, 2010; DeFond et al. 2011).   
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Table 2.8 Balanced Sample Approach and Treatment Self Selection Effect 
Panel A. Replication of CHL (2013) - Balanced Sample Approach 
 Dependent Variable: Ln(Bid-Ask Spread) 
 
Global IFRS EU vs. non-EU IFRS 
IFRS in EU with vs. without bundled Δ 
enforcement 














 Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 Column 6 Column 7 
(1) IFRS -0.1107       
 (-0.90)       
(2) IFRSEU  -0.1326** -0.1470** -0.2893*** -0.1454***   
  (-2.33) (-2.47) (-3.53) (-2.73)   
(3) IFRSEU_ENF      -0.3104*** -0.3325*** 
      (-2.81) (-4.40) 
(4) IFRSEU_nonENF      0.1491 -0.1750*** 
      (0.80) (-2.65) 
(5) IFRSnonEU  0.0900 0.0900 0.0250 0.0905 0.0901 0.0250 
  (0.81) (0.81) (0.37) (0.81) (0.81) (0.37) 
Ln(Market Valuet-4) -0.3287*** -0.3291*** -0.3291*** -0.3307*** -0.3376*** -0.3292*** -0.3307*** 
 (-45.05) (-44.72) (-44.79) (-50.30) (-30.33) (-44.65) (-50.30) 
Ln(Return Variabilityt-4) -0.3238*** -0.3246*** -0.3248*** -0.3244*** -0.3094*** -0.3252*** -0.3244*** 
 (-12.28) (-12.36) (-12.38) (-11.53) (-14.20) (-12.41) (-11.53) 
Ln(Share Turnovert-4) 0.4109*** 0.4092*** 0.4096*** 0.4084*** 0.3862*** 0.4110*** 0.4087*** 
 (22.89) (22.44) (22.65) (23.72) (13.66) (22.79) (23.72) 
MAD   -0.2145***     
   (-2.66)     
TPD   -0.3070*     
   (-1.65)     
Country & industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter-year FE Global & IFRS 
countries 
Global, IFRS & EU 
countries 
Global, IFRS & EU 
countries 
For each country 
separately 
IFRS & EU 
countries 
Global, IFRS & EU 
countries 
For each country 
separately 
Adj. R-squared 0.7555 0.7570 0.7575 0.7909 0.7452 0.7584 0.7910 
Observations 243432 243432 243432 243432 66384 243432 243432 
F-test for differences:   (2) vs. (5) (2) vs. (5) (2) vs. (5) (2) vs. (5) (3) vs. (4) (3) vs. (4) 
[p-value]  [0.0692] [0.0543] [0.0021] [0.0578] [0.0526] [0.0547] 
TG (self) Selection 1 (TGSE1) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
TG (sample) Selection 2 (TGSE2) No No No No No No No 
CG Selection (CGSE) No No No No No No No 
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Table 2.8 (continued) 
Panel B. Treatment Self Selection Effect - Balanced Sample Approach 
 Dependent Variable: Ln(Bid-Ask Spread) 
 High vs. low Selection Exposure Index (SEI) 
 
Global IFRS EU vs. non-EU IFRS 
IFRS in EU with vs. without bundled Δ 
enforcement 














 Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 Column 6 Column 7 
(1) IFRS_SEIHigh -0.2343       
 (-1.63)       
(2) IFRS_ SEILow 0.2224**       
 (2.54)       
(3) IFRSEU_ SEIHigh  -0.1924*** -0.1933*** -0.2902*** -0.2057***   
  (-3.07) (-3.09) (-3.48) (-3.30)   
(4) IFRSEU_ SEILow  0.2692 0.2073 -0.2729* 0.2537   
  (1.39) (1.29) (-1.77) (1.31)   
(5) IFRSEU_ENF_ SEIHigh      -0.4525*** -0.3710*** 
      (-4.50) (-9.62) 
(6) IFRSEU_ENF_ SEILow      0.1161 -0.0433 
      (0.72) (-0.26) 
(7) IFRSnonEU   0.0900 0.0900 0.0250 0.0904 0.0903 0.0250 
  (0.81) (0.81) (0.37) (0.81) (0.81) (0.37) 
(8) IFRSEU_nonENF      0.1781 -0.1751*** 
      (0.91) (-2.65) 
Ln(Market Valuet-4) -0.3288*** -0.3291*** -0.3290*** -0.3307*** -0.3374*** -0.3295*** -0.3307*** 
 (-44.76) (-44.68) (-44.72) (-50.30) (-30.02) (-44.14) (-50.28) 
Ln(Return Variabilityt-4) -0.3243*** -0.3249*** -0.3249*** -0.3244*** -0.3101*** -0.3241*** -0.3244*** 
 (-12.34) (-12.39) (-12.40) (-11.53) (-14.33) (-12.33) (-11.53) 
Ln(Share Turnovert-4) 0.4111*** 0.4097*** 0.4099*** 0.4084*** 0.3879*** 0.4119*** 0.4087*** 
 (22.85) (22.66) (22.74) (23.72) (13.77) (22.98) (23.73) 
MAD   -0.2008**     
   (-2.31)     
TPD   -0.1752     
   (-1.54)     
Country & industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter-year FE Global & IFRS 
countries 
Global, IFRS & EU 
countries 
Global, IFRS & EU 
countries 
For each country 
separately 
IFRS & EU 
countries 
Global, IFRS & EU 
countries 
For each country 
separately 
Adj. R-squared 0.7568 0.7578 0.7580 0.7909 0.7486 0.7593 0.7910 
Observations 243432 243432 243432 243432 66384 243432 243432 
F-test for differences:  (1) vs. (2) (3) vs. (4) (3) vs. (4) (3) vs. (4) (3) vs. (4) (5) vs. (6) (5) vs. (6) 
[p-value] [0.0114] [0.0361] [0.0263] [0.9106] [0.0401] [0.0036] [0.0357] 
TG (self) Selection 1 (TGSE1) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
TG (sample) Selection 2 (TGSE2) No No No No No No No 
CG Selection (CGSE) No No No No No No No 
Notes: This table displays the CHL (2013) replication based on a balanced panel structure. Specifically, the analysis only includes firms for which the data required for the regression was available for all 36 
quarters of the sample period (2001-2009). For further information on the model and variable definitions, see Table 2.5. 
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2.5 Conclusion 
This paper documents a systematic decline in the number of listed firms that adopt IFRS 
according to Thomson Reuters’ Worldscope, and links this trend to three underlying selection 
issues, a non-IFRS firms (control group) and a two-fold IFRS firms (treatment group) selection 
effect. We provide empirical evidence on the presence and the magnitude of these selection 
effects. Most importantly, we document that our treatment group selection effect is able to 
explain the liquidity findings documented in one prominent IFRS paper, CHL (2013). In essence, 
these findings introduce a so far unobserved variable—ex-post self selection into mandatory 
IFRS by not choosing to dispense with the mandate—that might drive liquidity findings 
documented in prior research. 
Our paper contributes to the extant literature in several ways. First, we contribute to the 
literature on mandatory IFRS adoption in a general way by highlighting an important research 
design issue that might explain the respective documented IFRS effects as a correlated omitted 
variable. Second, our paper specifically extends recent research on one important economic 
outcome, the liquidity effects that are observed concurrently with bundled IFRS and enforcement 
regulation (i.e., CHL 2013). In essence, our paper provides evidence on a direct channel in which 
concurrent IFRS accounting and enforcement regulation translate into higher market liquidity. 
With that, our findings might be relevant for dissolving the perceived inconsistency in the 
literature on mandatory IFRS adoption: While this literature shows that IFRS and enforcement 
regulation may lead to capital market benefits (e.g., market liquidity), it fails so far to provide 
conclusive evidence on potential channels for this relationship. In contrast to the conceptual level 
of most prior studies on the economic consequences of mandatory IFRS adoption, including CHL 
(2013), our liquidity findings do not inevitably require improvements in accounting or reporting 
quality as an implicit assumption or precondition for their internal validity. Third, our paper 
sheds light on firm-level characteristics and, more importantly, country-level institutional factors 
that shape cost-benefit tradeoffs pertaining to delisting and downlisting decisions. To that end, we 
augment another large stream in the accounting and finance literature by providing institutional 
country-level insight into the strictness of the IFRS mandate. 
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Finally, we note that our paper not only potentially contributes to some of the main 
research streams in the fields of accounting and finance during the recent years, but also 
potentially provides policy-relevant information. Specifically, from a European perspective, the 
mandatory adoption of IFRS for the consolidated accounts of firms listed on EU regulated stock 
markets is arguably the largest accounting related regulatory event in European history. Thus, 
research on potential unintended economic consequences and potential market externalities of 
this regulatory event, which we attempt to document in this paper, is of potential interest and 
value to national as well as supranational regulators. 
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2.6 Appendix 
Appendix 2.1 Worldscope Coverage over Time (2003-2013) 
Overview 
 (WDG, 
2013, p. 28) 
• Origins and Development: "The Worldscope Database originated in the international investment management activities of 
Wright Investors' Service, a U.S. based global money management firm. In 2000, Primark Corporation was acquired by 
Thomson Corporation. In 2008, Thomson Corporation acquired Reuters. Today, the content operations group, which 
supports the Worldscope database, employs over 500 people in seven global data centers."  
• Database applications include: "Construction and maintenance of global investment portfolios, Global Industry and Sector 
analysis, Comparison of capital structures and financing strategies of corporations worldwide, Evaluation and monitoring of 
the efficiency of capital markets, Style Analysis, Generalized screening, reporting and presentation of corporate data"  
• Existing Worldscope clients include: "Money Management firms: Portfolio managers, research analysts, Investment 
banks: Corporate finance, mergers & acquisitions departments, Corporations: Strategic planners, librarians, treasurers, 
controllers, auditors, Academic and Public Sector: Research libraries, Consulting firms: Management consultancies, 
accounting firms, pension consultants"  
Coverage 
 (WDG, 
2007, p. 19) 
• Worldscope database targets coverage of publicly quoted companies and provides either full, partial, or no coverage of the 
respective markets 
• The base year for the Worldscope Database is 1980, although statistically significant company and data item representation 
is best represented from January 1985 forward. 
• Coverage criteria for partial coverage (as of 2007/2010): 
 Firms need to meet one or more of the following criteria to be included in our coverage: (1) broker estimates equal to or 
greater than 5, (2) market capitalization equal or greater than 100 million US dollars, (3) firm belongs to the FTSE ALL 
Worlds, Dow Jones Global, MSCI World, MSCI EMF, S&P Global, S&P Citigroup, (4) firms are included in EASDAQ 
or EURO.NM, (5) non-US firm which has a listing on the NYSE, ASE or NASDAQ 
 Some exceptions to the above criteria are highlighted in the respective Worldscope Definition Guides (see, for example, 




• Full coverage for 30 countries (mainly developed countries) 
 Full coverage of almost all Western European countries since 1999 (i.e., 15 countries in the EU together with Norway and 
Switzerland) 
 Full coverage for the US (all US firms filing with the SEC) 




• Full coverage for 33 countries (mainly developed countries) 
 Developed markets: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada (excls Canadian Venture Market), Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, UK, US 
 Advanced emerging / emerging: Brazil, Mexico, Korea (excls KOSDAQ) , South Africa, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Thailand, China, Taiwan 
• Partial coverage for 28 countries 
 Developed, emerging, advanced emerging markets: Argentina, Bermuda, Canadian Venture Market, Cayman Islands, 
Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Egypt, Hungary, Iceland, India, Israel, Jordan, Korean KOSDAQ market, Morocco, 
New Zealand, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sri Lanka, Turkey, Venezuela, Virgin 




• Full coverage for 33 countries (mainly developed countries) 
 Developed markets: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada (excls Canadian Venture Market), Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, UK, US 
 Advanced emerging / emerging: Brazil, Mexico, Korea (excls KOSDAQ) , South Africa, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Thailand, China, Taiwan 
• Partial coverage for 47 countries 
 Developed, emerging, advanced emerging markets: Argentina, Bahrain, Bermuda, Bulgaria, Canadian Venture Market, 
Cayman Islands, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Egypt, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, India, Israel, Jordan, 
Kazakhstan, Kenya, Korean KOSDAQ market, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lithuania, Mauritius, Morocco, New Zealand, Nigeria, 
Oman, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, 
Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates (Dubai and Abu Dhabi markets), Venezuela, Vietnam, Virgin Islands, Zimbabwe 
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• Full coverage for 55 countries (both developed and developing countries) 
 Developed markets: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
UK, US 
 Advanced emerging / emerging: Argentina, Bahrain, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Iceland, Indonesia, Jordan, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Oman, Philippines, Poland, 
Qatar, Russia, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, UAE, Vietnam 
• Partial coverage for 56 countries 
 Developed, emerging, advanced emerging markets: India, Bolivia, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Botswana, Cote d'Ivoire, 
Croatia, Ecuador, Egypt, Fiji, Ghana, Guyana, Israel, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Macedonia, Malawi, Mauritius, Montenegro, 
Morocco, Namibia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine, Peru, Romania, Serbia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukraine, 
Venezuela, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, Syria, Canada - NEX 
Board of TSX Venture Exchange listings, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Trinidad & Tobago, Jamaica, Sri Lanka, 
Faroe Islands, Georgia, Guernsey, Isle of Man, Jersey, Mongolia, Niger, Senegal Sudan   
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Appendix 2.2 Detailed Data and Sample Description (Section 2.3) 
Complete Sample  
(countries and firm-year observations for sample period between 1995-2014) 
FULL Worldscope Coverage 
(since 2003/2007) 
Partial Worldscope Coverage 
(since 2003/2007) 
wc06026 # firm-year wc06026 # firm-year wc06026 wc06026 
ARGENTINA 1863 MOROCCO 876 AUSTRALIA ARGENTINA 
AUSTRALIA 26324 NETHERLANDS 3243 AUSTRIA CHANNEL ISLANDS 
AUSTRIA 1771 NEW ZEALAND 2000 BELGIUM CHILE 
BELGIUM 2296 NORWAY 3361 BRAZIL CZECH REPUBLIC 
BRAZIL 7592 PAKISTAN 351 CANADA EGYPT 
CANADA 40022 PHILIPPINES 3735 CHINA ESTONIA 
CHANNEL ISLANDS 11 POLAND 4587 DENMARK HUNGARY 
CHILE 3909 PORTUGAL 1007 FINLAND ICELAND 
CHINA 39921 QATAR 461 FRANCE INDIA 
CZECH REPUBLIC 382 RUSSIA 22 GERMANY ISRAEL 
DENMARK 3135 RUSSIAN FED 6599 GREECE LITHUANIA 
EGYPT 2087 SAUDI ARABIA 1560 HONG KONG MOROCCO 
ESTONIA 179 SINGAPORE 727 INDONESIA NEW ZEALAND 
FINLAND 2427 SLOVAKIA 228 IRELAND PAKISTAN 
FRANCE 10856 SLOVENIA 468 ITALY POLAND 
GERMANY 11475 SOUTH AFRICA 6118 JAPAN QATAR 
GREECE 4675 SOUTH KOREA 19 LUXEMBOURG RUSSIA 
HONG KONG 1861 SPAIN 2821 MALAYSIA RUSSIAN FED 
HUNGARY 628 SRI LANKA 2431 MEXICO SAUDI ARABIA 
ICELAND 202 SWEDEN 6264 NETHERLANDS SLOVAKIA 
INDIA 27589 SWITZERLAND 3824 NORWAY SLOVENIA 
INDONESIA 7181 TAIWAN 24833 PHILIPPINES SRI LANKA 
IRELAND 1437 THAILAND 9948 PORTUGAL TURKEY 
ISRAEL 5154 TURKEY 4383 SINGAPORE  
ITALY 5220 UNITED KINGDOM 28371 SOUTH AFRICA  
JAPAN 73809 UNITED STATES 159710 SOUTH KOREA  
LITHUANIA 343   SPAIN  
LUXEMBOURG 987   SWEDEN  
MALAYSIA 16594   SWITZERLAND  
MEXICO 3466   TAIWAN  
    THAILAND  
    UNITED KINGDOM  
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(no IFRS until 2014) 
wc06026 wc06026 wc06026 wc06026 wc06026 wc06026 wc06026 
AUSTRALIA AUSTRIA FINLAND AUSTRIA AUSTRALIA ARGENTINA CHANNEL ISLANDS 
AUSTRIA BELGIUM GERMANY BELGIUM HONG KONG BRAZIL CHINA 
BELGIUM CZECH REPUBLIC ICELAND CZECH REPUBLIC ISRAEL CANADA EGYPT 
CZECH REPUBLIC DENMARK NETHERLANDS DENMARK NEW ZEALAND CHANNEL ISLANDS INDIA 
DENMARK ESTONIA NORWAY ESTONIA PAKISTAN CHILE INDONESIA 
ESTONIA FINLAND UNITED KINGDOM FRANCE PHILIPPINES CHINA JAPAN 
FINLAND FRANCE  GREECE SINGAPORE EGYPT MALAYSIA 
FRANCE GERMANY  HUNGARY SOUTH AFRICA INDIA MOROCCO 
GERMANY GREECE  IRELAND SWITZERLAND INDONESIA QATAR 
GREECE HUNGARY  ITALY TURKEY JAPAN RUSSIA 
HONG KONG ICELAND  LITHUANIA  MALAYSIA RUSSIAN FED 
HUNGARY IRELAND  LUXEMBOURG  MEXICO SAUDI ARABIA 
ICELAND ITALY  POLAND  MOROCCO THAILAND 
IRELAND LITHUANIA  PORTUGAL  QATAR UNITED STATES 
ISRAEL LUXEMBOURG  SLOVAKIA  RUSSIA  
ITALY NETHERLANDS  SLOVENIA  RUSSIAN FED  
LITHUANIA NORWAY  SPAIN  SAUDI ARABIA  
LUXEMBOURG POLAND  SWEDEN  SOUTH KOREA  
NETHERLANDS PORTUGAL    SRI LANKA  
NEW ZEALAND SLOVAKIA    TAIWAN  
NORWAY SLOVENIA    THAILAND  
PAKISTAN SPAIN    UNITED STATES  
PHILIPPINES SWEDEN      
POLAND UNITED KINGDOM      
PORTUGAL       
SINGAPORE       
SLOVAKIA       
SLOVENIA       
SOUTH AFRICA       
SPAIN       
SWEDEN       
SWITZERLAND       
TURKEY       
UNITED KINGDOM       
Notes: This table displays the number of firms and corresponding countries available in Worldscope according to the following minimum data requirements: ISIN (wc06008), fiscal year (wc05350), 
country of firm domicile (wc06026), accounting standard followed (wc07536), total assets (wc02999), book value of equity (wc03501), and net income (wc01751). We acknowledge that Switzerland has 
not mandated the use of only IFRS (Zeff, 2016). Still, we include it to ensure consistency between the analyses of CHL (2013) and this study. 
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Appendix 2.3 Sample Details and CHL (2013) Treatment Groups (Section 2.4) 
      Disaggregation along SEI 





























European Union Countries 
Austria 1703 1201 46 54 0.17 0 1 0 1 0 0 
Belgium 3553 3250 91 104 0.14 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Czech Rep. 0 156 0 0 0.00 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Denmark 4891 4802 120 119 -0.01 1 0 1 0 0 0 
Estonia 209 146 6 15 1.50 0 1 0 1 0 0 
Finland 4428 4056 121 124 0.02 1 0 1 0 1 0 
France 18176 15817 441 432 -0.02 1 0 1 0 0 0 
Germany 14227 8296 332 356 0.07 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Greece 3956 0 1 254 253.00 0 1 0 1 0 0 
Hungary 870 674 24 0 -1.00 1 0 1 0 0 0 
Iceland 82 89 1 6 5.00 0 1 0 1 0 1 
Ireland 1273 629 30 30 0.00 1 0 1 0 0 0 
Italy 7963 7569 208 248 0.19 0 1 0 1 0 0 
Lithuania 415 71 18 22 0.22 0 1 0 1 0 0 
Luxembourg 645 11 20 16 -0.20 1 0 1 0 0 0 
Netherlands 4732 3443 117 111 -0.05 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Norway 4738 4897 118 159 0.35 0 1 0 1 0 1 
Poland 4169 5454 144 208 0.44 0 1 0 1 0 0 
Portugal 1462 1361 38 42 0.11 1 0 1 0 0 0 
Slovakia 0 63 0 0 0.00 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Slovenia 373 208 8 22 1.75 0 1 0 1 0 0 
Spain 3902 3195 103 110 0.07 1 0 1 0 0 0 
Sweden 9888 8071 264 318 0.20 0 1 0 1 0 0 
UK 36309 18809 703 746 0.06 1 0 1 0 1 0 
IFRS adoption countries outside the European Union 
Abu Dhabi 686 308 1 71 70.00 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Australia 39374 31543 1140 1391 0.22 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Hong Kong 26976 23222 26 46 0.77 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Israel 4611 385 328 360 0.10 1 0 0 0 0 0 
New Zealand 3656 3060 114 117 0.03 1 0 0 0 0 0 
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Appendix 2.3 (continued) 
      Disaggregation along SEI 
Country # obs. 
# obs.  
CHL (2013) 



























IFRS adoption countries outside the European Union (continued) 
Pakistan 1208 722 1 0 -1.00 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Philippines 4527 4495 123 153 0.24 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Singapore 15650 14841 11 26 1.36 0 1 0 0 0 0 
South Africa 8909 6635 232 284 0.22 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Switzerland 6453 5927 150 155 0.03 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Turkey 5030 5842 58 63 0.09 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Non-IFRS countries 
Argentina 731 128 1 57 56.00 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Brazil 5791 4585 151 249 0.65 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Canada 24582 13226 1 1938 1937.00 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Channel Isl. 224 436 1 27 26.00 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Chile 1395 280 1 106 105.00 0 0 0 0 0 0 
China 40195 39562 1079 1555 0.44 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Egypt 2146 1635 60 107 0.78 0 0 0 0 0 0 
India 14904 156 338 436 0.29 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Indonesia 6616 6864 182 202 0.11 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Japan 111879 108877 3183 3080 -0.03 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Malaysia 27142 26509 816 838 0.03 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mexico 2789 912 80 92 0.15 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Morocco 660 397 1 48 47.00 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Qatar 228 179 1 40 39.00 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Russia 1749 1114 36 140 2.89 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Saudi Arabia 1233 918 13 121 8.31 0 0 0 0 0 0 
South Korea 37308 28630 1134 1502 0.32 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sri Lanka 637 249 1 75 74.00 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Taiwan 18205 15305 50 1339 25.78 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Thailand 10727 11526 333 403 0.21 0 0 0 0 0 0 
United States 173108 163016 4289 5198 0.21 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Appendix 2.4 Distribution of number of listed firms across CHL Country-Clusters (CHL replication sample) 
Year 
CONTROL  IFRS IFRS_EU  IFRS_EU_ENF  IFRS_EU_nonENF  IFRS_nonEU  












 2Q2001 9839 4.94% 5332 32.93% 3031 17.80% 1509 9.19% 1522 27.79% 2301 60.01% 
3Q2001 10572 7.45% 5540 3.90% 3181 4.95% 1577 4.51% 1604 5.39% 2359 2.52% 
4Q2001 10473 -0.94% 5742 3.65% 3306 3.93% 1641 4.06% 1665 3.80% 2436 3.26% 
1Q2002 10595 1.16% 5946 3.55% 3460 4.66% 1736 5.79% 1724 3.54% 2486 2.05% 
2Q2002 10712 1.10% 6224 4.68% 3697 6.85% 1948 12.21% 1749 1.45% 2527 1.65% 
3Q2002 10768 0.52% 6353 2.07% 3746 1.33% 2017 3.54% 1729 -1.14% 2607 3.17% 
4Q2002 10796 0.26% 6341 -0.19% 3731 -0.40% 1976 -2.03% 1755 1.50% 2610 0.12% 
1Q2003 10569 -2.10% 6111 -3.63% 3519 -5.68% 1844 -6.68% 1675 -4.56% 2592 -0.69% 
2Q2003 10696 1.20% 6252 2.31% 3617 2.78% 1898 2.93% 1719 2.63% 2635 1.66% 
3Q2003 10808 1.05% 6412 2.56% 3639 0.61% 1932 1.79% 1707 -0.70% 2773 5.24% 
4Q2003 10876 0.63% 6506 1.47% 3682 1.18% 1931 -0.05% 1751 2.58% 2824 1.84% 
1Q2004 10713 -1.50% 6273 -3.58% 3495 -5.08% 1789 -7.35% 1706 -2.57% 2778 -1.63% 
2Q2004 10915 1.89% 6339 1.05% 3511 0.46% 1795 0.34% 1716 0.59% 2828 1.80% 
3Q2004 11039 1.14% 6367 0.44% 3485 -0.74% 1761 -1.89% 1724 0.47% 2882 1.91% 
4Q2004 11098 0.53% 6555 2.95% 3587 2.93% 1813 2.95% 1774 2.90% 2968 2.98% 
1Q2005 11336 2.14% 6494 -0.93% 3465 -3.40% 1714 -5.46% 1751 -1.30% 3029 2.06% 
2Q2005 11486 1.32% 6378 -1.79% 3305 -4.62% 1746 1.87% 1559 -10.97% 3073 1.45% 
3Q2005 11566 0.70% 6538 2.51% 3391 2.60% 1756 0.57% 1635 4.87% 3147 2.41% 
4Q2005 11744 1.54% 6743 3.14% 3494 3.04% 1817 3.47% 1677 2.57% 3249 3.24% 
1Q2006 12315 4.86% 6783 0.59% 3479 -0.43% 1772 -2.48% 1707 1.79% 3304 1.69% 
2Q2006 13914 12.98% 6947 2.42% 3564 2.44% 1825 2.99% 1739 1.87% 3383 2.39% 
3Q2006 14911 7.17% 6932 -0.22% 3512 -1.46% 1793 -1.75% 1719 -1.15% 3420 1.09% 
4Q2006 17973 20.54% 7436 7.27% 3641 3.67% 1858 3.63% 1783 3.72% 3795 10.96% 
1Q2007 16916 -5.88% 7288 -1.99% 3489 -4.17% 1739 -6.40% 1750 -1.85% 3799 0.11% 
2Q2007 17007 0.54% 7441 2.10% 3546 1.63% 1733 -0.35% 1813 3.60% 3895 2.53% 
3Q2007 17724 4.22% 7780 4.56% 3639 2.62% 1837 6.00% 1802 -0.61% 4141 6.32% 
4Q2007 17638 -0.49% 8054 3.52% 3823 5.06% 1929 5.01% 1894 5.11% 4231 2.17% 
1Q2008 17221 -2.36% 7776 -3.45% 3617 -5.39% 1772 -8.14% 1845 -2.59% 4159 -1.70% 
2Q2008 17512 1.69% 7980 2.62% 3723 2.93% 1823 2.88% 1900 2.98% 4257 2.36% 
3Q2008 17552 0.23% 7985 0.06% 3753 0.81% 1857 1.87% 1896 -0.21% 4232 -0.59% 
4Q2008 16720 -4.74% 7862 -1.54% 3891 3.68% 1901 2.37% 1990 4.96% 3971 -6.17% 
1Q2009 16572 -0.89% 7684 -2.26% 3667 -5.76% 1743 -8.31% 1924 -3.32% 4017 1.16% 
2Q2009 17327 4.56% 8233 7.14% 3971 8.29% 1777 1.95% 2194 14.03% 4262 6.10% 
3Q2009 17417 0.52% 8076 -1.91% 3731 -6.04% 1787 0.56% 1944 -11.39% 4345 1.95% 
4Q2009 17553 0.78% 8330 3.15% 4003 7.29% 1788 0.06% 2215 13.94% 4327 -0.41% 
∆ since 4Q2005 49.46%  23.54%  14.57%  -1.60%  32.08%  33.18% 
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3 The role of proportion and reliability of fair value assets on 





Abstract: A large public debate denounces debt value adjustments due to a change in own 
credit risk (DVAs) as “junk income” without relation to value creation. In contrast, recent 
literature finds that DVAs are value relevant if a firm has few unrecognized intangible assets 
(Cedergren et al. 2015). I add to this by testing the informational properties of DVAs 
conditional on the proportion and reliability of related fair value assets. Using a sample of 617 
firm-quarters of US banks in the period of 2007-2014, I find firms’ DVAs to be value relevant 
when a large proportion of related assets are measured at fair value reliably, specifically, at 
level 1. In contrast, when a large proportion of fair value assets are measured less reliably, 
i.e., at level 2 and 3, DVAs are not value relevant. I further find that financial markets do not 
price DVAs efficiently when large proportions of related assets are measured unreliably. 
Finally, I find that DVAs’ persistence is moderated by the amount of related level 2 fair value 
assets. Taken together, the results imply that reliable information on related fair value assets is 
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3.1 Introduction 
In this study, I test the informational properties of debt valuation adjustments due to a change 
in credit risk (DVAs), conditional on the proportion and reliability of related financial assets 
carried at fair value. In 2007, the FASB introduced DVAs into US GAAP accounting with 
FAS 159 “The Fair Value Option for Financial Assets and Financial Liabilities” (FASB 
2007). If a firm chooses to apply this said fair value option for liabilities (FVOL) to (a part of) 
its debt, this implies that this debt is irrevocably carried at fair value in future periods. If the 
market value of said debt changes significantly due to a change in the credit risk of the issuing 
firm, the firm adjusts the debt’s fair value accordingly and recognizes these changes as DVAs 
in its net income. 
The main objective of DVAs is to mitigate volatility that arises if assets are measured 
at fair value but liabilities are not (FASB 2007). An unexpected change in a firm’s assets’ 
value simultaneously triggers a change in the firm’s liabilities’ value (e.g. a decrease in 
assets’ value leads to a decrease in liabilities’ value). This is because of the declined assets’ 
value, which lowers the firm’s ability to pay back its debt, i.e., increases the firm’s credit risk. 
If the firm measures both, assets and liabilities, at fair value, it will recognize concurrent 
write-downs on assets and on liabilities in this case. The asset write-downs result in a negative 
net income effect, while the liability write-downs result in a positive net income effect that 
mitigates the first. The second effect is the intended mitigating effect of DVAs. In the 
opposite case of the example, an increase in asset value, the DVAs’ mitigating effect 
correspondingly runs in the other direction. 
Still, under certain circumstances, DVAs’ income effect does not only mitigate the 
income effects from unexpected asset value changes but exceeds them. If the change in credit 
risk stems from unexpected changes in the value of assets that are not or not reliably 
measured at fair value, it is possible that the balance sheet only reflects the liabilities’ value 
change to a full extend but not the assets’ value change. Accordingly, in such a case, only 
DVAs’ income effect is fully recognized but not the income effect that it is supposed to 
mitigate. If so, an increase in credit risk leads to a positive net income effect and a decrease in 
credit risk leads to a negative net income effect. 
Critics perceive this characteristic of DVAs as “counterintuitive” (Keoun 2008) and 
started an intensive public debate. DVAs’ opponents state that investors do not perceive 
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DVAs as value relevant but rather as “junk income” (Dash 2009) or “paper profits” to which 
they “rightly don’t ascribe much value” (Eavis 2008). In line with this, recent experimental 
literature finds that investors have difficulties interpreting firms’ performances and risk if 
DVAs influence net income (Gaynor et al. 2011; Lachmann et al. 2015). Representatives from 
both large international standard setters, FASB and IASB, acknowledged that DVAs are 
potentially “misleading” investors (FASB 2007; IASB 2009). Accordingly, both standard 
setters recently changed DVA accounting regulation in the respective standards so that, in the 
future, firms will recognize DVAs in other comprehensive income instead of net income. 
(FASB 2016; IASB 2014b) 
On the other hand, advocates of DVAs’ value relevance argue that DVAs reflect 
wealth transfers between shareholders and debtholders as a paper by Merton (1974) details. In 
this context, they stress the importance of an accurate display of credit risk changes on the 
balance’s asset side for investors to correctly assess DVAs. If a firm’s assets are either 
unrecognized or not recognized at fair value, “it is difficult to see how credit impairment can 
be deemed to have taken place” (Peasnell 2006). Findings from prior literature support this 
notion. Cedergren et al. 2015 find that DVAs are value relevant when a firm has a low level 
of unrecognized intangible assets but are not value relevant when this level is high. Fontes et 
al. 2014 find that DVAs decrease information asymmetry when a large proportion of firm 
assets are measured at fair value but potentially increase information asymmetry otherwise. 
No research yet has addressed the role of the reliability of firms’ fair value assets’ 
valuation for investors’ perception of DVAs. This is somewhat surprising, given that prior 
research on fair value assets’ reliability has shown its impact on financial markets in related 
areas, for example, on share prices (Song et al. 2010) and on credit risk (Kadous et al. 2012). 
Building on prior literature, I expect that a large proportion of reliably measured fair values 
on a firm’s balance sheet improve the informational properties of DVAs. 
My sample consists of 617 firm-quarters of US bank holding companies that applied 
the FVOL between 2007 and 2014 and were therefore required to recognize and disclose 
significant DVAs. As tests, I use established regression models that measure the association 
of current share returns and net income with quantifiable information, in my case: DVAs. As 
a proxy for fair values’ reliability, I use the hierarchical FASB system that divides fair values 
into level 1, level 2, and level 3 where an increasing level means decreasing reliability (FASB 
2006). 
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In line with Cedergren et al. 2015 but in contrast to Chung et al. 2012, I do not find 
DVAs to be value relevant for investors per se. Testing the role of the proportion of firms’ 
fair value assets, I do not find that a higher proportion of fair value assets increases DVAs’ 
value relevance. For my main test, I split firms’ fair value assets into reliably measured fair 
value assets and less reliably measured fair value assets. As expected, I find that a higher 
proportion of reliably measured fair value assets increase DVAs’ value relevance for 
investors. Also as predicted, a higher proportion of less reliably measured fair value assets 
does not increase DVAs’ value relevance. Taken together, the findings suggest that the 
reliability of related assets’ fair values have implications for investors’ perception of DVAs’ 
value relevance. 
Testing DVAs’ market pricing, I find that investors’ reaction to DVAs’ 
announcements are moderated by the proportion of unreliably measured related fair value 
assets. Specifically, investors tend to overreact to DVAs when firms carry lower proportions 
of level 2 and 3 fair value assets on the balance sheet. In contrast, when firms carry larger 
proportions of level 2 and 3 fair value assets on the balance sheet, financial markets tend to 
underreact to DVAs’ announcements, consistent with a conservative pricing of DVAs with 
low value relevance. Finally, testing DVAs’ persistence, I find that DVAs are in themselves 
not a persistent part of net income. However, firms with large proportions of level 2 fair value 
assets have persistent DVAs. This finding is in line with firms exerting discretion over assets’ 
valuation to smooth earnings among other explanations. 
I conduct several sensitivity tests to challenge my findings from the main analysis. 
First, I substitute my explaining variables by ratios of reliably measured fair values to less 
reliably measured fair values. Next, as an alternative proxy for fair value assets’ reliability, I 
use the composite governance index GOV41 that was established by Aggarwal et al. (2011). I 
proceed by rerunning my analyses with additional fixed effects. Finally, as a different return 
measure, I consider quarterly compounded returns. The findings from the sensitivity tests 
largely support the results from the main tests. 
The findings directly add to the findings of Cedergren et al. (2015), thereby 
contributing to the literature on informational properties of DVAs. Specifically, they improve 
our understanding of the complementary financial information that investors require to 
perceive DVAs as a value relevant part of net income and to price them efficiently. The 
findings also contribute to the literature on the role of fair value assets’ reliability centered 
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around Song et al. (2010) by showing asset reliability’s importance for DVAs’ correct 
financial market perception. Against the background of the ongoing DVA debate and the 
recent changes in DVAs’ accounting regulation, the findings should also be of interest for 
regulatory bodies. 
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section outlines the theoretical background on 
the fair value option for liabilities and on DVAs. Section 3.3 summarizes prior literature. 
Section 3.4 describes the research methodology. Section 3.5 details the sample selection and 
data collection. Section 3.6 presents the main tests’ results and Section 3.7 provides 
sensitivity tests’ results. Section 3.8 concludes. 
3.2 Background: The fair value option for liabilities and debt valuation adjustments 
In February 2007, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued the Statement of 
Financial Accounting Standards No. 159 (FAS 159), “The Fair Value Option for Financial 
Assets and Financial Liabilities” (new codification since 2009: ASC Topic 825-10). The 
therein codified fair value option for financial liabilities (FVOL) permits firms to measure 
financial liabilities at fair value. With some exemptions, the option is applicable to all 
financial liabilities. Firms can elect the FVOL for an instrument only at specified “election 
dates”, for example, the day of an item’s first recognition. The option can only be applied to 
entire instruments (not to portions) and cannot be revoked (FASB 2007). Besides the election 
dates, as a one-time measure, FAS 159 allowed firms to apply the FVOL to eligible items at 
the standard’s effective date, which was either the fiscal year beginning after November 15, 
2007, or for the early adoption option, the fiscal year that began before the effective date. 
The measurement of liabilities for which firms elected the FVOL follows FAS 157 
“Fair Value Measurements” (nowadays: ASC 820). This standard defines the fair value as 
“the price that would be (…) paid to transfer a liability in an orderly transaction between 
market participants” (FASB 2006, p. 2). Consequently, firms have to treat liabilities’ fair 
values as (hypothetical) market values. At initial recognition, a liability’s fair value equals its 
“transaction price”. For the subsequent measurement, FAS 157 offers different valuation 
techniques to ensure that the liabilities’ fair values continuously reflect current market prices 
(FASB 2006). 
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 In each interim or annual financial statement, FAS 159 requires firms to disclose their 
reasons for electing the fair value option for each item. Firms also need to disclose which 
balance sheet items contain liabilities for which the FVOL has been elected but they are not 
required to disclose the exact amount of FVOL liabilities. Specifically for long-term debt 
instruments, firms further have to disclose differences between aggregate fair values and 
unpaid principal balances. Regarding firms’ income statements, FAS 159 requires firms to 
disclose the gains and losses from fair value changes for each income statement line item 
included in earnings. Generally, gains and losses from changes in fair values for which the 
FVOL has been elected do not need to be disclosed separately from other fair value changes 
in the same line item. As an exception, firms need to separately disclose gains and losses from 
fair value changes that are attributable to changes in firms’ own credit risk. 
 There are several causes that can change the fair value of a liability. For example, 
liabilities’ market values typically increase when the central bank responsible for the currency 
that the liabilities are denoted in decreases the respective key interest rate. Also, when 
financial markets’ general pricing of certain risks inherent in liabilities (e.g. credit risk) 
changes, the liabilities’ fair values alter. Most importantly for my study, however, are changes 
of the value of a firm’s liabilities due to changes in its individual credit risk. For example, if a 
firm’s ability to meet its outstanding debt decreases, the market value of its issued debt 
decreases simultaneously. On the other hand, if markets assume that a firm’s solvency 
improved, its liabilities’ market values increase. Such value changes are called DVAs – debt 
valuation adjustments due to a change in own credit risk. 
 As Merton (1974) explains, DVAs represent wealth redistributions between the 
shareholders and the debtholders of the firm that issued the debt. This is because a firm’s debt 
implies an option of the shareholders to put the firm’s assets to the debtholders for an amount 
equal to the debt’s face value. This option constitutes an economic asset to the firm and the 
asset’s value depends on the value of the firm’s debt (Barth and Landsman 1995). For 
example, a decrease in the value of the firm’s debt means a wealth transfer from debtholders 
to shareholders. Or, to quote Barth and Landsman (1995): “Effectively, the debtholder 
contractually has committed to accept an interest rate that subsequently proves to be 
economically too low.” 
 If recognized financial assets and financial liabilities are measured at reliable fair 
values, DVAs help mitigate earnings volatility. For example, an unexpected decrease in an 
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asset’s value leads to an increase in credit risk. The increased credit risk in turn leads to a 
decrease in the corresponding liability’s fair value which results in positive DVAs. Here, the 
positive DVAs’ income effect mitigates the negative income affect from the asset’s 
depreciation. In reality, the described match can be imperfect. Reasons for this can be that the 
affected financial assets are not recognized on the balance sheet, that the assets are not 
measured at fair value, or that the assets’ fair values are not measured reliably. Under these 
circumstances, the DVAs’ income effect does not mitigate but dominate the initial income 
effect. In the described example, the asset’s value decreases and the consequential increase in 
credit risk would thus result in a net profit. 
 Experimental evidence suggests that investors potentially misinterpret the income 
effects of DVAs, i.e., they perceive gains from DVAs as a sign for lowered credit risk 
(Gaynor et al. 2011) and improved firm performance (Lachmann et al. 2015) when actually 
the opposite is true. Concerns about this have stirred up a large public debate (see Section 
4.2.2 and Appendix 4.4). Critics argue that DVAs are counterintuitive “accounting tricks” 
(Carver 2012a) that cloud investors’ view on actual firm performance. DVAs can be large and 
even alter the sign of net income. For example, in the third quarter of 2011, a positive $3.41 
billion DVA helped Morgan Stanley to an overall $2.2 billion profit.13 Acknowledging the 
controversy around DVAs (Rapoport and Lucchetti 2011; IASB 2009), international standard 
setters changed the still relatively young regulation. After an amendment to ASC 825, DVAs 
will be recognized in other comprehensive income instead of net income in fiscal years 
beginning after December 15, 2017 (FASB 2016). With IAS 39, IFRS accounting also 
introduced a fair value option for financial assets and liabilities that became effective in 2005. 
As in US GAAP accounting, IFRS firms initially have been recognizing DVAs in net income. 
This changed with the introduction of IFRS 9 in 2014 that succeeded IAS 39 and that requires 
recognition of DVAs in other comprehensive income instead. IFRS 9 will come into effect on 
1 January 2018 with early application permitted (IASB 2014b). 
3.3 Prior literature and empirical predictions 
In this study, I test the implications of related fair value assets’ reliability for informational 
properties of DVAs. By doing so, I contribute to the young but growing literature of DVAs’ 
                                                 
13 As an example for the opposite direction of action, a negative $3.22 billion DVA turned Bank of America’s 
net profit into a $1.24 billion loss in the fourth quarter of 2010. 
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financial markets’ perception. Barth et al. (2008) find that the decrease (increase) in a firm’s 
equity value associated with an increase (decrease) in the credit risk of the firm is mitigated 
by a higher debt-to-assets ratio. Confirming theoretical predictions of Merton (1974), the 
finding suggests that investors correctly price the wealth transfer from debtholders to 
shareholders that DVAs represent when firms do not recognize DVAs (the sample covers a 
period before DVAs’ introduction in accounting). Chung et al. (2012) are the first to directly 
test the value relevance of DVAs. They find that investors perceive DVAs as economic 
income, i.e., as value-relevant. They also find that gains and losses from FAS 159 (which 
include DVAs) are relevant to investors’ perception of firms’ risk. My study is most closely 
related to a recent study of Cedergren et al. (2015). The authors argue that a firm’s net income 
becomes biased if a change in credit risk is only reflected on the liabilities side (through 
DVAs) but not on the asset side. They develop a model that demonstrates a negative 
association between unrecognized asset value changes and the value relevance of 
corresponding DVAs. They test the model using the amount of unrecognized intangible assets 
(UIA) as a mediating variable. As predicted, they find that a large amount of unrecognized 
assets decreases the value relevance of corresponding DVAs. 
Motivating further research, Cedergren et al. (2015) state that “[i]t is possible that 
other assets not measured at fair value could also affect the valuation of DVA in the same way 
as UIA does”. In an according study, Fontes et al. (2014) find that accounting completeness 
for the asset side of the balance sheet influences how investors interpret reported DVAs. In 
their sample of European banks, DVA recognition per se potentially increases information 
asymmetry among investors, by misleading them about firm’s income and performance. 
However, the relation is different for firms in their sample who measure a large proportion of 
assets at fair value. For those firms, the DVAs’ recognition decreases information 
asymmetries. The authors conclude that investors are “more confident in their ability to 
ascertain the reliability of reported [DVA] gains and losses when the sources of these gains 
and losses are recognized in the financial statements.” I expand this stream of literature by 
testing whether information properties of DVAs, namely their value relevance, their market 
pricing, and their persistence, additionally depend on the reliability of the related assets’ fair 
value measurement. 
 I draw further motivation for this analysis from a second stream of literature to which 
this study also contributes: the literature on financial market consequences of fair value 
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assets’ measurement reliability. Prior research in this field shows that investors’ perception of 
fair values’ reliability has significant influence on their decisions. As a proxy for fair values’ 
reliability, these studies typically use the hierarchic system introduced by FAS 157 (FASB 
2016). It measures fair values’ reliability according to the lowest level of inputs that were 
used to determine them (FASB 2006). Level 1 inputs are quoted prices in active markets for 
identical assets or liabilities. Therefore, level 1 fair values reflect the highest reliability. Level 
2 inputs are inputs other than quoted prices that are observable. Finally, unobservable inputs 
are level 3. 
 A central study of this literature, Song et al. (2010), compares the value relevance of 
fair value instruments for 1,260 US bank firm-quarters depending on the instruments’ level of 
reliability. Generally, they find fair values of assets and liabilities of all levels to be value 
relevant. Still, in their sample, the value relevance of level 1 and level 2 instruments is 
significantly higher than the value relevance of level 3 instruments. Kolev (2008) confirms 
this finding for fair value assets for a sample of 349 US bank-firm-quarters. Goh et al. (2015) 
also find fair value assets and liabilities of all levels to be value relevant. However, as Song et 
al. (2010), they find differences between the value relevance of level 1, level 2, and level 3 
fair value assets. Finally, a recent study by Arora et al. 2014 sheds light on the consequences 
of fair value assets’ measurement reliability for credit markets. The authors find that firms 
with lower asset reliability have higher short-horizon credit risk. 
 Building on the findings of these two streams of literature, I expect that investors’ 
perception of DVAs is mediated by the proportion of reliably measured related fair value 
assets. Specifically, I expect that a large proportion of reliably measured fair value assets on 
the balance sheet provides information on the sources, the quantity, and the quality of the 
credit risk change that underlies DVAs. Accordingly, investors’ perception of DVAs, as 
expressed by its value relevance, will be in line with management’s. However, I do not expect 
that a large proportion of less reliably measured fair value assets enhance investors’ 
perception of DVAs in a similar way. 
3.4 Research methodology 
To examine the associations between informational properties of DVAs and the proportion 
and reliability of fair value assets, I use OLS regression models as employed by prior 
literature. The value relevance literature studies the associations between accounting measures 
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and equity market values. This suggests testing whether these accounting measures explain 
cross-sectional variation in share prices (Barth et al. 2001). The objective is to examine 
whether and how quickly the accounting measures reflect changes in the information set that 
is incorporated in share returns over a given period (Kothari 2001). To test this association 
between share returns and individual net income components, prior literature uses return 
regressions with the components of a disaggregated net income as independent variables 
(Ohlson and Penman 1992; Lipe 1986). In accordance with this prior research, I use the 
following model: 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸_𝑒𝑥𝑐𝑙_𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝑉𝐴1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝑉𝐴23𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐹𝑉𝐴1𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐹𝑉𝐴23𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑈𝐼𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑈𝐼𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑂𝐶𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (1) 
where R is the quarterly share return of firm i in period t, E_excl_DVA is quarterly net income 
minus DVAs, DVA are quarterly debt value adjustments due to a change in own credit risk on 
liabilities for which the fair value option has been elected, FVA1 is the proportion of level 1 
fair value assets to total assets, FVA23 is the proportion of level 2 and 3 fair value assets to 
total assets, UIA is the amount of unrecognized intangible assets, and OCI is the quarterly 
other comprehensive income. I scale E, E_excl_DVA, DVA, OCI, and UIA by the market 
value of equity in t-1 (see Cedergren et al. 2015; Barth et al. 2008). I further include leverage 
(LEV) and the natural logarithm of firm’s market value (SIZE) as control variables (Chen et 
al. 2011). I use robust standard errors that are clustered along the dimensions quarter-years 
and firms (White 1980).  
My categorization of reliable fair values (level 1 fair values) versus less reliable fair 
values (level 2 and level 3 fair values) follows Arora et al. (2014) who use the proportion of 
level 2 and 3 fair values to total assets as proxy for unreliable assets. Further, it is in line with 
Penman 2007 who discusses level 2 and level 3 fair value measurements jointly, as both 
“admit estimates of hypothetical market prices”. However, theoretical considerations (Hitz 
2007) and recent empirical literature (Song et al. 2010; Goh et al. 2015) are rather consistent 
with differences in the value relevance of level 2 and level 3 fair values. To be able to explore 
such potential differences, I also consider the following alternative model: 
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𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸_𝑒𝑥𝑐𝑙_𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝑉𝐴12𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝑉𝐴3𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐹𝑉𝐴12𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐹𝑉𝐴3𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑈𝐼𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑈𝐼𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑂𝐶𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (2) 
where FVA12 is the proportion of level 1 and 2 fair value assets to total assets and FVA3 is the 
proportion of level 3 fair value assets to total assets. 
The literature on market pricing examines associations between current accounting 
measures and future share returns (Sloan 1996). The goal is to test how efficiently current 
accounting information is reflected in share returns. Assuming efficient, quick pricing, current 
accounting information should have no significant association with future share returns. To 
gain insights in how financial markets react to published DVA information under different 
circumstances, I test the association between DVAs and future stock prices moderated by 
proportion and level of fair value assets. Following prior literature (Chen et al. 2011; Kraft et 
al. 2007), the model for my tests is: 
𝑅𝑖𝑡+4 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸_𝑒𝑥𝑐𝑙_𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝑉𝐴1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝑉𝐴23𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐹𝑉𝐴1𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐹𝑉𝐴23𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑈𝐼𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑈𝐼𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑂𝐶𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (3) 
where Rit+4 is the share return of firm i measured between quaters t+1 and t+4. Again, I scale 
E, E_excl_DVA, DVA, OCI, and UIA by the market value of equity in t-1 and use robust 
standard errors that are clustered along the dimensions quarter-year and firms. 
As for the test of value relevance, I additionally employ a model with a different 
distinction between reliably and unreliably measured fair value assets: 
𝑅𝑖𝑡+4 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸_𝑒𝑥𝑐𝑙_𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝑉𝐴12𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝑉𝐴3𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐹𝑉𝐴12𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐹𝑉𝐴3𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑈𝐼𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑈𝐼𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑂𝐶𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (4) 
The earnings persistence literature examines the predictive value of current earnings and its 
components for future earnings. In this context, high persistence is considered a desirable 
informational property (Hanlon 2005). However, critics argue that persistence can also be 
achieved through earnings management (Dechow et al. 2010). To measure persistence, prior 
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literature directly tests the association between earnings’ components and future earnings. In 
accordance with this literature, I use the following model (see Chen et al. 2011): 
𝐸𝑖𝑡+4 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸_𝑒𝑥𝑐𝑙_𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝑉𝐴1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝑉𝐴23𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐹𝑉𝐴1𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐹𝑉𝐴23𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑈𝐼𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑈𝐼𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑂𝐶𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (5) 
Again, I scale E, E_excl_DVA, DVA, OCI, and UIA by total assets in t-1 (Chen et al. 2011). 
As for the other models, I use robust standard errors clustered along quarter-years and firms. 
The model with the alternative distinction of fair values’ reliability looks as follows: 
𝐸𝑖𝑡+4 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸_𝑒𝑥𝑐𝑙_𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝑉𝐴12𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝑉𝐴3𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐹𝑉𝐴12𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐹𝑉𝐴3𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑈𝐼𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑈𝐼𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑂𝐶𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (6) 
All variables used in the analyses are summarized in Table 3.1. 
The role of proportion and reliability of fair value assets on informational properties of DVAs 
81 
Table 3.1 Variable Definitions and Measurement 
Panel A: Variables of the main tests 
Variable Name Definition 
R Quarterly share returns, calculated as raw returns: 
𝑃𝑡−𝑃𝑡−1
𝑃𝑡−1
 where P is Thomson 
Reuters Datastream item P and t indicates quarters 
E Net income before preferred dividends (Thomson Reuters Worldscope item: 
WC01651A or, if not available from this source, from 10-Q/10-K filings) 
E_excl_DVA E – DVA 
DVA Debt value adjustments due to a change in own credit risk on liabilities for which the 
fair value option has been elected (DVAs), source: 10-Q/10-K filings 
FVA Fair value assets (source: 10-Q/10-K filings) divided by total assets (WC02999A or, 
if not available from this source, from 10-Q/10-K filings) 
FVA1 Fair value assets at level 1 divided by total assets 
FVA23 Fair value assets at level 2 and 3 divided by total assets 
FVA12 Fair value assets at level 1 and 2 divided by total assets 
FVA3 Fair value assets at level 3 divided by total assets 
UIA Unrecognized intangible assets, measured as market value of equity (Datastream 
item: MV) minus book value of equity (WC03501A or, if not available from this 
source, from 10-Q/10-K filings) 
OCI Quarterly other comprehensive income, source: 10-Q/10-K filings 
LEV Leverage, calculated as total liabilities (WC03351A or, if not available from this 
source, from 10-Q/10-K filings) divided by total assets 
SIZE Natural logarithm of market value of equity (Datastream item: MV) 
Panel B: Variables of the sensitivity tests 
Variable Name Definition 
HighFVA Binary variable indicating an above median value of FVA within the full sample 
HighFVA1 Binary variable indicating an above median value of FVA1/FVA23 within the full 
sample 
HighFVA12 Binary variable indicating an above median value of FVA12/FVA3 within the full 
sample 
HighFVA1_75 Binary variable indicating a value above the 75%-quantile of FVA1/FVA23 within 
the full sample 
GOV41 Composite governance index of 41 individual attributes, established by Aggarwal et 
al. 2011. As the index is not available as time-series data beyond the year 2008, I 
assume stickiness of the index on the firm-level and use the youngest available index 
for each firm as a firm-level variable, source: 
http://faculty.msb.edu/aggarwal/Gov.xls 
CR Quarterly share returns, calculated as daily compounded returns 
This table summarizes the definitions and the measurements of the variables used in this paper. All 10-Q/10-K 
filings are collected from the SEC Edgar database. 
 
3.5 Sample selection and data collection 
Following prior literature on the fair value option for liabilities, I constrain my sample to 
firms from the banking industry (e.g. Cedergren et al. 2015; Schneider and Tran 2015). I 
consider 36,096 firm-quarters between 2007 and 2014 of all 1128 bank holding companies 
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that filed a report on Consolidated Financial Statements for Holding Companies (FRY9C) in 
the fourth quarter of 2014. FRY9C reports contain the item “F553: Net gains (losses) on 
liabilities [elected to account for under a fair value option]”. It follows that all firms that filed 
a non-zero entry for this item are necessarily adopters of the fair value option for liabilities 
(FVOL) while the others are most likely not (see very similar Cedergren et al. 2015). The 
drawbacks of this approach are: It falsely labels adopters as non-adopters of the FVOL if they 
never had a change in the value of fair value liabilities. Because such firms are not in the 
focus of my investigation, I find the approach still suitable. It also neglects firms that applied 
the FVOL only in 2007, because the item “F553: Net gains (losses) on liabilities [elected to 
account for under a fair value option]” has only been part of FRY9C reports since the first 
quarter of 2008. Lastly, it ignores all bank holding companies that did not file FRY9C reports 
in the fourth quarter of 2014. Therefore, the sample contains a size and a survivorship bias. 
The size bias should be a minor concern, as it is mostly large firms that elect the FVOL (see 
Henry 2009; Guthrie et al. 2011). 
Because the regulatory data from FRY9C filings is possibly not fully compliant with 
US GAAP regulation, I only use it to identify 64 “FVOL adopters” (i.e., firms with a 
minimum of one non-zero entry for item F553 in the sample period). This excludes 34,048 
firm-quarters. Afterwards, I hand-collect all available 10-Q and 10-K filings of the 64 FVOL 
adopters between 2007 and 2014. I exclude 800 firm-quarters of 25 adopters for which there 
are no SEC filings available for the sample period.14 I further exclude 192 firm-quarters of six 
adopters that did not disclose any information on FVOL adoption in their 10-Q or 10-K 
filings. Finally, I exclude 32 firm-quarters of one adopter whose price data is unavailable in 
the Thomson Reuters Datastream database. My final sample consists of the 617 firm-quarters 
in which the remaining 32 bank holding companies adopted the FVOL. Table 3.2 displays the 
sample selection process. 
  
                                                 
14 These firms are not listed in the United States or not required to file reports for other legal reasons. 
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Table 3.2 Sample Selection 
Sample: Firms-quarters with FVOL adoption between 2007 and 2014 
 Firm-quarters between 2007 and 2014 of all bank holding companies filing FRY9C 
reports in 4Q2014 
  
36,096  
- Firms without FVOL adoption in the sample period -34,048 2,048 
- Firms without SEC filings throughout sample period (10-Q/10-K) -800 1,248 
- Firms without information on FVOL adoption in SEC filings -192 1,056 
- Firms without price data on Thomson Reuters Datastream -32 1.024 
- Firm-quarters without FVOL adoption -407 617 
This table displays the sample selection process. “Firms without FVOL adoption” are firms that never filed a non-zero 
entry for item “F553: Net gains (losses) on liabilities [elected to account for under a fair value option]” in their 
FRY9C reports between 2008 and 2014 (the item in question was not part of the FRY9C report in 2007). I determine 
“Firm-quarters without FVOL adoption” by analyzing hand-collected SEC filings (10-Q/10-K).  
3.6 Results 
3.6.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3.3 shows descriptive statistics for the regression inputs. Panel A displays descriptive 
statistics for the unscaled inputs. The mean quarterly share return in the sample is 0.68% 
(median: 0.97%). Quarterly earnings are positive on average with a mean of $536 million 
(median: $22.8 million). DVAs are negative on average with a mean of -$10.4 million 
(median: $0.00 million). The lowest DVA in the sample is -$3.60 billion and was recognized 
by Bank of America Corp. in the second quarter of 2009. The largest DVA in the sample is 
$4.51 billion and was also recognized by Bank of America Corp. in the third quarter of 2011. 
The other comprehensive income in the sample has a mean of -$20.2 million (median: $0.3 
million). The proportion of assets that firms measured at fair value is 25.63% on average 
(median: 22.51%). The mean proportion of level 1 fair value assets is 4.48% (median: 1.09%). 
The minimum is 0.00% indicating that in some quarters, some firms held no level 1 fair 
valued assets. The maximum is 27.30%. For level 2 fair valued assets, the mean proportion 
throughout the sample period is 19.53% (median: 18.94%). The average proportion of assets 
that sample firms carry at fair value level 3 is 1.62% (median: 0.83%). Panel B, Panel C, and 
Panel D show descriptive statistics for variables scaled by lagged market value of equity, for 
variables scaled by lagged total assets, and of regression inputs of the sensitivity tests 
respectively. 
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Table 3.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics on regression inputs (unscaled) 
 Mean Standard 
Dev 
Min Median Max N 
R 0.0068 0.2161 -0.7801 0.0097 0.9923 617 
E 0.5364 1.6249 -9.8330 0.0228 6.3130 617 
E_excl_DVA 0.5468 1.6927 -10.2760 0.0232 6.8240 617 
DVA -0.0104 0.4919 -3.6000 0.0000 4.5060 617 
FVA 0.2563 0.1461 0.0253 0.2251 0.8046 617 
FVA1 0.0448 0.0632 0.0000 0.0109 0.2730 617 
FVA2 0.1953 0.1037 0.0002 0.1894 0.5571 617 
FVA3 0.0162 0.0195 0.0000 0.0083 0.1702 617 
UIA -3.9100 25.4036 -155.0156 0.0186 130.6114 617 
OCI -0.0202 0.9207 -11.1940 0.0003 5.3700 617 
LEV 0.8982 0.0240 0.8255 0.9009 0.9703 617 
SIZE 1.2636 2.5005 -3.9065 0.7709 5.5362 617 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics on regression inputs scaled by lagged market value of equity 
E 0.0017 0.2300 -2.5736 0.0173 4.4116 617 
E_excl_DVA 0.0025 0.2278 -2.5480 0.0176 4.3446 617 
DVA -0.0008 0.0121 -0.1153 0.0000 0.0768 617 
UIA -0.1747 1.0719 -16.5628 0.0207 0.9898 617 
OCI -0.0001 0.0397 -0.6731 0.0003 0.3850 617 
Panel C: Descriptive statistics on regression inputs scaled by lagged total assets 
E 0.0010 0.0039 -0.0416 0.0019 0.0195 617 
E_excl_DVA 0.0010 0.0039 -0.0416 0.0019 0.0192 617 
DVA -0.0000 0.0004 -0.0037 0.0000 0.0041 617 
UIA 0.0096 0.0491 -0.2878 0.0017 0.2214 617 
OCI -0.0000 0.0017 -0.0086 0.0000 0.0180 617 
Panel D: Descriptive statistics on regression inputs of the sensitivity tests 
GOV41 0.6932 0.0942 0.4390 0.7317 0.8293 611 
QCReturn -0.0003 0.0037 -0.0230 0.0001 0.0105 617 
Panel A of this table provides descriptive statistics on regression inputs if unscaled. Panel B and C provide 
descriptive statistics on regression inputs scaled by lagged market value of equity and scaled by lagged total 
assets respectively. Panel D provides descriptive statistics on regression inputs of the sensitivity tests. For 
variable definitions, see Table 3.1. 
Table 3.4 displays the correlation coefficients of the regression inputs. Panel A displays the 
correlation coefficients for unscaled inputs. Quarterly share returns are positively associated 
with quarterly net income and with quarterly other comprehensive income but negatively 
associated with DVAs. Apart from that, DVAs are not significantly associated with other 
variables except for a negative association with net income excluding DVAs and with OCI. 
Panel B, Panel C, and Panel D show regression coefficients for variables scaled by lagged 
market value of equity, for variables scaled by lagged total assets, and for regression inputs of 
the sensitivity tests respectively. 
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Table 3.4 Correlation Coefficients 
Panel A: Correlation coefficients of regression inputs (unscaled) 
N=617 
R E E_excl_ 
DVA 
DVA FVA FVA1 FVA23 FVOL OCI LEV SIZE 
R 1           
E 0.109 1          
E_excl_ 
DVA 
0.204 0.957 1         
DVA -0.342 0.011 -0.280 1 
   
   
 
FVA 0.035 0.362 0.350 -0.009 1 
  
   
 
FVA1 0.020 0.368 0.359 -0.020 0.701 1 
 
   
 
FVA23 0.035 0.266 0.255 -0.001 0.915 0.352 1    
 
FVOL 0.029 0.308 0.312 -0.056 0.745 0.574 0.652 1   
 
OCI 0.148 0.106 0.177 -0.258 -0.012 -0.005 -0.013 -0.047 1  
 
LEV -0.050 0.140 0.117 0.057 0.372 0.409 0.256 0.353 -0.039 1 
 
SIZE 0.094 0.452 0.445 -0.036 0.619 0.600 0.472 0.616 -0.014 0.195 1 




DVA FVA FVA1 FVA23 FVA12 FVA3 UIA OCI LEV SIZE 
R 1             
E 0.044 1            
E_excl_
DVA 
0.061 0.999 1       
    
DVA -0.320 0.207 0.155 1          
FVA 0.036 0.044 0.048 -0.064 1         
FVA1 0.020 0.042 0.047 -0.083 0.701 1        
FVA23 0.036 0.034 0.037 -0.036 0.914 0.352 1       
FVA12 0.036 0.045 0.048 -0.057 0.993 0.684 0.914 1      
FVA3 0.017 0.019 0.024 -0.079 0.563 0.475 0.469 0.461 1     
UIA 0.065 -0.010 -0.015 0.092 0.072 -0.007 0.099 0.081 -0.022 1    
OCI 0.121 0.293 0.303 -0.143 0.016 -0.001 0.022 0.015 0.020 0.322 1   
LEV -0.050 -0.073 -0.073 -0.008 0.371 0.409 0.255 0.350 0.340 0.020 -0.036 1  
SIZE 0.094 0.100 0.105 -0.080 0.620 0.600 0.472 0.600 0.457 0.113 0.026 0.195 1 
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Table 3.4 (continued) 




DVA FVA FVA1 FVA23 FVA12 FVA3 UIA OCI LEV SIZE 
R 1             
E 0.107 1            
E_excl_
DVA 
0.140 0.994 1       
    
DVA -0.315 0.023 -0.083 1          
FVA 0.036 0.118 0.120 -0.030 1         
FVA1 0.020 0.083 0.089 -0.056 0.701 1        
FVA23 0.036 0.107 0.108 -0.007 0.914 0.352 1       
FVA12 0.036 0.131 0.134 -0.032 0.993 0.684 0.914 1      
FVA3 0.017 -0.030 -0.030 0.002 0.563 0.475 0.469 0.461 1     
UIA 0.092 0.228 0.225 0.030 -0.070 -0.028 -0.076 -0.050 -0.178 1    
OCI 0.065 -0.164 -0.162 -0.022 -0.005 -0.008 -0.002 -0.001 -0.029 0.008 1   
LEV -0.050 -0.068 -0.072 0.043 0.371 0.409 0.255 0.350 0.340 0.201 -0.033 1  
SIZE 0.094 0.159 0.162 -0.036 0.620 0.600 0.472 0.600 0.457 -0.081 -0.039 0.195 1 















UIA OCI LEV SIZE 
R 1             
CR 0.966 1            
E_excl_ 
DVA 
0.061 0.093 1       
    
DVA -0.320 -0.293 0.155 1          
High 
FVA1 
0.017 -0.004 0.028 -0.069 1      
   
High 
FVA12 
0.000 0.023 -0.020 0.076 -0.280 1     
   
High 
FVA1_75 








0.027 0.020 0.043 -0.065 0.322 -0.309 0.323 0.343 1    
 
UIA 0.065 0.127 -0.015 0.092 -0.074 0.044 -0.114 0.073 -0.077 1    
OCI 0.121 0.109 0.303 -0.143 -0.020 -0.025 -0.033 0.048 0.011 0.322 1   
LEV -0.050 -0.078 -0.073 -0.008 0.277 -0.190 0.317 0.261 -0.154 0.020 -0.036 1  
SIZE 0.094 0.111 0.105 -0.080 0.514 -0.399 0.428 0.453 0.582 0.113 0.026 0.195 1 
Panel A of this table provides correlation coefficients on regression inputs if unscaled. Panel B and C provide 
correlation coefficients on regression inputs scaled by lagged market value of equity and scaled by lagged total 
assets respectively. Panel D provides correlation coefficients on regression inputs of the sensitivity tests. Bold 
letters indicate significance at the 10%-level. For variable definitions, see Table 3.1. 
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3.6.2 Value relevance tests 
Table 3.5 shows the results of the multivariate return regression analysis that tests for DVAs’ 
value relevance. In Model 1, earnings (including DVAs) are not significantly associated with 
returns. Splitting earnings in DVAs and the remaining components of earnings (Model 2), I 
find that the coefficient on DVA is significantly negative. This is consistent with DVAs not 
being value relevant for investors in the sample, in line with findings of Cedergren et al. 
(2015). While this stands in contrast to the findings of Chung et al. (2012), their sample 
differs from mine in several aspects, for example, their sample period goes only until  2010. 
In Model 3, I test whether the proportion of corresponding assets measured at fair value 
mediates the value relevance of DVAs. As the coefficient on the variable that tests for this 
association (DVA*FVA) is insignificant, I conclude that this is not the case. Additionally, an 
F-Test for the coefficients on DVA and DVA*FVA shows that the coefficients are not jointly 
significant (p-value: 0.8200). In conclusion, while Fontes et al. (2014) demonstrate that a 
higher proportion of fair value assets is generally able to mediate the information asymmetry 
from DVAs among investors, I do not find that a higher proportion of fair value assets 
similarly improves investors’ perception of DVAs concerning DVAs’ value relevance. 
Among other reasons, one explanation could be the different samples between their and my 
study. Especially, Fontes et al. 2014 conduct their tests for a sample of European banks, not 
US banks. 
Concerning my main tests, I find that the coefficient on DVA*FVA1 in Model 4 is 
significantly positive. Additionally, an F-test shows joint significance for DVA and 
DVA*FVA1 (p-value: 0.0000). This finding suggests an increasing DVA value relevance in 
the presence of a higher proportion of corresponding level 1 fair value assets. The finding is 
consistent with investors being able to better assess the wealth transfers between shareholders 
and debtholders due to changes in credit risk (and therewith: DVAs), when the corresponding 
assets provide reliable information on the change in credit risk. In contrast, the coefficient on 
DVA*FVA23 is negative. An F-test shows joint significance of the coefficients on DVA and 
DVA*FVA23 (p-value: 0.0885). This finding suggests that a higher proportion of level 2 and 3 
fair values do not increase DVAs’ value relevance. The finding is consistent with the notion 
that investors do not price the wealth transfer between shareholders and debtholders due to a 
change in credit risk (as reflected by DVAs), when the corresponding assets related to the 
change in credit risk are recognized on the balance sheet but not measured reliably. In Model 
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5, the coefficients on FVA12 and FVA3 are insignificant and not jointly significant with DVA. 
This implies that the found association between DVAs’ value relevance and fair values’ 
reliability from Model 4 does not hold when classifying level 2 assets as reliable. In the light 
of findings from Hitz (2007) and Song et al. (2010), this is somewhat surprising. A potential 
explanation could lie in the relatively low proportions of level 3 fair value assets that firms 
hold in my sample. The descriptive statistics from Table 3.3 show that the average proportion 
of held level 3 fair value assets (1.62%) is notably smaller than the proportions of level 1 
(4.48%) and level 2 fair value assets (19.53%). This finding could be indicative of a mutual 
understanding of investors and managers that level 3 fair value measures are not reliable and 
thus managers waive from using level 3 measures due to expected negative effects. As the 
amounts of firms’ level 3 fair value assets are consequently low, they are relatively less likely 
to reflect the changes in credit risk that underlie DVAs. 
Throughout the tests, the coefficient on DVA*UIA is significantly negative. This is 
consistent with the finding of Cedergren et al. (2015) that DVAs are more value relevant 
when the level of related unrecognized intangible assets is low. However, in contrast to their 
findings, I do not find value relevance for earnings throughout the models. Also, unlike them, 
I do not find DVAs to be value relevant in Model 2, the model which most closely follows 
Cedergren et al. 2015. The differences are potentially due to the fact that both studies’ 
samples are relatively small as adoption of the fair value option for liabilities is not 
widespread (Guthrie et al. 2011). Therefore, the small differences in variable measures and in 
the sample selection between their study and my study might lead to the differing results. To 
highlight one difference in variable measures: Cedergren et al. (2015) include DVAs in their 
sample that are only recognized in regulatory reports (FRY9C reports) but not in annual and 
quarterly reports (10-Q and 10-K filings). In annual and quarterly reports, firms need to 
disclose only “significant” DVAs (FASB 2007). Therefore, a number of firms disclose DVAs 
only in regulatory reports as anecdotal evidence in the course of my data collection suggests. 
Contacting investor relations services of such firms, I receive confirmation that this is indeed 
a matter of materiality. I do not include such DVAs in my sample as they are possibly not 
compliant with US GAAP regulation and “not audited or reviewed by external auditors” 
(Cedergren et al. 2015). However, the higher relevance of DVAs that the findings of 
Cedergren et al. (2015) reflect in comparison to my findings could potentially be driven by 
their inclusion of such DVAs. This would imply that investors, on average, price DVAs even 
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when they are not recognized in annual and quarterly reports, consistent with the findings of 
Barth et al. 2008. 
In sum, my findings add to the findings of Cedergren et al. 2015. Their study shows 
that investors do not price DVAs when the sources of the change in credit risk are clouded by 
a large amount of unrecognized intangible assets. My findings additionally show that even 
when the corresponding assets are recognized at fair value on the balance sheet, investors 
demand high reliability of these assets’ fair values to perceive them as useful for their 
assessment of the value relevance of DVAs. 
Table 3.5 Value Relevance Test 
Dependent variable: Quarterly Share Return Rt 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
E -0.0059     
 (-0.29)     
      
E_excl_DVA  -0.0057 -0.0689 -0.0857 -0.0030 
  (-0.09) (-0.65) (-1.25) (-0.05) 
      
DVA  -7.6002*** -13.5498 -5.5998 -10.5727 
  (-3.38) (-1.47) (-0.70) (-1.05) 
      
DVA*FVA   16.8740   
   (0.72)   
      
DVA*FVA1    51.4527***  
    (6.93)  
      
DVA*FVA23    -32.3260  
    (-1.08)  
      
DVA*FVA12     1.6034 
     (0.05) 
      
DVA*FVA3     43.5183 
     (0.94) 
      
FVA   -0.0714   
   (-0.72)   
      
FVA1    -0.0822  
    (-0.49)  
      
FVA23    0.0030  
    (0.06)  
      
FVA12     -0.0216 
     (-0.21) 
      
FVA3     -0.2095 
     (-0.22) 
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Table 3.5 (continued)    
DVA*UIA  -0.9430* -1.9121* -1.4215*** -1.1703** 
  (-1.72) (-1.75) (-4.17) (-2.21) 
      
UIA  0.0177* 0.0290* 0.0235** 0.0176 
  (1.76) (1.94) (2.34) (1.60) 
      
OCI 0.6417* 0.1216 -0.2351 -0.0262 0.1176 
 (1.89) (0.40) (-0.41) (-0.09) (0.38) 
      
LEV -0.6033* -0.5476 -0.6792* -0.4596 -0.4574 
 (-1.68) (-1.47) (-1.78) (-0.94) (-1.43) 
      
SIZE 0.0090** 0.0059 0.0062* 0.0073** 0.0069* 
 (2.08) (1.59) (1.89) (2.06) (1.90) 
      
Constant 0.5373* 0.4891 0.6176* 0.4128 0.4151 
 (1.73) (1.53) (1.95) (1.00) (1.61) 
F-Tests (two-sided):      
DVA+DVA*UIA  0.0016 0.1179 0.3879 0.2565 
DVA+DVA*FVA   0.8200   
DVA+DVA*FVA1    0.0000  
DVA+DVA*FVA23    0.0885  
DVA+DVA*FVA12     0.7081 
DVA+DVA*FVA3     0.4987 
Adj. R² 0.0208 0.1295 0.1322 0.1518 0.1274 
N 617 617 617 617 617 
This table displays coefficient estimates from an OLS model. The underlying regression model is (Model 5): 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸_𝑒𝑥𝑐𝑙_𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝑉𝐴12𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝑉𝐴3𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐹𝑉𝐴12𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽
6
𝐹𝑉𝐴3𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑈𝐼𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑈𝐼𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑂𝐶𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
For all variable definitions, see Table 1. E, E_excl_DVA, DVA, OCI, and UIA are scaled by lagged market value 
of equity. The regression models have standard errors that are heteroscedasticity robust and clustered at firm and 
quarter-year level. t-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively. 
3.6.3 Market pricing tests 
Table 3.6 displays the results of the tests for DVAs’ market pricing. In Model 1, I find the 
coefficient on E to be insignificant. Accordingly, earnings in period t are not associated with 
returns in subsequent periods, suggesting that markets price earnings (including DVAs) 
efficiently at their announcement. In Model 2, I disaggregate earnings in DVAs and its 
remaining components. Here, the coefficient on DVAs is also insignificant suggesting that 
financial markets price DVAs efficiently in general at their announcement. This potentially 
stands in contrast to concerns from the public DVA debate that DVAs blur investors’ view on 
firm performance. In Model 3, I additionally control for firms’ proportion of fair value assets. 
Here, the coefficient on DVA is significantly negative. This suggests that DVA information is 
not fully incorporated into share prices after its announcement. Instead, the DVAs also 
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negatively affect share returns in the following year. This is consistent with financial markets 
overreacting to the announcements of DVAs in financial reports under certain circumstances. 
 To shed more light on this finding, I further disaggregate the variable FVA in Model 4 
into the proportion of assets carried at level 1 fair values (FVA1) and carried at level 2 and 3 
fair values (FVA23). The significantly positive coefficient on FVA23 implies that financial 
markets underreact to DVAs when large proportions of assets are measured at level 2 and 3 
fair values. This is consistent with a too conservative pricing of DVAs by investors when the 
sources of the underlying change in credit risk are not reliably measured and displayed. At the 
same time, the coefficient on DVA*FVA1 is insignificant. This suggests that the proportion of 
reliably measured fair value assets has no association with investors’ market pricing of DVAs. 
The coefficients on the test variable in Model 5 confirm the findings of Model 4, but with a 
lower level of significance. This is consistent with level 1 and level 2 fair values having less 
similar properties in the context of this test than level 2 and level 3 fair values. As in Section 
3.6.2, I caution the reader to consider the overall low proportion of level 3 fair value assets in 
the sample as an additional explanation for the lower significance of the coefficient on 
DVA*FVA3 compared to DVA*FVA23. 
In conclusion, the tests of DVAs’ market pricing suggest that financial markets 
generally price DVAs efficiently at their announcement in financial statements. However, 
when sources of the underlying change in credit risk are not transparent on the balance sheet, 
specifically, when the proportion of fair value assets on the balance sheet is small or largely 
consists of level 2 and 3 fair value assets, financial markets tend to overreact respectively 
underreact to DVAs initially and later correct their pricing. In the summary of FAS 159, the 
FASB states that the standard’s objective is to improve financial reporting by enabling firms 
to mitigate volatility caused by measuring related assets and liabilities differently. My 
findings stress the importance of an application of the FVOL in accordance with FAS 159 for 
investors to be able to efficiently price DVAs. Specifically, the desired positive financial 
markets effects from the application of the option seem to be conditional on a thorough and 
reliable measurement of related fair value assets. 
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Table 3.6 Market Pricing Test 
Dependent variable: Future Returns Rt+4 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
E 0.0483     
 (1.07)     
      
E_excl_DVA  0.0490 0.2416*** 0.1574 0.0622 
  (0.44) (3.01) (1.55) (0.53) 
      
DVA  1.5790 -10.8050* -20.8923*** -11.4509** 
  (1.31) (-1.96) (-3.63) (-2.27) 
      
DVA*FVA   24.0005   
   (1.36)   
      
DVA*FVA1    -6.1090  
    (-0.97)  
      
DVA*FVA23    84.4136***  
    (3.70)  
      
DVA*FVA12     24.1461 
     (1.12) 
      
DVA*FVA3     81.7636* 
     (1.81) 
      
FVA   0.2273   
   (1.22)   
      
FVA1    0.1877  
    (0.48)  
      
FVA23    0.2188  
    (1.47)  
      
FVA12     0.2218 
     (1.52) 
      
FVA3     0.2759 
     (0.21) 
      
DVA*UIA  0.2719 1.2579 -0.2874 -0.5129 
  (0.35) (1.33) (-0.99) (-1.26) 
      
UIA  -0.0207 -0.0428 -0.0279 -0.0205 
  (-0.92) (-1.54) (-1.25) (-0.94) 
      
OCI 0.6332* 0.8881* 1.6022** 0.9934** 0.8471* 
 (1.71) (1.87) (2.05) (2.02) (1.72) 
      
LEV -1.7583* -1.7652* -1.8159* -2.0051* -2.0599** 
 (-1.96) (-1.88) (-1.71) (-1.75) (-1.97) 
      
SIZE 0.0055 0.0068 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0013 
 (0.77) (0.91) (-0.09) (-0.10) (-0.16) 
      
Constant 1.5813** 1.5831* 1.5811* 1.7523* 1.8001** 
 (1.99) (1.90) (1.70) (1.75) (1.98) 
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Table 3.6 (continued)     
F-Tests (two-sided):      
DVA+DVA*UIA  0.2516 0.1221 0.0001 0.0059 
DVA+DVA*FVA   0.2773   
DVA+DVA*FVA1    0.0001  
DVA+DVA*FVA23    0.0002  
DVA+DVA*FVA12     0.4611 
DVA+DVA*FVA3     0.1237 
Adj. R² 0.0224 0.0230 0.0423 0.0443 0.0319 
N 617 617 617 617 617 
This table displays coefficient estimates from an OLS model. The underlying regression model is (Model 5): 
𝑅𝑖𝑡+4 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸_𝑒𝑥𝑐𝑙_𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝑉𝐴12𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝑉𝐴3𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐹𝑉𝐴12𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽
6
𝐹𝑉𝐴3𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑈𝐼𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑈𝐼𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑂𝐶𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
For all variable definitions, see Table 3.1. E, E_excl_DVA, DVA, OCI, and UIA are scaled by lagged market 
value of equity. The regression models have standard errors that are heteroscedasticity robust and clustered at 
firm and quarter-year level. t-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
3.6.4 Persistence tests 
Table 3.7 displays the results of the tests of DVAs’ persistence. In Model 1, the coefficient on 
earnings is positive and significant. This is consistent with earnings (including DVAs) being 
persistent, i.e., being associated with future earnings. The coefficient is significantly different 
from 1 (p-value: 0.0000, untabulated), which indicates that earnings are not fully persistent in 
the sample but instead revert to the mean over time (Chen et al. 2011). Separating DVAs from 
earnings in Model 2 results in an insignificant negative coefficient on DVA. This is consistent 
with DVAs not being persistent. In Model 3, the coefficient on DVA is significantly negative 
stressing DVAs’ lack of persistence. Instead, positive (negative) DVAs seem to indicate 
smaller (higher) earnings one year later. This is likely due to the fact that changes in the value 
of a firm’s credit risk are not only subject to firm’s actions, for example, its management and 
its credit risk politics, but are also influenced by factors beyond their control, for example, the 
economy. I test whether DVAs’ lack of persistence is moderated by the proportion of assets 
that firms measure at fair value. The significantly positive coefficient on DVA*FVA and the F-
test for joint significance of the coefficients on DVA*FVA and DVA (p-value: 0.0014) indicate 
that this is the case. 
In Model 4, I additionally test whether the level of fair value assets moderates the 
association found in Model 3. The significantly positive coefficient on DVA*FVA23 implies 
that the results from Model 3 are driven by level 2 and level 3 fair values, i.e., DVAs’ 
persistence is higher when a larger proportion of assets is carried at level 2 and 3 fair values. 
In Model 5, the significant positive coefficient on DVA*FVA12 and the insignificant 
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coefficient on DVA*FVA3 suggest that the findings from Model 4 are mainly attributable to 
level 2 fair value assets. Among other potential explanations, DVAs’ increased persistence in 
the presence of large proportions of level 2 fair value assets could be a result of higher 
managerial discretion regarding earnings (Dechow et al. 2010) and is a potential reason for 
the demonstrated lower value relevance of DVAs under these circumstances. However, if 
managerial discretion was a main driver for DVAs’ persistence, one would also expect to find 
a significantly positive association between the persistence and large proportions of level 3 
fair values, as level 3 fair values’ measurement allows for the largest managerial discretion 
(e.g., Song et al. 2010). However, I do not find such an association. A possible explanation for 
this could be that proportions of level 3 fair values on average are low within in the sample. 
This could limit managers’ scope for exercising discretion concerning level 3 fair values and 
might shift their focus on level 2 fair values in this regard instead.  
Table 3.7 Persistence Test 
Dependent variable: Future Earnings Et+4 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
E 0.1975***     
 (4.12)     
      
E_excl_DVA  0.1576*** 0.1565*** 0.1552*** 0.1521*** 
  (2.89) (3.20) (3.03) (3.18) 
      
DVA  -0.6334 -3.5883*** -3.8701*** -3.7637*** 
  (-1.32) (-2.82) (-3.22) (-2.85) 
      
DVA*FVA   6.8498***   
   (2.97)   
      
DVA*FVA1    5.6486  
    (1.47)  
      
DVA*FVA23    8.8878***  
    (3.37)  
      
DVA*FVA12     7.7474*** 
     (2.88) 
      
DVA*FVA3     6.6312 
     (1.03) 
      
FVA   0.0036*   
   (1.78)   
      
FVA1    0.0020  
    (0.67)  
      
FVA23    0.0023  
    (1.43)  
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Table 3.7 (continued)     
FVA12     0.0027 
     (1.53) 
      
FVA3     -0.0057 
     (-0.41) 
      
DVA*UIA  -14.9985 -21.2597** -22.3225** -21.7197* 
  (-1.12) (-2.18) (-2.26) (-1.80) 
      
UIA  0.0112** 0.0113** 0.0120** 0.0114** 
  (2.23) (2.21) (2.28) (2.12) 
      
OCI 0.2353 0.2164 0.2170 0.2157 0.2127 
 (1.54) (1.43) (1.42) (1.40) (1.41) 
      
LEV -0.0095 -0.0148** -0.0158** -0.0183** -0.0171* 
 (-1.23) (-1.99) (-2.02) (-2.16) (-1.87) 
      
SIZE 0.0002* 0.0002** 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 
 (1.80) (2.13) (1.29) (1.37) (1.38) 
      
Constant 0.0092 0.0138** 0.0141** 0.0165** 0.0155* 
 (1.35) (2.11) (2.08) (2.26) (1.94) 
F-Tests (two-sided):      
DVA+DVA*UIA  0.2607 0.0176 0.0144 0.0456 
DVA+DVA*FVA   0.0014   
DVA+DVA*FVA1    0.5719  
DVA+DVA*FVA23    0.0029  
DVA+DVA*FVA12     0.0105 
DVA+DVA*FVA3     0.6076 
Adj. R² 0.0578 0.0733 0.0807 0.0762 0.0771 
N 617 617 617 617 617 
This table displays coefficient estimates from an OLS model. The underlying regression model is (Model 5): 
𝐸𝑖𝑡+4 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸_𝑒𝑥𝑐𝑙_𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝑉𝐴12𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝑉𝐴3𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐹𝑉𝐴12𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽
6
𝐹𝑉𝐴3𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑈𝐼𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑈𝐼𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑂𝐶𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
For all variable definitions, see Table 3.1. E, E_excl_DVA, DVA, OCI, and UIA are scaled by lagged total assets. 
The regression models have standard errors that are heteroscedasticity robust and clustered at firm and quarter-
year level. t-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively. 
3.7 Sensitivity tests 
I conduct several sensitivity tests to validate the robustness of my findings. I hereby focus on 
the tests of DVAs’ value relevance as my main contribution to prior literature. For a first 
sensitivity test, I use several binary variables and their interactions as an alternative proxy for 
the proportion and reliability of fair value assets. Specifically, I use the following model: 
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𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸_𝑒𝑥𝑐𝑙_𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑉𝐴 ∗ 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐹𝑉𝐴 ∗ 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐹𝑉𝐴1 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐹𝑉𝐴1𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐹𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐹𝑉𝐴1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐹𝑉𝐴1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐷𝑉𝐴 ∗ 𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽8𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑈𝐼𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑈𝐼𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑂𝐶𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽13𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(7) 
where HighFVA is a binary variable indicating a ratio of fair value assets to total assets above 
the sample’s median value and HighFVA1 is a binary variable indicating a ratio of level 1 fair 
value assets to level 2 and 3 fair value assets above the sample’s median value. Table 3.8 
displays the results. The findings from Model 1 do not support my findings from the main 
specification as the main test variable DVA*HighFVA*HighFVA1 is not significantly different 
from zero. This implies that in this specification, a high proportion of fair value assets in 
combination with a high proportion of such fair value assets being measured reliably do not 
improve the value relevance of DVAs. In Model 2, I employ the same model, but instead use 
a dummy that reflects an above median ratio of level 1 and 2 fair values relative to level 3 fair 
values (HighFVA12). Again, I do not find confirmation for my main tests. In Model 3, I 
further explore the reasons for the differences between these sensitivity tests and my main 
tests. For this, I rerun Model 1 with a dummy that indicates a ratio of level 1 fair value assets 
to level 2 and 3 fair value assets that lies above the 75%-quantile of the sample. I find that the 
coefficient on DVA*HighFVA*HighFVA1_75 is significantly positive. Furthermore the joint 
coefficient on DVA+DVA*HighFVA+DVA*HighFVA1_75 +DVA*HighFVA*HighFVA1_75 
is significantly positive (p-value: 0.0000) while the coefficient on DVA is significantly 
negative. This adds to my findings from the main test. Specifically, this finding is consistent 
with the notion that investors perceive DVAs as especially value relevant if the proportion of 
a firms’ related level 1 fair value assets is in the highest 25%-quantile.15 
In my next sensitivity test, I analyze an alternative measure of fair values assets’ 
reliability. Song et al. 2010 find that investors perceive a firm’s fair value assets’ valuation as 
more reliable when the firm has strong means of corporate governance. In conclusion, 
corporate governance could proxy for fair value assets’ reliability and therefore could mediate 
DVAs’ value relevance. To test for this, I include an interaction term for firms’ level of 
                                                 
15 I do not employ an according test with a binary variable indicating a value above the 75%-quantile of 
FVA12/FVA3. This is because such a split would result in an interaction term 
DVA*HighFVA*HighFVA12_75 that assumes only values of zero. 
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corporate governance with DVAs and with the proportion of fair value assets. Specifically, I 
use the following model: 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸_𝑒𝑥𝑐𝑙_𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐺𝑂𝑉41𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐺𝑂𝑉41𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐹𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐺𝑂𝑉41𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐺𝑂𝑉41𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐹𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽9𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑈𝐼𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑈𝐼𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑂𝐶𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽13𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(8) 
where GOV41 is the GOV41-Index from Aggarwal et al. 2011
16 and FVA is the proportion of 
assets measured at fair value. Table 3.8, Model 4 displays the test results. The coefficient on 
DVA*FVA*GOV41 is positive. This is consistent with DVAs’ being more value relevant for 
investors if a high proportion of assets is carried at fair value and the firm’s strong corporate 
governance implies that these assets’ fair values are reliable. The coefficient on DVA*FVA is 
negative which is in line with a high proportion of fair values assets possibly being 
detrimental to investors’ perception of DVAs, potentially because the overall average 
reliability of such fair values is low. The coefficient on DVA*GOV41 is not positive, 
suggesting that in my sample, DVAs’ value relevance is on average not higher for firms with 
higher corporate governance. However, none of the three coefficients is significantly different 
from zero. Therefore, this sensitivity test does not provide profound evidence to support the 
findings from my main tests. 
  
                                                 
16 Because this measure is unavailable for two banks in my sample, the sample size for this test is reduced by 
six firm-quarters. 
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Table 3.8 Sensitivity Tests with Ratio-Dummies and with Alternative Reliability Measure 
Dependent variable: Rt Rt Rt Rt 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Model specification: FVA1 FVA12 FVA1_75 Alt. Rel.Measure 
E_excl_DVA -0.0037 0.0155 -0.0122 -0.1213*** 
 (-0.06) (0.25) (-0.20) (-2.59) 
     
DVA -12.6906** -10.1497*** -10.9822*** 240.4261 
 (-2.27) (-10.88) (-6.19) (1.45) 
     
DVA*HighFVA*HighFVA1 -8.0345    
 (-0.69)    
     
DVA*HighFVA*HighFVA12  1.8247   
  (0.36)   
     
DVA*HighFVA*HighFVA1_7
5 
  18.2593***  
   (3.60)  
     
DVA*FVA*GOV41    986.9653 
    (1.31) 
     
DVA*HighFVA1 4.6853    
 (0.47)    
     
HighFVA*HighFVA1 -0.0479**    
 (-2.13)    
     
HighFVA1 0.0049    
 (0.51)    
     
DVA*HighFVA12  0.1091   
  (0.04)   
     
HighFVA*HighFVA12  0.0179   
  (0.50)   
HighFVA12  0.0146   
  (0.70)   
     
DVA*HighFVA1_75   -11.2783**  
   (-2.00)  
     
HighFVA*HighFVA1_75   -0.0134  
   (-0.61)  
     
HighFVA1_75   0.0083  
   (0.24)  
     
HighFVA*DVA 8.4601 2.5754 -3.2415***  
 (1.08) (1.15) (-3.82)  
     
HighFVA 0.0093 -0.0243 -0.0061  
 (0.47) (-0.71) (-0.34)  
     
DVA*FVA    -693.3175 
    (-1.26) 
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Table 3.8 (continued)     
DVA*GOV41    -354.7850 
    (-1.57) 
     
FVA*GOV41    -0.6110* 
    (-1.95) 
     
FVA    0.3788*** 
    (4.08) 
     
GOV41    -0.0073 
    (-0.04) 
     
DVA*UIA -0.9577* -0.9982 -2.3682*** -1.2114 
 (-1.70) (-1.44) (-4.84) (-1.17) 
     
UIA 0.0155 0.0152** 0.0177 0.0259** 
 (1.37) (2.45) (1.32) (2.09) 
     
OCI 0.1243 0.1591 0.1019 -0.1395 
 (0.35) (0.60) (0.25) (-0.34) 
     
LEV -0.4024 -0.3635 -0.4495 -0.6439 
 (-1.12) (-1.49) (-1.04) (-1.13) 
     
SIZE 0.0107** 0.0091* 0.0074* 0.0124* 
 (2.14) (1.83) (1.80) (1.69) 
     
Constant 0.3601 0.3200 0.4039 0.5853 
 (1.20) (1.46) (1.11) (1.01) 
F-Tests (two-sided):     
DVA+DVA*UIA 0.0098 0.0000 0.0000 0.1526 
DVA*HighFVA*HighFVA1 0.0009    
DVA*HighFVA*HighFVA12  0.0000   
DVA*HighFVA*HighFVA1_75   0.0000  
DVA+DVA*FVA+DVA* 
GOV41+DVA*FVA*GOV41 
   0.2025 
Adj. R² 0.1261 0.1246 0.1397 0.1463 
N 617 617 617 611 
This table displays coefficient estimates from OLS models. The underlying regression models are 
Model 1: 























𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑈𝐼𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑈𝐼𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑂𝐶𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
Model 2 and Model 3 are constructed accordingly with 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐹𝑉𝐴12 respectively 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐹𝑉𝐴1_75 
 
Model 4: 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸_𝑒𝑥𝑐𝑙_𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐺𝑂𝑉41𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡
∗ 𝐺𝑂𝑉41𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐹𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐺𝑂𝑉41𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐹𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐺𝑂𝑉41𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑈𝐼𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑈𝐼𝐴𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽
11
𝑂𝐶𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽13𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
For all variable definitions, see Table 3.1. E, E_excl_DVA, DVA, OCI, and UIA are scaled by lagged market 
value of equity. The regression models have standard errors that are heteroscedasticity robust and clustered at 
firm and quarter-year level. t-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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 Next, I address the potential issue of possible correlated omitted variables. 
Specifically, my results could be driven by undetected firm characteristics that are associated 
with both, the proportion of reliable fair value assets and DVAs’ value relevance. To remove 
this concern, I add firm fixed effects to my main tests (i.e., Equation (1) and (2)). I 
simultaneously control for potential correlated time trends that could affect my results by 
adding quarter-year fixed effects. Table 3.9, Model 1 and 2 display the results of the 
regression estimation. Sign and significance of all main test variables remain unaltered by the 
inclusion of the fixed effects. 
 In a final robustness test, I use quarterly share returns that are calculated as daily 
compounded returns instead of raw returns as dependent variable for the estimation of my 
main tests (Equation (1) and (2)). Table 3.9, Model 3 and 4 display the results. Here, too, all 
coefficients on my test variables remain unchanged. Taken together, the results from the 
sensitivity tests provide some additional support for the findings of my main tests. 
Table 3.9 Sensitivity Tests with Fixed Effects and Daily Compounded Returns 
Dependent variable: Rt Rt CRt CRt 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Model specification: Incl. Fixed Effects Incl. Fixed Effects Comp. Returns Comp. Returns 
E_excl_DVA -0.1855*** -0.1203 -0.0002 0.0010 
 (-2.97) (-1.62) (-0.18) (1.06) 
     
DVA -4.0794 -11.9062 -0.0923 -0.1711 
 (-0.77) (-1.27) (-0.66) (-1.12) 
     
DVA*FVA1 46.0338***  0.7831***  
 (7.14)  (12.31)  
     
DVA*FVA23 -28.1997  -0.4848  
 (-1.62)  (-0.96)  
     
DVA*FVA12  22.3731  0.0375 
  (0.73)  (0.08) 
     
DVA*FVA3  -30.1589  0.6619 
  (-1.04)  (0.89) 
     
FVA1 0.0041  -0.0004  
 (0.02)  (-0.15)  
     
FVA23 -0.2453  -0.0001  
 (-1.13)  (-0.11)  
     
FVA12  -0.1910  0.0003 
  (-1.04)  (0.18) 
     
FVA3  -0.3197  -0.0134 
  (-0.18)  (-0.74) 
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Table 3.9 (continued) 
DVA*UIA -1.2134*** -1.0509*** -0.0197*** -0.0161 
 (-5.54) (-2.87) (-2.76) (-1.60) 
     
UIA -0.0192 -0.0307** 0.0007*** 0.0005** 
 (-1.61) (-2.58) (3.29) (2.50) 
     
OCI 0.5592*** 0.7409*** -0.0052 -0.0028 
 (3.08) (3.58) (-0.69) (-0.35) 
     
LEV 0.1941 0.2735 -0.0130 -0.0111** 
 (0.28) (0.33) (-1.57) (-1.97) 
     
SIZE 0.1533*** 0.1682*** 0.0001** 0.0001* 
 (3.79) (4.16) (2.19) (1.93) 
     
Constant -0.9317 -1.0864 0.0113 0.0096** 
 (-1.35) (-1.48) (1.62) (2.11) 
F-Tests (two-sided):     
DVA+DVA*UIA 0.3285 0.1800 0.4367 0.2387 
DVA+DVA*FVA1 0.0000  0.0000  
DVA+DVA*FVA23 0.0079  0.1176  
DVA+DVA*FVA12  0.6262  0.6942 
DVA+DVA*FVA3  0.2243  0.5043 
Adj. R² 0.5159 0.4976 0.1546 0.1391 
N 617 617 617 617 
This table displays coefficient estimates of OLS models. The underlying regression models are: 
Model 1: 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸_𝑒𝑥𝑐𝑙_𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝑉𝐴1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝑉𝐴23𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐹𝑉𝐴1𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽
6
𝐹𝑉𝐴23𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑈𝐼𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑈𝐼𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑂𝐶𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Model 2: 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸_𝑒𝑥𝑐𝑙_𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝑉𝐴12𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝑉𝐴3𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐹𝑉𝐴12𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽
6
𝐹𝑉𝐴3𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑈𝐼𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑈𝐼𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑂𝐶𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Model 3: 
𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸_𝑒𝑥𝑐𝑙_𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝑉𝐴1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝑉𝐴23𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐹𝑉𝐴1𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽
6
𝐹𝑉𝐴23𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑈𝐼𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑈𝐼𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑂𝐶𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Model 4: 
𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸_𝑒𝑥𝑐𝑙_𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝑉𝐴12𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝑉𝐴3𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐹𝑉𝐴12𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽
6
𝐹𝑉𝐴3𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑈𝐼𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑈𝐼𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑂𝐶𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
For all variable definitions, see Table 3.1. E, E_excl_DVA, DVA, OCI, and UIA are scaled by lagged market 
value of equity. The regression models have standard errors that are heteroscedasticity robust and clustered at 
firm and quarter-year level. t-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
3.8 Conclusion 
This study investigates the role of proportion and reliability of fair value assets on 
informational properties of DVAs. Based on an established return regression model, this 
study’s findings suggest that investors perceive the controversial DVAs as a value relevant 
part of firms’ net income if the sources of the underlying change in credit risk are made 
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transparent through a large proportion of reliably measured fair value assets. If, in contrast, a 
firm measures a large proportion of its assets at less reliable fair values, investors do not 
perceive DVAs as value relevant and tend to price them too conservatively. The findings 
further suggest that DVAs’ persistence is moderated by the proportion and reliability of 
related fair valued assets. 
 The findings contribute to two streams of literature. First, they extend the relatively 
young research on the financial market effects of DVAs. Building on prior literature, my 
findings suggest that even when assets are recognized and carried at fair value, they might not 
provide sufficient information about credit risk changes for investors to perceive the 
consequential DVAs as value relevant. Instead, a second necessary condition is that these fair 
value assets are measured reliably. This adds to our understanding of investors’ information 
demand regarding a part of income that critics describe as opaque and value irrelevant. 
 Second, the findings extend the literature on the role of fair value assets’ reliability. 
Prior literature shows that fair value assets’ reliability increases the value relevance of these 
assets (Song et al. 2010; Goh et al. 2015). Based on this, my findings suggest that the 
reliability of fair value assets’ measurement also increases investors’ perception of DVAs. 
Thereby, the finding improve our knowledge of the relevance of fair values assets’ reliability 
in financial accounting. They further enhance our understanding of potential differences 
between investors’ perception of level 1, level 2, and level 3 fair values. 
 However, my employed research setting does not allow for the identification of causal 
relations between the examined items. I therefore caution the reader to interpret my results as 
merely descriptive. For further limitations of this study, see Section 5.2. My findings create 
opportunities for future research. While the results show that investors benefit from a large 
proportion of reliably measured fair value assets for their assessment of DVAs, they do not 
allow for conclusions how exactly this information is processed by investors and what amount 
of transparency is required for an assessment of DVAs that benefits investors the most. 
Against the background of the ongoing DVA debate and the current changes in DVA 
accounting regulation, such research would be of interest. 
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4 “Some fuzzy math”- relational information on debt value 





Abstract: This study provides comprehensive descriptive evidence on managers’ and the 
financial press’ reporting of debt value adjustments due to a change in own credit risk 
(DVAs). The study is motivated by a public debate about DVAs in which critics name them 
“counterintuitive” and claim that managers disclose DVA information in a way that makes 
their firms “look good”. Analyzing a sample of 353 firm-quarters of 15 US financial firms 
that report DVAs between 2007 and 2014, I find that managers provide more DVA relational 
information in firm-quarters with large negative DVAs compared to positive DVAs. 
Analyzing newspaper articles on 202 firm-quarters, I find that the financial press is more 
likely to cover DVAs on which managers provide more information. Examining the contents 
of the articles, I find that the press is more likely to provide new DVA information if 
managers’ press releases contain little information. Finally, I find that the financial press often 
assumes a critical tone towards DVAs, especially when DVAs increase net income. The 
findings are in line with popular claims of asymmetric DVA reporting by managers. They also 
offer insights on the role of the financial press concerning the information of financial 
markets about controversial DVAs. 
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This study provides comprehensive descriptive evidence on relational information on debt 
value adjustments due to a change in credit risk (DVAs) as provided by managers and by the 
financial press. Under US GAAP and IFRS accounting regulation as applied to this day, 
DVAs cause net income gains when a firm’s credit risk deteriorates and net income losses 
when a firm’s credit risk improves. This characteristic has stirred an ongoing public debate. 
Critics perceive it as “counterintuitive” and call DVAs “some fuzzy math” (Dash 2009), “one 
of the more ridiculous concepts that’s ever been invented in accounting” (Rapoport 2012), a 
“mess” (Tchir 2012) or an “abomination” (Keoun and Henry 2010). They state that DVAs’ 
introduction in accounting was a result of lobbying efforts by big banks (Keoun 2008) that 
“were looking for ways to find profits” (Rice 2012). Moreover, critics accuse managers of 
asymmetric DVA reporting, i.e., highlight DVA losses but downplay DVA gains, in an 
attempt “to trick the media and investors” (Milstead 2012). Potentially incentivized by the 
debate, the IASB shifted DVAs’ recognition from net income to other comprehensive income 
for future periods (IASB 2014a). The FASB, acknowledging that DVAs are controversial 
(Rapoport and Lucchetti 2011) followed in January 2016 (FASB 2016). 
 The assessment of prior literature of DVAs is potentially not fully consistent. 
Theoretical literature warns that DVAs could be “counterintuitive” (Chasteen and Ransom 
2007) and even “dangerous” (Lipe 2002). Recent experimental literature finds that investors 
have difficulties interpreting firms’ performance and risk if DVAs influence net income 
(Gaynor et al. 2011; Lachmann et al. 2015). Somewhat in contrast to such concerns, recent 
empirical studies do not find that DVAs’ perceived counterintuitivity manifests in adverse 
capital market effects. Instead, the evidence suggests that investors perceive DVAs as value- 
and risk-relevant (Chung et al. 2012), that investors understand the relation between DVAs 
and incomplete fair value accounting (Cedergren et al. 2015), and that DVAs do not increase 
information asymmetry (Schneider and Tran 2015). 
So far, there is relatively little evidence on the occurrence, magnitude and reporting of 
DVAs. The young stream of DVA literature provides only few descriptive DVA statistics, 
mostly in the form of scaled measures (see e.g. Schneider and Tran 2015; Fontes et al. 2014) 
or for samples that potentially do not include all DVA reporting firms (Cedergren et al. 2015; 
Chung et al. 2012). Prior evidence on DVAs’ reporting stems from only two studies. Bischof 
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et al. (2014) find for a European sample that the majority of observed analysts explicitly 
exclude DVAs. Eichner and Mettler (2014) find low DVA disclosure quality in annual reports 
of European firms in the year 2012 in a preliminary study. Motivated by the public DVA 
debate, the recent changes in DVA accounting regulation, and the potentially varying 
assessment of DVAs in prior literature, I seek to add to these findings by providing 
comprehensive descriptive evidence on DVAs’ occurrence, magnitude and reporting by 
managers and the financial press. 
Analyzing 353 firm-quarters of DVA-reporting US firms between 2007 and 2014, I 
find that positive and negative DVAs occur equally often and on average with similar 
magnitude, contrasting concerns that managers use DVAs to systematically inflate their 
profits. Analyzing managers’ DVA reporting in corresponding quarterly earnings press 
releases, I find that managers present certain pieces of DVA information more regularly for 
negative than for positive DVAs. I also find weak evidence that managers provide more DVA 
relational information when they have opportunistic incentives to do so, for example, when 
negative DVAs turn a net profit into a loss. These findings are consistent with claims from the 
DVA debate that managers report negative, income-decreasing DVAs more transparently than 
positive DVAs which improve firms’ performance figures. 
 Analyzing 202 article-firm-quarters, I find that several factors determine the likelihood 
of financial press’ DVA reporting. Specifically, the probability for press coverage is higher 
for large positive DVAs, when managers provide more DVA information, and when 
managers place DVA information on the first page of their press release. The first finding is 
consistent with the press providing some counterweight to the emphasis on negative DVAs in 
firms’ press releases. The latter two findings are consistent with the financial press picking up 
spin from managers’ DVA reporting. 
 Analyzing the content of finacial press articles, I find that the financial press provides 
new information on DVAs beyond the information from the press release in 20.8% of the 
articles. The probability for new DVA information is higher when the corresponding press 
releases contain little information. Finally, I find that the financial press is more likely to 
critically comment on positive DVAs relative to negative DVAs. The findings are in line with 
the financial press assuming a “watchdog” role in two regards. First, in that the press adds 
new DVA information when DVA information by managers is scarce. Second, in that it takes 
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a critical stance especially against positive, income-increasing DVAs that could mislead 
investors towards a too positive evaluation of managers’ and firms’ performances. 
 Taken together, the findings contribute to the young DVA literature by providing 
thorough descriptive evidence on DVAs’ occurrence, magnitude and reporting by managers 
and the financial press in the US, thereby enhancing our knowledge of an unusually 
controversial accounting item. The results also contribute to the public DVA debate by 
providing clarification on some commonly heard arguments. Finally, the findings add to the 
literature on the financial press by expanding our knowledge of the press’ role as a provider of 
financial accounting information and critical watchdog of accounting and reporting practice. 
The results should be of interest to international accounting standard setters. For 
example, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB) take an active role in the public DVA debate acknowledging that 
DVAs are “controversial” (Rapoport and Lucchetti 2011) and “potentially misleading” (IASB 
2009). The regulation of DVA accounting is a central topic for both standard setters and has 
seen recent changes in US GAAP and IFRS (FASB 2016; IASB 2014a). The results should 
also be of interest to public policy makers who are involved in the DVA debate such as the 
European Commission that initially “carved-out” DVA accounting from their endorsement of 
accounting standard IAS 39 (EC 2005). Finally, the results should yield valuable insights to 
all remaining participants of the public DVA debate which include investors, researchers, 
managers, financial analysts, and rating agencies (Fitch Ratings 2012), amongst others. 
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section outlines the theoretical background on 
DVA accounting regulation, the public DVA debate, and prior literature. Section 4.3 
describes the sample selection and data collection. Section 4.4 presents results on DVAs’ 
occurrence, magnitude and reporting by managers. Section 4.5 presents results on DVAs’ 
reporting by the financial press and Section 4.6 concludes. 
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4.2 Debt value adjustments: theoretical background, the public debate, and prior 
literature 
4.2.1 Debt value adjustments due to a change in own credit risk (DVAs) 
In February 2007, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued the Statement of 
Financial Accounting Standards No. 159 (FAS 159), “The Fair Value Option for Financial 
Assets and Financial Liabilities” (new codification since 2009: ASC Topic 825-10). The fair 
value option for financial liabilities (FVOL) permits the recording of liabilities at fair value in 
US GAAP financial statements. The standard defines the fair value as a (hypothetical) market 
value. Firms may decide whether to elect the FVOL for each eligible item separately on each 
of its “election dates” which typically is the day of its first recognition. The option can only 
be applied to entire instruments (not just to portions) and cannot be revoked (FASB 2007). 
After application of the FVOL, firms need to update the fair values of the respective 
liabilities periodically. One reason for a change in a liability’s fair value is a change in firm’s 
own credit risk (FASB 2006). Naturally, if market participants assume that the probability for 
a settlement of an outstanding liability has changed, its market price and therewith its fair 
value will change. As Merton (1974) explains, a change in firm’s own credit risk causes a 
wealth redistribution between shareholders and debtholders of the firm that issued the debt. 
This is because a firm’s debt implies an option of the shareholders to put the firm’s assets to 
the debtholders for an amount equal to the debt’s face value. This option is an economic asset 
of the firm and its value depends on the value of the firm’s debt (Barth and Landsman 1995). 
For example, a decrease in the value of the firm’s debt means a wealth transfer from 
debtholders to shareholders. Or, to quote Barth and Landsman (1995): “Effectively, the 
debtholder contractually has committed to accept an interest rate that subsequently proves to 
be economically too low.” 
In this paper, I refer to such fair value changes due to a change in own credit risk as 
debt value adjustments or DVAs. To this day, DVAs are recognized in firms’ income 
statements and thereby increase or decrease firms’ net income. FAS 159/ASC 825 requires 
separate disclosure of DVAs in the notes of the financial statements if DVAs affected a 
liability’s fair value significantly. Firms further have to disclose reasons for the value changes 
and their determination (FASB 2007). After an amendment to ASC 825, DVAs will be 
recognized in other comprehensive income instead of net income in fiscal years beginning 
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after December 15, 2017 (FASB 2016). With IAS 39, IFRS accounting also introduced a fair 
value option for financial assets and liabilities that became effective in 2005. As in US GAAP 
accounting, IFRS firms initially recognized DVAs in net income. This changed with the 
introduction of IFRS 9 in 2014 that succeeded IAS 39 and requires recognition of DVAs in 
other comprehensive income instead (IASB 2014b). 
4.2.2 The public DVA debate  
Since DVAs’ introduction in US GAAP accounting, a large public debate surrounds them. 
Focal point of the debate is a unique characteristic of DVAs that critics perceive as 
counterintuitive: the fact that economically unfavorable increases in firms’ own credit risk 
lead to DVA gains which increase net income. If the firm’s credit risk decreases, on the other 
hand, it recognizes a loss from DVAs in net income. A first concern by critics is that investors 
are unable to differentiate between earnings from DVAs and core earnings. They suspect that, 
as a consequence, investors’ view on the actual firm performance could be blurred, e.g. in 
cases in which large DVA gains turn a net loss into a net gain. Some of the associations with 
DVAs from financial media that express this concern are “counterintuitive”, “artificial”, 
“phantom revenue” (Keoun 2008), “ludicrous” (Goff 2011), “accounting fiction”, “paper 
profits” (Burne 2011), “unnatural” (Pollack 2011), “weird” (Hofman 2011), an “abomination” 
(Keoun and Henry 2010), “accounting voodoo” (Carver 2012b), “bizarre”, “Alice in 
Wonderland-ish” (Rice 2012), “schmee-VA”, an “accountancy spider's web (…) as dusty and 
all-enswathing as Miss Havisham's boudoir” (DVA, CVA, schmee-VA! 2013), or just “some 
fuzzy math” (Dash 2009). 
A second concern voiced in the course of the debate is that managers use DVAs to 
improve their earnings. Bob Rice, general managing partner with Tangent Capital Partners 
LLC, argues in an interview that the FASB introduced DVAs “because frankly the banks and 
their accountants were looking for ways to find profits (Rice 2012). Analyst Meredith A. 
Whitney said in 2009 that banks use DVAs as a tool for a “great whitewash” to create the 
impression that banks are stabilizing after the financial crisis (Dash 2009). Other critics that 
share this point of view see DVAs as “accounting tactics – gimmicks” (Dash 2009), 
“accounting tricks”, or even a “shameful scam” that banks deploy “to boost their profits” 
(Carver 2012a). Still other voices in the DVA debate contradict this view. For example, Joyce 
Frost, co-founder of Riverside Risk Advisors LLC, states that DVAs are “not something 
banks decided to use to boost their earnings” (Burne 2011). Another expert argues that 
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“shareholders can’t push for more of a mark-to-market world, but then cherry-pick when they 
want to include the mark-to-market” (Burne 2011). 
Related to the first and second concern, a third concern by critics is that managers do 
not provide DVA relational information transparently but only in certain cases, potentially to 
shape investors’ perceptions of the firms’ performance. David Milstead from the large 
Canadian newspaper The Globe and Mails says “the banks have been more than happy to 
highlight these [DVA] losses in their earnings releases, while being a lot more circumspect 
when valuation gains boost earnings”. Quoting another expert, he adds that this "makes it look 
like they are trying to trick the media and investors and make the story better than it is" 
(Milstead 2012). An article in the news publication Euroweek asserts that “when the DVA 
strip-out makes the bank look good, it's more likely to end up in the press release headlines 
than when it doesn't” (DVA, CVA, schmee-VA! 2013). Similarly, Rolf Benders states in the 
German newspaper Handelsblatt that managers only complain about DVAs’ artificiality in 
quarters in which DVAs reduce banks’ profits but less so when DVAs result in gains (Benders 
2012). Laurie Carver, Senior Staff Writer at Risk magazine more generally argues that 
“[b]anks downplay [DVAs] in their earnings report” (Carver 2012b). Other experts disagree 
and describe managers’ DVA reporting as transparent. Financial executive Bob Pozen says: 
“Thankfully, most large banks realize that DVA should not count as profit. When reporting 
earnings, financial firms have been clearly laying out what part of their earnings come from 
DVA” (Pozen 2011). Others observe that managers ensure reporting transparency by 
excluding DVAs from reported figures (Goff 2011) although still others claim that managers 
exclude DVAs just “to avoid the public reputation risk” (Castagna 2012). Another concern 
about managers’ DVA reporting is that they are “doing it all a bit differently” (Wroblewska 
2014) so that performance comparisons between firms allegedly are as difficult as “doing a 
crossword in Sanskrit” (DVA, CVA, schmee-VA! 2013). Another, less common concern 
relates to the role of the financial press. Bob Rice said in 2012 that “[m]ost mainstream media 
is only now picking up on the basic idea that these [DVAs] are really value irrelevant” (Rice 
2012). Contradicting this view, Bob Pozen stated in 2011 that “the media has reported 
earnings explaining that profits from DVA are an ’accounting gain’ rather than true earnings” 
(Pozen 2011). For further evidence on the public DVA debate, see Appendix 4.4. 
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4.2.3 Prior literature 
The relatively young research on DVA accounting consists of theoretical, experimental, and 
empirical studies. Two theoretical studies deal with DVAs prior to DVAs’ introduction in US 
GAAP accounting in 2007. Lipe (2002) is the first to document a counterintuitive DVA result 
in a “what if”-scenario and concludes that DVAs are potentially “dangerous”. Chasteen and 
Ransom (2007) state that DVAs are “counterintuitive” and propose an alternative approach 
for liability measurement that avoids including DVAs. Two experimental studies find that 
DVAs mislead even accounting professionals. Gaynor et al. (2011) find that among 184 
Certified Public Accountants that participated in their experiment, over 70% wrongly 
interpreted DVA gains as a signal for decreased credit risk and DVA losses as a signal for 
increased credit risk. Lachmann et al. (2015) conduct an experiment with 93 auditors. They 
find that participants are more likely to misinterpret a firm’s performance if net income 
included DVAs relative to a firm’s performance where equivalent DVAs are disclosed in 
other comprehensive income instead. 
Findings from empirical DVA literature do not show evidence for DVAs blurring 
investors’ view. Barth et al. (2008) find that the decrease (increase) in a firm’s equity value 
associated with an increase (decrease) in the credit risk of the firm is mitigated by a higher 
debt-to-assets ratio. The finding suggests that investors price the wealth transfer from 
debtholders to shareholders that DVAs represent correctly when firms do not recognize DVAs 
(the sample covers a period before DVAs’ introduction in accounting). Chung et al. (2012) 
find that investors perceive DVAs as economic income, i.e. as value-relevant. They also find 
that gains and losses from FAS 159 (which include DVAs) are relevant to investors’ 
perception of firms’ risk. Cedergren et al. (2015) add to their findings by showing that 
investors additionally understand the offsetting relation between DVAs and changes in 
unrecognized intangible assets’ fair values that result from changes in firms’ own credit risk. 
Finally, Schneider and Tran (2015) find that information asymmetry among adopters of the 
fair value option for liabilities (FVOL) is not higher for those firms that recognize DVAs 
compared to other FVOL adopting firms that do not recognize DVAs. 
Regarding the reporting of DVAs, Bischof et al. (2014) find that a majority of 
financial analysts discuss DVAs’ impact on performance figures in analyst reports and often 
exclude them from performance figures. In a preliminary study, Eichner and Mettler (2014) 
find low DVA disclosure quality in annual reports of European firms in the year 2012.  
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Overall, the findings from theoretical, experimental, and empirical DVA literature are 
not necessarily inconclusive. Still, they seem to indicate some variation concerning 
researchers’ attitude towards DVAs’ usefulness. In any case, prior DVA literature offers 
informative insights in DVAs’ properties from different points of view. Still, no research yet 
provides comprehensive descriptive evidence on comparably basic characteristics of DVAs 
such as their occurrence, magnitude, and their reporting. In light of DVAs’ topicality and the 
still rather fragmented DVA literature such evidence should make a valuable contribution. 
Additionally, thorough descriptive evidence on DVA reporting by the financial press 
should contribute to the literature of the financial press as an information intermediary 
(Bushee et al. 2010). As my findings are indicative of the financial press providing 
counterweight to potentially imbalanced reporting by managers, the evidence might especially 
improve our understanding of the financial press’ information enhancement function (Bushee 
et al. 2010). Thereby, it should contribute to the literature on the role of the financial press as 
a watchdog for accounting and corporate governance related topics such as good accounting 
practice (Foster 1987; Foster 1979), reporting of non GAAP figures (Koning et al. 2010); 
accounting fraud (Miller 2006), corporate fraud (Dyck et al. 2010), and executive 
compensation (Core et al. 2008).  
4.3 Sample selection and data collection 
I provide descriptive evidence on DVAs’ occurrence, magnitude and reporting by managers 
for all firm-quarters of US financial firms that reported DVAs and published quarterly 
earnings press releases between 2007 and 2014. To ensure a broad identification of DVA-
reporters, I use two identification strategies from recent literature on FVOL adoption and 
combine the results (Cedergren et al. 2015; Wu et al. 2016). For this, I collect initial 
information on FVOL adoption from regulatory reports and from the Compustat annual 
database. Afterwards, I thoroughly search annual and quarterly financial reports of such 
potential FVOL adopters for DVA reporting. I thereby identify fifteen banks that adopt the 
FVOL in a total of 353 firm-quarters and report DVAs. I am confident that my approach 
allows for the most complete identification of DVAs in recent research. For example, while 
the sample of Cedergren et al. (2015) contains 193 firm-quarter observations with non-zero 
DVAs between 2007 and 2013, my sample contains 299 such observations in the same period 
(untabulated). 
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I further provide evidence on DVA reporting by the financial press for all articles from 
US newspapers containing DVA information that I can link to firms in my sample. Again, I 
run a twofold approach to make sure that the sample is as complete as possible. First, I 
consider all articles from four major nationwide daily newspapers that cover firm-quarters of 
DVA-reporting firms. Specifically, I collect articles from the Wall Street Journal, The New 
York Times, The Washington Post, and USA Today via ProQuest and Nexis. Second, I 
perform a search for DVA-related keywords in all 202 US newspapers indexed in Nexis and 
the Wall Street Journal. In total, I collect 173 articles. Because some articles contain DVA 
information on several banks, I am able to link such articles with more than one firm-quarter. 
In total, my final sample analyzes 202 article-firm-quarters, i.e. non-distinct firm-quarters that 
are covered by a financial press article that contains DVA information. Appendix 4.1 of this 
paper provides a thorough description of the sample selection process. Table 4.1 summarizes 
the sample selection process and the linkage between financial press articles and article-firm-
quarters.  
Table 4.1 Sample Selection Process 
Panel A: Sample selection process for the base sample 
Step 1: Identification of DVA-reporters through Bank Regulatory Reports 
 All bank holding companies filing FRY9C reports between 2007 and 2014  8,558  
- Firms without FVOL adoption in the sample period -8,464 94 
- Firms without link between RSSD ID and PERMCO -39 55 
- Firms without link between PERMCO and CIK -2 53 
- Firms without information on DVAs in SEC filings -43 10 
Step 2: Identification of DVA-reporters through Compustat accounting data 
 All financial firms with coverage in “Compustat North America Annual Database 
between 2007 and 2014 
  
5,783 
- Firms without fair value option adoption 5,576 207 
- Firms without fair value liabilities -47 160 
- Firms without fair value changes recognized in earnings -65 95 
- Firms without CIK identifier -10 85 
- Firms whose filings I searched in Step 1 of the selection process -31 54 
- Firms without mentioning of DVA-related keywords in 10-K filings -13 41 
- Firms without information on DVAs in SEC filings -35 6 
Step 3: Identification of FVOL firm-quarters of DVA-reporting firms with earnings press releases 
 Firm-quarters of 16 DVA-reporting firms with SEC filings (10-Q and 10-K) 
between 2007 and 2014 
 483 
- Firm-quarters without 8-K filings (quarterly earnings press releases) -52 431 
- Firm-quarters without FVOL adoption -78 353 
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Table 4.1 (continued) 
Panel B: DVA articles’ distribution over time and across newspapers  
Newspaper 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Total 
AdvisorOne 
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The New York Times 
  
10 9 8 11 7 7 52 
The Washington Post 
  














1 2 2 
 
6 
The Wall Street Journal 1 3 14 2 10 20 6 10 66 
Total 1 5 32 14 26 50 27 18 173 
Panel C: Linkage between individual financial press articles and article-firm-quarters observations 
154 article(s) provide(s) DVA information for 1 sample firm-quarter(s) = 154 article-firm-quarters 
13 " 2 " = 26 " 
3 " 3 " = 9 " 
2 " 4 " = 8 " 
1 " 5 " = 5 " 
173 articles provide DVA information for a total of    202 article-firm-quarter 
observations  
Panel A of this table summarizes the sample selection process. Appendix 4.1 provides a description of the 
sample selection process. Panel B provides an overview over the distribution of DVA articles over time and 
across newspapers. A description of the DVA article collection process is provided in Appendix 4.3. Panel C 
provides information on the linkage between individual financial press articles and article-firm-quarters. 
Further information on the linkage is provided in Appendix 4.5. 
4.4 DVAs’ occurrence, magnitude, and reporting by managers 
4.4.1 Characteristics of DVA-reporting firms 
Prior literature remains silent on the characteristics of DVA-reporting firms. To gain insights, 
I compare certain financial characteristics of DVA reporters with those of FVOL adopters that 
do not report DVAs and with non-FVOL adopters. I use data of the fourth quarter of 2006 as 
it is the effective date for firms’ decisions whether to early adopt the FVOL and the last 
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quarter with accounting data that is unaffected by this choice.18 Consequently, my research 
setting follows Guthrie et al. (2011). Table 4.2 presents definitions of used variables and Table 
4.3 presents descriptive statistics. Comparing FVOL adopters that do not report DVAs with 
non-FVOL adopters, I find FVOL adopters to be significantly larger in terms of total assets 
and total liabilities. For example, the average total assets for a FVOL adopter without DVAs 
are $66.39 billion whereas the average total assets for a non-FVOL adopter are $26.07 billion. 
This is consistent with larger US financial institutions that are more engaged in complex 
hedging activities, having higher demand for an adoption of the FVOL to facilitate such 
activities (Guthrie et al. 2011). FASB’s reason for the issuance of the FVOL was to relieve 
firms from the burden to comply with complex hedge accounting provisions for derivatives 
(FASB 2007). Accordingly, I find that FVOL adopters are significantly more likely to use 
derivatives prior to the introduction of the FVOL than non-adopters (48% compared to 20%). 
Comparing DVA-reporting FVOL adopters with FVOL adopters that do not report 
DVAs, I find that the DVA-reporters are significantly larger than the latter. For example, the 
median total assets of DVA-reporters are $838.20 billion compared to $8.05 billion of other 
FVOL adopters. DVA-reporters also carry significantly larger amounts of fair value liabilities 
in both terms, absolute and relative to total liabilities (according to a Wilcoxon rank-sum test). 
The finding is consistent with DVA-reporters applying the FVOL to larger portions of 
liabilities. This is plausible as FAS 159 only requires reporting of material DVAs (FASB 
2007) and the magnitude of DVAs depends on the amount of debt for which the FVOL has 
been elected. Finally, the large majority of DVA-reporters use derivatives (87%), significantly 
more than other FVOL adopters (48%). 
In conclusion, DVA-reporters seem to be systematically different from other FVOL 
adopters and from non-FVOL adopters. DVAs appear to concern only few but therefore very 
large and complex US financial institutions that apply the FVOL extensively. For example, 
five of the largest six US bank holding companies are among the fifteen DVA-reporters.19  
  
                                                 
18 As data for one firm from the sample of DVA reporters is missing for the fourth quarter of 2006, I use the 
earliest data available for this firm instead, which is data from the fourth quarter of 2008. The results are not 
sensitive to the exclusion of this firm. 
19 Specifically: JPMorgan Chase & Co., Bank of America Corp., Citigroup Inc., the Goldman Sachs Group Inc., 
and Morgan Stanley. See https://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/nicweb/HCSGreaterThan10B.aspx. Accessed 13 
March 2017. 
“Some fuzzy math”- relational information on debt value adjustments by managers and the 
financial press 
115 
Table 4.2 Variable Definitions and Measurement 
Panel A: Variables on firm characteristics 
Total assets Total assets (Compustat item at) 
Total liabilities  Total liabilities (Compustat item lt) 
Total fair value 
liabilities  
Total liabilities at fair value (Compustat item tfvl) 
Total fair value 
liabilities (%) 
Total fair value liabilities / Total liabilities 
Eligible instruments (%) 




Binary variable indicating use of derivatives, i.e. one or both of Compustat items 
cidergl and aocidergl are different from zero 
Return on equity (%) Return on equity (Compustat items ib/seq) 
Panel B: DVA, DVA information, and further variables 
Variable Name Definition 
DVAs Debt value adjustments due to a change in own credit risk on liabilities for which the 
fair value option has been elected (DVAs). Source: 10-Q/10-K filings. 
AbsDVA Absolute DVAs scaled by natural log of lagged total assets 
NegDVA Binary variable indicating negative DVAs in a given firm-quarter 
DVA (%) Ratio of absolute quarterly DVAs to absolute quarterly net income 
Incentive Binary variable indicating the presence of an opportunistic incentive for managers to 
report/emphasize DVAs. Specifically, Incentive indicates the presence of one (or more) 
of the following situations in a given firm-quarter: 1. missed last year’s earnings due to 
DVAs, 2. missed profitability due to DVAs, 3. missed mean consensus analyst forecast 
while DVAs are negative 
Pages Natural log of the number of pages in the quarterly earnings press of a given firm-
quarter 
Quarter Time trend variable increasing with equal steps from 1 (first quarter of 2007) to 32 
TA Natural log of lagged total assets 
Ment Binary variable indicating that a quarterly earnings press release (qepr) mentions 
DVAs. 
Sign Binary variable indicating that a qepr provides the sign of DVAs 
Amount Binary variable indicating that a qepr provides the amount of DVAs 
Due Binary variable indicating that a qepr provides the information that DVAs result from a 
change in the value of the firm’ own debt or from a change in firm’s own credit risk. 
Example: “net revenues included negative revenue of $189 million related to debt-
related credit spreads”. 
Dir Binary variable indicating that a qepr provides information on the direction of the 
change in debt’s value or the direction of the change in credit risk. Example: “net 
revenues included the negative impact of $2.0 billion from the tightening of debt-
related credit spreads”. 
Comment Binary variable indicating that a qepr provides an evaluative comment of DVAs, for 
example, by the CEO 
Excl Binary variable indicating that a qepr provides a non-GAAP figure that excludes DVAs 
or a description of a situation that excludes DVAs. Example: “excluding debt-related 
mark-to-market losses, trading income increased” 
AggInfo Ment + Sign + Amount + Due + Dir + Comment + Excl 
FirstPageMent Binary variable indicating that a qepr’s first page provides DVA information or a non-
GAAP figure excluding DVAs 
Coverage Binary variable indicating that a firm-quarter is covered by one or more financial press 
articles that provide DVA information 
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Table 4.2 (continued) 
Net income Quarterly net income (Compustat item niq) 
AbsNI Absolute value of Net income (Compustat item niq) 
NegNI Binary variable indicating negative Net income in a given firm-quarter 
Panel C: Information enhancement variables 
NewInfoDum Binary variable indicating that a financial press article provides a piece of information 
as measured by Ment, Sign, Amount, Due, Dir, Comment, or Excl that the 
corresponding firm qepr does not provide 
Critique Binary variable indicating that a financial press articles’ tone is critical towards DVAs 
This table summarizes the definitions and the measurements of the variables used in this paper. 
 
Table 4.3 Characteristics of DVA Reporters 
 Mean Std. Dev Min Median Max N 
Panel A: DVA reporters 
      
Total assets (in $bn) 665.97*** 617.06 1.90 838.20*** 1884.32 15 
Total liabilities (in $bn) 620.30*** 573.27 1.49 797.66*** 1764.54 15 
Total fair value liabilities (in $bn) 136.08*** 180.92 0.17 28.84*** 479.9 15 
Total fair value liabilities (%) 0.17 0.14 0.00 0.18*** 0.45 15 
Eligible instruments (%) 0.80 0.19 0.23 0.85 0.97 15 
Derivative user (dummy) 0.87*** 0.35    15 
Return on equity (%) 0.14 0.06 0.01 0.13 0.27 15 
Panel B: FVOL adopters that do not report DVAs 
Total assets (in $bn) 66.39** 180.44 0.41 8.05*** 1030.51 82 
Total liabilities (in $bn) 60.68** 170.88 0.13 6.37*** 982.18 82 
Total fair value liabilities (in $bn) 11.81 63.23 0.00 0.10 467.20 82 
Total fair value liabilities (%) 0.10 0.21 0.00 0.01 1.00 82 
Eligible instruments (%) 0.80 0.21 0.10 0.91 0.99 82 
Derivative user (dummy) 0.48*** 0.50    82 
Return on equity (%) 0.13 0.12 -0.07 0.12** 0.83 82 
Panel C: Non-FVOL adopters 
Total assets (in $bn) 26.07 152.89 0.00 0.81 1965.16 1716 
Total liabilities (in $bn) 24.23 146.12 0.00 0.63 1919.42 1716 
Total fair value liabilities (in $bn) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1716 
Total fair value liabilities (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1716 
Eligible instruments (%) 0.76 0.26 0.00 0.92 1 1716 
Derivative user (dummy) 0.20 0.40    1716 
Return on equity (%) 0.69 20.37 -18.57 0.10 840.53 1716 
Panel A, B, and C of this table provide descriptive statistics on financial characteristics of DVA reporters, FVOL 
adopters that do not report DVAs, and non-FVOL adopters, respectively. The identification of DVA reporters 
follows Step 1 and 2 of the sample selection process, the identification of FVOL adopters follows Step 2 of the 
sample selection process, see Table 4.1. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level of two-
tailed t-tests (means) and Wilcoxon rank-sum tests (medians) of equality between statistics of DVA reporters and 
statistics of FVOL Adopters that do not report DVAs in Panel A and between statistics of FVOL Adopters that do 
not report DVAs and statistics of non-FVOL adopters in Panel B. Definitions of variables are reported in Table 
4.3, Panel A. 
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4.4.2 Descriptive statistics on DVAs’ occurrence and magnitude 
Table 4.4, Panel A depicts descriptive statistics regarding DVAs’ magnitude and reporting by 
managers. The average of quarterly DVA amounts in the sample is $9.857 Mio (median: 
$0.000 Mio.). Negative DVAs appear in 49.9% of the firm quarters. The lowest DVA amount 
in the sample is -$3,600.000 Mio, the largest is $4,506.000 Mio. The mean of absolute 
quarterly DVA amounts is $314.910 Mio (median: $76.000 Mio). The average ratio of 
absolute quarterly DVA amounts relative to absolute quarterly net income is 73.1% (median: 
6.9%). Of the 353 firm-quarters, only eleven firm-quarters have DVA amounts of zero 
(untabulated). Taken together, the descriptive evidence is consistent with DVAs causing 
losses equally often as gains in the sample. Further, the low mean of DVAs is consistent with 
positive and negative DVAs assuming comparable amounts on average. The findings contrast 
concerns from the public DVA debate that DVAs are an “accounting trick” (Carver 2012a) 
used “to find profits” (DVA, CVA, schmee-VA! 2013). Still, they are consistent with a 
regular and notable impact of DVAs on firms’ results and therewith further motivate my 
following research on DVAs’ reporting by managers and the financial press. 
4.4.3 DVA reporting by managers 
4.4.3.1 Descriptive statistics 
To explore managers’ reporting of DVAs, I examine firms’ issued quarterly earnings press 
releases. Quarterly earnings press releases are a direct way of firms to communicate with 
financial markets and among the most common and important instruments of voluntary 
disclosure (Davis et al. 2012; Davis and Tama-Sweet 2012). Compared to financial reports, 
they are unaudited and less regulated and therefore allow for a higher level of discretion 
concerning form and content (Henry 2008). In addition, as seen in Section 4.2.2 common 
claims in the DVA debate regarding managers’ DVA reporting usually refer to DVAs’ 
reporting in earnings press releases. 
I construct several disclosure variables that indicate the presence of specific 
information in a quarterly earnings press release (see similar: Baumker et al. 2014). The 
arguably broadest measure, Ment, indicates that the quarterly earnings press release mentions 
DVAs. Sign indicates that the press release contains information on the DVAs’ sign (i.e. 
whether DVAs were positive or negative). Amount indicates that the press release contains the 
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amount of DVAs as an absolute or per share figure.20 Regarding variables that indicate 
information provided on DVAs’ characteristics, Due indicates that the press release contains 
information explaining that DVAs stem from a change in debt value or from a change in 
credit risk. Dir indicates that the press release contains directional information on DVAs. For 
example, in firm-quarters with negative DVAs, Dir indicates that the press release contains 
the information that the negative DVAs stem from an increase in own debt’s value and/or that 
they stem from a decrease in the firm’s own credit risk. According to experimental evidence, 
this information can help investors unravel the criticized “counterintuitivity” of DVAs 
(Gaynor et al. 2011). 
The variable Comment indicates that the press release provides an evaluative comment 
on DVAs. For example, in Morgan Stanley’s press releases of the first quarter of 2009, its 
CEO John J. Mack says „In fact, Morgan Stanley would have been profitable this quarter if 
not for the dramatic improvement in our credit spreads – which is a significant positive 
development, but had a near-term negative impact on our revenues.” Excl indicates that the 
press release provides a non-GAAP performance figure that excludes DVAs or a description 
of a scenario that excludes DVAs, for example, “excluding debt-related mark-to-market 
losses, trading income increased”. Prior literature considers such non-GAAP figures as 
information on the excluded items’ transitoriness (Curtis et al. 2014; Baumker et al. 2014). As 
an overall measure of disclosure quality and of reporting emphasis, AggInfo is an aggregated 
measure equal to the sum of Ment, Sign, Amount, Due, Dir, Comment, and Excl. Such 
“checklist” measures are founded in prior literature on disclosure quality (see e.g. Hail 2002; 
Botosan 1997). Finally, FirstPageMent indicates that the press release provides DVA 
information or a non-GAAP figure excluding DVAs on its first page. Prior literature finds that 
managers use prominent placement of items within press releases as means of emphasis (see 
e.g. Bowen et al. 2005; Guillamon-Saorin et al. 2012). I provide an example for the measures’ 
codification in Appendix 4.2 and a discussion of the measures in the conclusion of the paper. 
Table 4.4 depicts descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients on the disclosure 
measures and regression inputs. It shows that there is considerable variation in the frequency 
                                                 
20 In some quarterly press releases, I find that managers report DVA amounts aggregated with other amounts 
such as credit value adjustments (from counterparty risk changes) or certain fair value adjustments on 
derivatives. If the inclusion of DVAs in such aggregated amounts is explicitly stated in the press release, I 
consider it reporting of an Amount. Apart from that, I also say that a quarterly earnings press release contains 
a DVA amount if, within one paragraph, a figure is reported including and excluding DVAs, for example, 
“net income was $1.8 billion and $1.6 billion excluding DVAs”. The results from all following tests are not 
sensitive to the exclusion of the Amount variable. 
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of the different disclosures. In particular, 55.2% of quarterly earnings press releases in the 
sample mention DVAs, a narrow majority. Information on the sign of DVAs, on their amount, 
and on the fact that they arise from changes in debt and credit risk are provided similarly often 
(means of 51.6%, 47.6%, and 53.5%). In contrast, only 24.9% of the press releases provide 
directional DVA information that explains DVAs’ “counterintuitivity”. Evaluative comments 
on DVAs appear in 2.5% of the press releases. A non-GAAP figure excluding DVAs is 
provided in 39.1% of the press releases. An average press release contains 2.75 of the seven 
investigated pieces of information (median: 3). Finally, 23.8% of the press releases provide 
DVA information on their first page. 
In sum, the descriptive evidence on managers’ DVA disclosures is not consistent with 
managers providing DVA disclosures very continuously but it is also not consistent with 
DVA disclosures by managers being very scarce. Rather, Managers’ DVA reporting in 
quarterly earnings press releases shows a certain degree of variation which further motivates 
my following analysis on its determinants. 
Table 4.4 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Coefficients for the Base Sample 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Dev Min Median Max N 
DVA measures       
DVAs 9.857 698.514 -3600.000 0.000 4506.000 353 
NegDVA 0.499     353 
Absolute DVAs 314.910 623.353 0.000 76.000 4506.000 353 
DVA (%) 0.731 3.839 0.000 0.069 61.419 353 
DVA information measures 
Ment 0.552     353 
Sign 0.516     353 
Amount 0.476     353 
Due 0.535     353 
Dir 0.249     353 
Comment 0.025     353 
Excl 0.391     353 
AggInfo 2.745 2.280 0 3 7 353 
FirstPageMent 0.238     353 
Coverage 0.212     353 
Further regression inputs 
AbsDVA 22.773 43.933 0.000 6.001 307.844 353 
Incentive 0.198     353 
Quarter 17.079 8.802 1 17 32 353 
Pages 2.617 0.422 1.099 2.639 3.611 353 
TA 12.747 2.051 7.528 13.632 15.016 353 
AbsNI 199.219 411.260 0.051 89.076 4447.359 353 
NegNI 0.317     353 
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Table 4.4 (continued) 
Panel B: Correlation Coefficients 
N = 353 DVA AbsDVA NegDVA Ment Sign Amount Due Dir Comment Excl AggInfo FirstPage 
Ment 
Coverage NegIncent Quarter Pages TA AbsNI NegNI 
DVA 1                   
        
  
AbsDVA 0.080 1                  
       
  
NegDVA -0.451 -0.019 1                 
       
  
Ment -0.032 0.319 -0.003 1                
      
  
Sign -0.032 0.345 0.014 0.929 1               
      
  
Amount -0.008 0.340 0.014 0.858 0.924 1              
     
  
Due -0.031 0.329 -0.003 0.966 0.927 0.876 1             
     
  
Dir -0.067 0.440 0.054 0.519 0.519 0.500 0.524 1            
    
  
Comment -0.200 0.234 0.054 0.146 0.121 0.134 0.151 0.281 1           
    
  
Excl -0.067 -0.053 0.049 -0.038 -0.013 0.050 -0.010 -0.032 0.091 1          
   
  
AggInfo -0.063 0.381 0.030 0.923 0.932 0.917 0.934 0.654 0.263 0.212 1         




-0.095 0.243 0.002 0.302 0.329 0.373 0.320 0.324 0.205 0.398 0.451 1         
  
  
Coverage -0.016 0.357 0.008 0.426 0.448 0.476 0.442 0.373 0.224 0.194 0.521 0.474 1       
  
  
NegIncent -0.296 0.096 0.456 0.076 0.070 0.052 0.079 0.140 0.145 0.140 0.127 0.089 0.089 1      
 
  
Quarter -0.116 -0.202 0.257 -0.017 0.001 -0.020 -0.038 -0.094 -0.040 0.281 0.024 0.233 0.174 0.116 1     
 
  
Pages -0.035 0.094 -0.052 0.484 0.436 0.425 0.487 0.202 0.080 -0.006 0.444 0.137 0.064 -0.064 0.031 1      
TA -0.014 0.274 -0.068 0.292 0.282 0.249 0.268 0.306 0.086 -0.252 0.249 -0.026 0.350 -0.238 -0.017 0.280 1     
AbsNI 0.044 0.066 -0.019 -0.009 -0.045 -0.058 -0.022 0.009 -0.032 0.018 -0.026 -0.134 -0.017 -0.054 -0.118 0.038 0.291 1   
NegNI 0.057 0.102 -0.010 -0.035 -0.033 -0.040 -0.024 -0.111 -0.033 0.265 0.004 -0.038 -0.131 0.226 -0.180 -0.006 -0.286 0.139 1 
Panel A of this table provides descriptive statistics on DVA measures and the inputs of the regression tests for the base sample. Panel B provides correlation coefficients for the 
inputs of the regression tests for the base sample. Bold letters indicate significance at the 10%-level in Panel B. Definitions of variables are reported in Table 4.2, Panel B. 
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4.4.3.2 Regression analysis 
In the prior section, I find a certain degree of variation in the quantity and quality of DVA 
relational information that managers provide in quarterly earnings press releases. In this 
section, I examine potential determinants of such differences using multivariate regression 
analyses. This method allows for a better identification of the potential variation in reporting 
that is associated with individual determinants because it simultaneously controls for 
reporting variation that is associated with other factors in the model. Motivated by the DVA 
debate and prior literature, I investigate whether DVA relational information in quarterly 
earnings press releases is associated with DVAs’ magnitude and sign (Schrand and Walther 
2000) and with opportunistic incentives to provide more information (Marques 2010; 
Baumker et al. 2014). I employ a probit model for regressions with binary dependent 
variables and an OLS model for regressions with AggInfo as dependent variable. The 
regression model is: 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑏𝑠𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑏𝑠𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑁𝑒𝑔𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝑃𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (1) 
where Disclosure represents the different measures of DVA information: Ment, Sign, Due, 
Dir, Comment, Excl, AggInfo, and FirstPageMent (see Section 4.4.3 and Table 4.2, Panel B for 
details). AbsDVA is the absolute dollar-amount of DVAs deflated by the natural log of lagged 
total assets. NegDVA is a binary variable indicating that DVAs are negative in the firm-
quarter. Incentive is a binary variable indicating the presence of an opportunistic incentive for 
managers to report/emphasize DVAs. In line with prior literature, I consider three situations 
(Marques 2010): 1. missed last year’s earnings due to DVAs, 2. missed profitability due to 
DVAs, and 3. missed mean consensus analyst forecast while DVAs are negative.21 Pages is 
the natural log of the number of pages in the quarterly earnings press releases. Quarter is a 
time trend variable increasing with equal steps from 1 (first quarter of 2007) to 32 (fourth 
                                                 
21 Bischof et al. 2014 find for a European sample that most of the observed analysts exclude DVAs from 
reported earnings. Checking Thomson Reuters TRAA database, I find that there is also variation in the sense 
that for some of my sample firms, DVAs are excluded from analysts’ earnings forecasts, but for others they 
are not. Therefore, I am unable to limit this third component of my Incentive variable to cases in which 
negative DVAs are the cause for missed consensus analysts’ forecast. This inaccuracy potentially weakens 
the measure’s association with the test variables in my regression analyses. 
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quarter of 2014). TA is the natural log of lagged total assets. I use robust standard-errors that 
are clustered by firms (White 1980). 
Table 4.5 provides the results of the regression estimations. The coefficient on 
AbsDVA is significantly positive in all models except for Model 6 and 7 as the results of F-
tests indicate. Similarly, the sum of coefficients AbsDVA and AbsDVA*NegDVA is positive 
and significant in all models but Model 3 and 7. These findings are consistent with managers 
providing more DVA relational information in quarterly earnings press releases for larger 
positive DVAs and for larger negative DVAs. The coefficient on AbsDVA*NegDVA is 
significantly positively associated with four disclosure measures in the regression models 
(Ment, Sign, Due, and Comment). This finding is in line with managers being more likely to 
provide these pieces of DVA information for large negative DVAs relative to large positive 
DVAs. The coefficient on NegDVA is negatively significant in Model 1, 2, and 4. This 
indicates that managers are less likely to provide this information when small DVAs are 
negative. The coefficient on Incentive is positive and statistically significant in five models, 
including Model 8 (AggInfo). This is consistent with managers providing more DVA 
information, regarding specific information and overall, when they have a strategic incentive 
to do so, for example, when a negative DVA turned a quarterly net profit into a loss. The 
coefficient on Pages is significantly positive in several models indicating a higher likelihood 
for DVA information in more comprehensive earnings press releases. The coefficient on 
Quarter is only significant in Model 7 (Excl). This is consistent with the reporting of non-
GAAP figures excluding DVAs becoming more common over time. For Model 9, the 
coefficients on AbsDVA, NegDVA, and the joint coefficient of AbsDVA+AbsDVA*NegDVA 
indicate that DVA reporting on a press release’s first page is more likely for larger DVAs, 
positive and negative, but more common for positive DVAs when DVAs are small. The 
significantly positive coefficient on Quarter is in line with more prominent DVA reporting by 
managers over time. 
I rerun all analyses including firm indicators. Thereby, I control for time-invariant firm 
characteristics that are associated with the propensity to provide DVA information. The 
procedure leads to varying sample sizes between the models as some firms never provide 
specific pieces of DVA information. Table 4.5, Panel B displays the results. I find that the 
implications of the results largely persist. In particular, the coefficients on AbsDVA*NegDVA 
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in Models 1, 2, 4, and 6 remain positive and statistically significant. The coefficients on 
NegDVA and Incentive are mostly insignificant in this specification. 
In conclusion, the findings from my regression analysis on the determinants of 
managers’ DVA reporting are consistent with claims from the public DVA debate that 
managers provide more relational information on large negative DVAs than on large positive 
DVAs. For smaller DVAs, I find weak evidence that managers provide more information on 
positive DVAs relative to negative DVAs. I also find some evidence that managers provide 
more information on DVAs when they have strategic incentives to do so. However, as these 
findings largely do not hold after inclusion of firm indicators in the model, I caution to 
interpret these results carefully. Finally, I do not find evidence that managers report large 
negative DVAs significantly more often on the first page of quarterly earnings press releases 
than positive DVAs. 
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Table 4.5 Regression Analysis on Managers’ DVA Reporting 
Panel A: Regression results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Dependent 
variable: 
Ment Sign Amount Due Dir Comment Excl AggInfo FirstPageMent 
AbsDVA 0.020*** 0.023*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.010*** 0.001 0.001 0.015*** 0.008** 
 (2.9263) (2.7429) (3.0724) (2.8192) (2.8720) (0.7988) (0.2239) (3.4304) (2.2097) 
AbsDVA*NegDVA 0.044*** 0.039*** -0.009 0.042*** 0.002 0.006** 0.003 0.004 0.009 
 (2.8269) (3.1002) (-0.9043) (2.8736) (0.4276) (2.2092) (1.0519) (0.8402) (1.4607) 
NegDVA -0.502** -0.379* 0.158 -0.471** 0.011 -0.324 -0.257 -0.176 -0.460*** 
 (-2.1044) (-1.9108) (0.6781) (-2.0114) (0.0545) (-1.0266) (-1.5555) (-0.6719) (-2.7662) 
Incentive 0.668*** 0.412* 0.175 0.584** 0.553** 0.659 0.221 0.782** 0.041 
 (2.8120) (1.7588) (0.7549) (2.0646) (2.0383) (1.5499) (1.2011) (2.9440) (0.1546) 
Pages 2.039*** 1.776*** 1.542*** 2.085*** 0.723 0.571 0.181 2.131*** 0.510 
 (4.3170) (4.3580) (3.5956) (4.5674) (1.2836) (1.5587) (0.3110) (4.3605) (1.1586) 
Quarter 0.014 0.019 0.009 0.011 -0.012 -0.014 0.050*** 0.017 0.061** 
 (0.6270) (0.8809) (0.4159) (0.4718) (-0.9645) (-0.6684) (2.9781) (0.5606) (2.4988) 
TA 0.088 0.067 0.074 0.058 0.263** 0.112 -0.189 0.089 -0.136 
 (0.7018) (0.5684) (0.6851) (0.4882) (2.3087) (0.9911) (-1.2830) (0.6653) (-1.0996) 
Constant -6.931*** -6.245*** -5.647*** -6.688*** -6.282*** -5.021*** 0.798 -4.714** -1.557 
 (-3.8883) (-4.0928) (-3.7077) (-4.1377) (-3.0334) (-2.7858) (0.3562) (-2.6953) (-0.8640) 




0.002 0.001 0.209 0.001 0.054 0.001 0.342 0.039 0.004 
Pseudo R²/Adj. R² 0.370 0.343 0.259 0.372 0.261 0.227 0.125 0.326 0.187 
N 353 353 353 353 353 353 353 353 353 
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Table 4.5 (continued) 
Panel B: Regression results with firm indicators 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Dependent variable: Ment Sign Amount Due Dir Comment Excl AggInfo FirstPageMent 
AbsDVA 0.016** 0.017** 0.019** 0.018** 0.009*** 0.005** 0.001 0.009*** 0.005 
 (2.0570) (1.9972) (2.4807) (2.0709) (3.1286) (2.0698) (0.3814) (3.0617) (1.4987) 
AbsDVA*NegDVA 0.026*** 0.018* -0.014 0.027*** 0.001 0.009** 0.005 0.002 0.006 
 (3.7348) (1.6933) (-1.5074) (3.7893) (0.3362) (2.3407) (1.3235) (0.8296) (1.4131) 
NegDVA -0.241 0.084 0.702* -0.262 0.233 -0.381 0.224 0.212 -0.167 
 (-1.0323) (0.3761) (1.8971) (-1.0243) (0.8710) (-1.2055) (0.5751) (1.1778) (-0.7331) 
Incentive 0.972* 0.488 0.132 0.813 0.506 0.781 -0.371 0.311 -0.078 
 (1.9218) (1.2378) (0.3250) (1.6009) (1.4219) (1.2060) (-1.2552) (1.1844) (-0.2269) 
Pages 2.090** 1.250 1.597 2.023** 0.322 -0.550 1.948* 1.722** -0.394 
 (2.1519) (1.6130) (1.5204) (2.1192) (0.5393) (-0.3172) (1.7707) (2.9411) (-0.8371) 
Quarter 0.036 0.049 0.031 0.028 -0.004 -0.018 0.139*** 0.035 0.081* 
 (1.0045) (1.3568) (0.7936) (0.8445) (-0.2448) (-1.3442) (3.2064) (0.9678) (1.6707) 
TA -0.201 1.150 0.535 -0.394 0.422 2.129*** -1.774 -0.038 -2.935** 
 (-0.2317) (0.9799) (0.5163) (-0.5014) (1.0079) (6.6282) (-1.0794) (-0.0773) (-1.9741) 
Constant -3.326 -15.115 -9.636 -1.201 -6.430 -25.320*** 12.852 -2.730 29.573* 
 (-0.3819) (-1.3993) (-0.9999) (-0.1557) (-1.1810) (-2.7604) (0.7791) (-0.6661) (1.9142) 




0.000 0.000 0.432 0.000 0.006 0.001 0.012 0.004 0.000 
Pseudo R²/Adj. R² 0.506 0.428 0.393 0.491 0.183 0.241 0.516 0.571 0.360 
N 301 273 273 301 188 120 185 353 213 
Panel A of this table displays coefficient estimates from regression models. Panel B displays coefficient estimates of the same model including firm indicators. The underlying 
regression model is: 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑏𝑠𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑏𝑠𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑁𝑒𝑔𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑃𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
The dependent variables (1)-(7) are binary variables indicating whether managers provide specific DVA information in the respective quarterly earnings press release (qepr). 
AggInfo is a continuous variable measuring aggregated DVA relational information provided by managers in the respective qepr. FirstPageMent is a binary variable indicating 
whether managers provided DVA information on the first page of the respective qepr. The regression models have standard errors that are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered 
by firms. z-statistics/t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. All F-tests are two-tailed. Definitions 
of variables are reported in Table 4.2, Panel B. 
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4.5 DVAs’ reporting by the financial press 
4.5.1 Introduction to the financial press analyses 
As noted before, prior evidence on DVA information in financial markets is scarce. The only 
evidence, to my knowledge, stems from Bischof et al. (2014) who find that the majority of 
financial analysts in their sample provide information on DVAs. An analysis of DVAs’ 
reporting by the financial press could still be of interest. If “counterintuitive” DVAs indeed 
complicated investors’ assessment of firms’ performance and risk, as experimental literature 
finds (Lachmann et al. 2015; Gaynor et al. 2011), retail investors are likely more affected by 
this, as they have higher information processing costs (Hirshleifer and Teoh 2003). However, 
prior literature finds that retail investors’ assessment of financial analysts’ information is 
rather naïve (Malmendier and Shanthikumar 2007). Indeed, retail investors perceive financial 
media as the most useful source of information (Pellens and Schmidt 2014). Also, my 
summary of the public DVA debate suggests that the debate is reflected in the financial press 
which spurs additional interest in the press’ DVA reporting behavior (see Section 4.2.2 and 
Appendix 4.4). My analysis of DVA reporting by the financial press consists of two analyses. 
First, I analyze the determinants of DVA reporting by the financial press. Second, I analyze 
the determinants of new DVA information by the press and the determinants for a critical tone 
of the press reporting towards DVAs. 
4.5.2 Determinants of DVA coverage 
Table 4.1, Panel B provides an overview over the distribution over time and across newspapers 
of 173 financial press articles containing DVA information that I find in US financial 
newspapers. Appendix 4.3 provides information on the collection of the articles. The 173 
articles cover 75 of my 353 sample firm-quarters (21.2%). To analyze the determinants for 
financial press’ DVA reporting, I employ the following probit regression model: 
𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑏𝑠𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑏𝑠𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑁𝑒𝑔𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑔𝑔𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡𝑃𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑀𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐴𝑏𝑠𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐴𝑏𝑠𝑁𝐼 ∗ 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽9𝑃𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(2) 
where Coverage is a binary variable indicating that a firm-quarter is covered by at least one 
financial press article that provides DVA information. AbsNI is the absolute value of net 
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income and NegNI is a binary variable indicating negative net income. See Table 4.2, Panel B 
for all further variable definitions. I use robust standard-errors that are clustered by firms 
(White 1980). 
Table 4.6 provides results of the regression estimations. In Model 1, the coefficient on 
AbsDVA is significantly positive. This is consistent with press coverage being more likely for 
larger positive DVAs. In contrast, the joint coefficient on  AbsDVA+AbsDVA*NegDVA is not 
different from zero (p-value: 0.691). This is inconsistent with press coverage being more 
likely for large negative DVAs. The coefficient on AggInfo is significantly positive. This is in 
line with a higher chance for press’ DVA reporting when managers provide more DVA 
relational information in quarterly earnings press releases. The coefficient on FirstPageMent 
is significantly positive, too. This implies a higher probability of DVA reporting by the press 
when managers emphasize DVAs with a prominent placement in earnings press releases. The 
significantly negative coefficient on AbsNI and the significantly positive coefficient on 
AbsNI*NegNI indicate higher chances for press’ DVA reporting for firm-quarters with low 
net profits and high net losses. Finally, the significantly positive coefficients on Quarter and 
TA imply an increased DVA coverage by the press over time and a higher DVA coverage for 
larger firms. I rerun the analysis including firm indicators (Model 2). This decreases the 
sample size as some firms never receive DVA press coverage. The coefficients on my main 
variables remain unchanged except for the now significantly negative coefficient on 
AbsDVA*NegDVA. The finding is consistent with the financial press being less likely to cover 
large positive DVAs. I repeat both analyses, Model 1 and 2, including Ment as control 
variable. The results remain largely unchanged (see Model 3 and 4). 
In conclusion, findings from my analyses on the determinants of DVA coverage by the 
financial press are in line with the financial press being more likely to cover large positive 
DVAs relative to large negative DVAs. This is consistent with the financial press providing 
some counterweight to asymmetric DVA reporting by managers who rather emphasize 
negative DVAs. It is also consistent with prior literature that finds that “bad news” are more 
likely to be covered by the financial press, because large positive DVAs reflect high increases 
in credit risk on average (Gaa 2008). The findings are also consistent with the financial press 
potentially following managers’ reporting spin in the sense that DVA coverage is associated 
with managers’ reporting emphasis on DVAs in press releases (Ahern and Sosyura 2014; 
Dyck and Zingales 2003). 
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Table 4.6 Determinants of Financial Press’ DVA Reporting 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent 
Variable: 
Coverage Coverage Coverage Coverage 
AbsDVA 0.006*** 0.004** 0.006*** 0.004** 
 (5.3277) (2.4547) (5.3706) (2.1960) 
AbsDVA*NegDVA -0.004 -0.008*** -0.004 -0.009*** 
 (-1.1455) (-3.1789) (-1.1492) (-4.7110) 
NegDVA -0.005 0.198 -0.002 0.223* 
 (-0.0674) (1.3756) (-0.0205) (1.7470) 
AggInfo 0.277** 0.292*** 0.242* 0.540*** 
 (2.3339) (2.7138) (1.9005) (3.1564) 
FirstPageMent 1.049*** 1.042** 1.078*** 0.810* 
 (2.8758) (2.2653) (3.1402) (1.7429) 
Ment   0.178 -1.423 
   (0.2403) (-1.5690) 
AbsNI -0.002** -0.000 -0.002** -0.000 
 (-2.2127) (-0.4199) (-2.1843) (-0.7134) 
NegNI -0.412 0.200 -0.411 0.231 
 (-1.5097) (0.4910) (-1.5413) (0.4807) 
AbsNI*NegNI 0.002** 0.000 0.002** 0.001 
 (2.2295) (0.8034) (2.2215) (1.2913) 
Pages -0.992* 0.109 -0.994* -0.180 
 (-1.7769) (0.1612) (-1.8335) (-0.2082) 
Quarter 0.035*** 0.016 0.034*** 0.025** 
 (2.7105) (1.6398) (2.7375) (1.9659) 
TA 0.669*** -0.174 0.680*** -0.131 
 (3.0864) (-0.1204) (2.9930) (-0.0875) 
Constant -8.932*** 0.588 -9.087** 0.892 
 (-2.6479) (0.0293) (-2.4889) (0.0430) 




0.691 0.106 0.698 0.031 
Pseudo R² 0.530 0.434 0.530 0.445 
N 353 188 353 188 





















𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
The dependent variable is a binary variable indicating that a firm-quarter of the base sample is covered by a 
minimum of one financial press article. The regression models have standard errors that are heteroskedasticity 
robust and clustered by firms. z-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. All F-tests are two-tailed. Definitions of variables are reported in Table 
4.2, Panel B. 
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4.5.3 Determinants of financial press’ DVA information enhancement 
To analyze the financial press’ information enhancement function regarding DVA 
information (Bushee et al. 2010), I analyze 202 article-firm-quarters (see Table 4.1, Panel C 
and Appendix 4.3 for details). I construct two measures of information enhancement. 
NewInfoDum is a binary variable indicating that a financial press article provides a piece of 
DVA information that the quarterly earnings press release in the firm-quarter covered by the 
article does not provide. I find that this is the case for 42 article-firm-quarters (20.8%, 
untabulated). Further untabulated results show that the most common form of DVA 
information enhancement are the provision of non-GAAP figures excluding DVAs and the 
provision of evaluative comments on DVAs by journalists. In contrast, for example, I find 
only three instances in which the press mentions DVAs that the corresponding firm press 
release does not mention and only one article that provides a DVA amount that is not 
disclosed in the respective press release. My second measure of information enhancement 
Critique is a binary variable indicating a critical tone in the press release towards DVAs. 
Narrative DVA disclosures in firms’ quarterly earnings press releases are very rare, as the low 
mean of Comments indicates. Especially, I only find two instances of very mild DVA 
criticism in firms’ press releases. I therefore argue that a critical tone by the press can raise 
investors’ awareness on DVAs’ unusual and potentially “counterintuitive” characteristics. For 
examples of critical tone in press articles in the sample, see Appendix 4.4. I find a critical tone 
towards DVAs in 53 article-firm-quarters (26.2%). Appendix 4.5 provides information on the 
coding of NewInfoDum and Critique. For my test, I employ the following probit regression: 
𝐸𝑛ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑏𝑠𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑏𝑠𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑁𝑒𝑔𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑔𝑔𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡𝑃𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑀𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑃𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (3) 
where Enhance represents NewInfoDum or Critique. I use robust standard-errors that are 
clustered by firms (White 1980). 
 Panel A of Table 4.7 provides descriptive statistics on regression inputs, Panel B 
provides correlation coefficients, and Panel C provides results of the regression estimations. 
In Model 1, the coefficient on AbsDVA is significantly positive. This is consistent with the 
financial press being more likely to provide information beyond the information already 
released in firms’ press releases for large positive DVAs. The insignificant joint coefficient of 
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AbsDVA+AbsDVA*NegDVA (p-value: 0.304) implies that this association, in contrast, does 
not hold for large negative DVAs. The significantly negative coefficient on AggInfo is 
consistent with the financial press being more likely to enhance DVA information when 
managers provide fewer DVA disclosures. The coefficient on FirstPageMent is insignificant 
which suggests that a prominent placement of DVAs in earnings press releases does not 
increase or decrease press’ propensity to provide new information. The negative coefficient 
on Pages provides weak evidence that the press enhances information more frequently for less 
transparent firms. I rerun the estimation including firm indicators (Model 2). The sample size 
hereby decreases slightly. In this specification, the coefficient on AbsDVA is not significant. 
However, the coefficient on AggInfo retains its sign and significance. To ensure that the 
coefficient is not mainly driven by observations where managers already provided thorough 
information and the financial press therefore has little opportunities to add information, I re-
estimate Model 1 and 2 excluding all observations where AggInfo is equal or above 5 (Model 
3 and 4). For this reduced sample, I find the coefficients on my test variables unchanged. 
Model 5 presents results on the determinants of a critical tone by the financial press towards 
DVAs. As in Model 1, I find that the association between large DVAs and information 
enhancement only holds for positive DVAs, but not for negative DVAs. The significantly 
negative coefficient on NegDVA is in line with smaller positive DVAs being more likely to be 
critically covered by the press than smaller negative DVAs. The results hold when including 
firm indicators (Model 6). 
 Taken together, the findings on the determinants of DVA information enhancement by 
the financial press are consistent with the financial press providing additional DVA 
information when managers provide little information, in line with an information 
enhancement function of the press. As the press’ tone seems to be more critical towards 
positive, income-improving DVAs relative to negative DVAs, this could potentially indicate 
that the press assumes a watchdog role regarding controversial DVA accounting and 
reporting, consistent with prior literature (Miller 2006, Koning et al. 2010). 
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Table 4.7 DVA Information Enhancement by the Financial Press 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for article-firm-quarter observations 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Median Max N 
NewInfoDum 0.208 0.407 0.000 0.000 1.000 202 
Critique 0.262 0.441 0.000 0.000 1.000 202 
AbsDVA 75.342 79.063 0.343 38.673 307.844 202 
NegDVA 0.530 0.500 0.000 1.000 1.000 202 
AggInfo 5.391 1.124 0.000 5.000 7.000 202 
FirstPageMent 0.713 0.454 0.000 1.000 1.000 202 
Pages 2.702 0.338 2.079 2.639 3.332 202 
TA 14.159 0.466 13.347 14.444 14.717 202 
Quarter 19.738 6.917 3.000 21.000 32.000 202 
Panel B: Correlation coefficients for article-firm-quarter observations 
N = 202 NewInfoDum Critique AbsDVA NegDVA AggInfo FirstPage 
Ment 
Pages TA Quarter 
NewInfoDum 1           
   Critique 0.221 1         
   AbsDVA -0.042 0.139 1        
  NegDVA -0.079 -0.272 -0.009 1       
  Emp -0.461 0.043 0.219 0.187 1      
 FirstPageMent -0.376 -0.144 0.229 0.191 0.524 1     
 Pages -0.087 0.130 0.111 0.070 0.117 -0.127 1    
TA -0.051 0.226 -0.028 -0.149 0.177 -0.316 0.713 1   
Quarter -0.230 -0.188 -0.291 0.112 0.144 0.395 0.169 -0.055 1 
Panel C: Determinants of DVA information enhancement by the financial press 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent 
variable 
NewInfoDum NewInfoDum NewInfoDum NewInfoDum Critique Critique 
AbsDVA 0.002** 0.001 0.002* 0.002 0.002** 0.002*** 
 (1.9934) (1.1125) (1.7695) (1.3868) (2.2488) (3.0366) 
AbsDVA*NegDVA 0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.4157) (-0.2933) (0.8017) (0.5334) (-0.8233) (-0.7695) 
NegDVA 0.103 0.191 0.386 0.461 -0.602** -0.616*** 
 (0.3402) (0.5110) (1.0985) (0.9901) (-2.3445) (-2.9571) 
AggInfo -0.605*** -0.568** -1.048*** -1.081*** 0.164 0.133 
 (-3.1699) (-2.2866) (-3.2112) (-2.9642) (0.8722) (0.6279) 
FirstPageMent -0.594 -0.572 -0.515 -1.129 -0.267 -0.195 
 (-1.4277) (-1.0661) (-0.7390) (-1.2726) (-1.0439) (-0.9979) 
Pages -0.429* -0.427 -0.300 -1.112 0.345 -0.079 
 (-1.7171) (-0.7782) (-0.9706) (-1.3871) (0.8685) (-0.1134) 
Quarter -0.019 -0.035 0.007 0.009 -0.027 -0.035** 
 (-0.7849) (-1.1855) (0.1490) (0.1715) (-1.4721) (-2.3263) 
TA -0.101 0.204 -0.810 -2.733 0.262 -1.978*** 
 (-0.4356) (0.2318) (-1.6220) (-1.5449) (0.7578) (-8.0554) 
Constant 5.441** 1.442 16.141** 44.968* -5.300 26.465*** 
 (2.1957) (0.1180) (2.3054) (1.7508) (-1.3940) (12.8178) 
Firm Indicators  No Yes No Yes No Yes 
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0.304 0.817 0.100 0.092 0.890 0.889 
Pseudo R² 0.258 0.288 0.380 0.424 0.137 0.189 
N 202 198 146 144 202 198 
This table displays coefficient estimates from probit regression models. The underlying regression model is: 















𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
NewInfoDum is a binary variable indicating that an article-firm-quarter provided DVA information beyond the 
information provided in the respective firm quarterly earnings press release. Critique is a binary variable 
indicating that an article-firm-quarter assumed a critical tone towards DVAs. The regression models have 
standard errors that are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered by firms. z-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. All F-tests are two-tailed. 
Definitions of variables are reported in Table 4.2, Panel B and C. 
4.6 Conclusion 
Based on an extensive sample of 353 firm-quarters and 202 article-firm-quarters of US 
financial firms that report DVAs between 2007 and 2014, I provide comprehensive 
descriptive evidence on the occurrence, magnitude, and reporting by managers and the 
financial press of controversial debt value adjustments due to a change in own credit risk 
(DVAs). I find that DVAs occur only for few but therefore the largest US banks who apply 
the fair value option for liabilities thoroughly. For these banks, I find that DVAs occur 
regularly and that DVA gains and DVA losses occur equally often and with comparable 
magnitude on average. I further find that managers provide DVA information in slightly more 
than half of their quarterly earnings press releases and scarcely provide directional DVA 
information that could help unravel DVAs’ perceived “counterintuitivity”. Consistent with 
claims from the public DVA debate, I find that managers provide specific DVA information 
more often for large positive DVAs relative to large negative DVAs. Also, I find weak 
evidence that managers provide more DVA relational information when they have strategic 
incentives to do so. Concerning financial press’ DVA reporting, I find that the press 
potentially forms a counterweight to this behavior by covering large positive DVAs more 
often than negative DVAs. However, I also find evidence that press’ decision to cover DVAs 
follows the emphasis that managers put on DVAs. Finally, I find that the financial press 
possibly enhances investors’ understanding of DVAs by providing new DVA information 
when managers’ DVA reporting is scarce and by assuming a critical tone especially towards 
positive, income-increasing DVAs. The evidence expands our knowledge of the properties 
and the informational environment of a novel accounting item that is target of a public debate. 
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 My findings are subject to several limitations. First, the findings offer purely 
descriptive evidence and can therefore not be interpreted as causal relations. Second, there is 
no evidence of the “optimal” level of DVA information by managers or the financial press. 
Therefore, while the found reporting behavior is consistent with behavior from prior 
literature, it could still follow different incentives. Third, my text-based measures of DVA 
information underlie inherent limitations. Foremost, they are subjective by nature. Also, the 
aggregating measures (AggInfo and NewInfoDum) weigh pieces of information equally that 
are likely of different importance and do not account for the possibility that some pieces of 
information might be complements and others might be substitutes (Leuz and Wysocki 2016). 
Finally, DVAs are innately a small-sample story and while the firms in the sample arguably 
cover a large share of the financial market, the evidence in this paper only represents fifteen 
firms and their press coverage. 
 The found variation in DVA information provided by managers and the financial press 
provides avenues for future research. Specifically, a test of the role of DVA information from 
the two sources on financial markets’ perception of DVAs should make a valuable 
contribution. The recent change in IFRS and US GAAP accounting regulation that shifts 
DVAs’ recognition from net income to other comprehensive income could provide an 
interesting setting for such research. 
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4.7 Appendix  
Appendix 4.1: Sample selection process for the base sample 
To ensure a broad identification of DVA-reporting financial firms in the US in the sample 
period between 2007 and 2014, I combine two identification approaches from prior literature. 
First, following Cedergren et al. (2015), I use data from regulatory FRY9C reports as 
provided by the “Bank Regulatory Database - Bank Holding Companies”. The inherent 
restriction of my sample to firms from the financial industry is consistent with prior literature 
on DVAs (Schneider and Tran 2015; Cedergren et al. 2015). I consider all 8,558 bank holding 
companies with available data for the sample period between 2007 and 2014. I require firms 
to file a non-zero amount for one or both of the following items at least once in the sample 
period: net gains (losses) on fair value liabilities (BHCKF553) and estimated net gains 
(losses) on fair value liabilities attributable to changes in instrument-specific credit risk 
(BHCKF554). I find that this is true for 94 firms. Because the regulatory data from FRY9C 
filings is possibly not fully compliant with US-GAAP, I require accounting data from 10-K 
filings. Therefore, I use the New York Fed link data to match the firms’ RSSD IDs from the 
regulatory database with PERMCO identifiers.22 This excludes 39 firms. I then match the 
retrieved PERMCOs with CIK identifiers through the “CRSP/Compustat Merged - 
Fundamentals Annual” database which excludes another two firms. For the remaining 53 
firms, I collect all available 10-Q and 10-K filings from the SEC Edgar company filings 
database. Performing a thorough manual search of these filings, I find that ten of the firms 
report DVAs in the sample period. 
Second, following Wu et al. (2016), I consider all 5,783 financial firms, i.e., firms with 
a SIC code starting with “6”, that are covered by the “Compustat North America annual 
database” for fiscal years between 2007 and 2014. I identify 207 financial firms as adopters of 
the fair value option because they have “Adoption of Accounting Changes” (accthcg) equal to 
“FS159” in any year of the sample period. To exclude firms that did not elect the fair value 
option for liabilities, I eliminate 47 firms without any fair value liabilities (tfvl) in periods 
subsequent to the fair value adoption. I further eliminate 65 firms without fair value changes 
reported in earnings subsequent to their FVO adoption (tfvce) because potential DVAs are 
                                                 
22 The data is available from http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/banking_research/datasets.html (Accessed 10 
March 2017). 
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reflected in this item, among other fair value changes. Next, I eliminate 10 firms without CIK 
identifier (cik) and 31 firms whose 10-K and 10-Q filings I already searched in the first part of 
the identification process. For the remaining 54 firms, I collect all available 10-K filings in the 
sample period from the SEC Edgar company filings database. I search all collected filings for 
the terms "instrument-specific credit risk", "own credit", "own debt", "own liabilities", and 
"own spread". I find these terms in 10-K filings of 41 firms. I perform a thorough manual 
search of all available 10-Q and 10-K filings of these firms in the sample period. I hereby 
identify an additional six firms that report DVAs in the sample period. 
To analyze managers’ DVA reporting, I require the sixteen DVA-reporting firms to 
file 8-K reports with the SEC because quarterly earnings press releases are attached to these 
reports. This requirement eliminates one private firm from the sample that never filed 8-K 
reports. In total, I collect such quarterly press releases for 431 firm-quarters in the sample 
period. Finally, I exclude 78 firm-quarters without FVOL adoption. In conclusion, my sample 
consists of 353 firm-quarters in which DVA-reporting US financial firms adopted the FVOL 
and released a quarterly earnings press release. Table 4.1, Panel A summarizes the sample 
selection process. 
Appendix 4.2: Example for the coding of DVA reporting measures in quarterly earnings 
press releases 
The following example describes the coding of my DVA reporting measures Ment, Sign, 
Amount, Due, Dir, Excl, Comment, AggInfo, and FirstPageMent for the sample that relates to 
the third quarter of 2011 of Morgan Stanley. The displayed excerpt is taken from the 
respective quarterly earnings press release.  
 
I find that this press release mentions DVAs (Ment), provides DVAs’ sign (Sign), provides 
DVAs’ amount (Amount), provides the information that DVAs stemmed from a change in 
debt value/credit risk (Due), and provides directional information, here: explains that credit 
spread widened, i.e. that the positive DVAs stemmed from an increase in own credit risk 
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(Dir). Accordingly, for this firm-quarter observation, I code the respective five binary 
variables as 1. I do not find non-GAAP figures excluding DVAs (Excl) or evaluative 
comments on DVAs (Comment) in this press release. Accordingly, I code these two binary 
variables as 0. AggInfo is equal to the sum of the seven binary variables. Therefore, I code it 
as 5 in this firm-quarter. The displayed excerpt is taken from the first page of the press 
release. Ergo, the first press release page provides DVA information and I consequently code 
FirstPageMent as 1 in this firm-quarter. 
Appendix 4.3: Collection of press articles providing DVA information 
To analyze the information content of financial press articles concerning DVAs, I link all 
DVA information from newspaper articles (excluding online contents) in the sample period 
between 2007 and 2014 to the 353 firm-quarters from the base sample. 
To collect respective press articles, I pursue a twofold approach. First, I collect all 
articles by four influential daily newspapers with nationwide circulation that cover the 353 
base sample firm-quarters (Fang and Peress 2009): the Wall Street Journal, The New York 
Times, The Washington Post, and USA Today. I collect Wall Street Journal articles from 
ProQuest and the remaining articles from Nexis. Following Engelberg and Parsons (2011), I 
define that an article “covers” a firm’s quarterly earnings press release if the respective 
database indexes the article on day 0, 1, or 2 after the issuance of the firm’s earnings press 
release and mentions the firm in the article’s index. Performing an extensive manual search of 
the articles, I find 125 articles that cover the firm-quarters and contain DVA information. 
Second, I conduct a search in all US newspapers included in the Nexis database. The 
Nexis database provides news and business information from a number of source. 
Specifically, I search the 205 US newspapers included in Nexis for all combinations of the 
keywords “debt/debit/credit”, “value/valuation”, and “adjustment/adjustments”, as well as for 
“DVA”, “CVA”, and “own credit risk” in the sample period between 2007 and 2014. I 
additionally perform the same searches for the Wall Street Journal via ProQuest. Analyzing 
all found articles by hand, I identify an additional 56 articles containing information on 
DVAs. Consequently, in sum, I find a total of 181 articles with DVA information in the 
sample period. I exclude eight articles that contain general DVA information or cover non-US 
firms and which I therefore cannot link to one of the firm-quarters from the overall sample. 
The fact that I do not find articles about DVAs concerning US firms outside my overall 
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sample provides some reassurance on the completeness of the sample. In conclusion, I use 
173 articles with DVA information for my tests, covering 75 distinct firm-quarters of the base 
sample. Table 4.1, Panel B provides an overview over the distribution of the articles over time 
and across newspapers. 
Appendix 4.4: Evidence on the DVA debate 
To provide insights in the DVA debate, I structure and present some of the narrative 
disclosures from the 173 articles containing DVA information that I found (see Appendix 
4.3). I find that a very common way of journalists to deal out mild criticism of DVAs is to 
label DVAs mere “accounting items” with little relation to fundamental value creation (e.g. 
Gogoi 2009; Murakami Tse 2010; Craig 2011; New York Times). In addition or alternatively, 
journalists often refer to DVAs as “one-time” gains or losses that “boosted” respectively “hit” 
net income (e.g. Murakami Tse 2009; Healy and Story 2009; Schwartz 2011; Schwartz 2012). 
Increasing the degree of criticism, journalists often use nicknames for DVAs. For example, I 
find the expression “accounting quirk” in ten articles (e.g., Eavis 2009c; Landy 2011). 
Another frequent name for DVAs in press articles is “paper gains” (e.g., Eavis 2008; 
DeCambre 2012). 
Many journalists explicitly state that DVAs can be “counterintuitive” (e.g. Eavis 2008; 
Landy 2009; Rapoport and Lucchetti 2011; Browdie 2012). Other journalists imply that 
DVAs’ effects on net income can be perceived as confusing by refering to them as “weird 
results” (Phillips 2009), “ugly results” (Eavis 2009a), “obscuring” (Appelbaum 2009), 
“erratic” (Davis 2010), ''noise” (Protess 2012), “a mirage” (Elstein 2012) “arcane” (Eavis 
2015), or “fuzzy math” (Beck 2009; Dash 2009). Still other journalists rather target the 
accounting rule itsself by calling it “nonsensical” (Currie and Cox 2010) or “twisted” (Currie 
and Campbell 2010). 
Some journalists or experts cited in press articles argue almost polemically against 
DVAs. They say that DVAs are “fundamentally unconscionable” (Landy 2009) and have a 
“perverse practical impact” (Reilly 2011). One journalist states after explaining DVAs “I am 
not making this up” (Weinreich 2012). Finally, one journalist of the Washington Post goes on 
a lenghty rant towards managers DVAs’ reporting in quarterly earnings press releases (see 
Sloan 2013): 
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“To say that the Citi earnings release and supplementary data are complicated is as 
understated as calling Yankee closer Mariano Rivera a reasonably competent pitcher. 
The headline on Citi's news release - the part of the package presumably aimed at a general 
audience - reads as follows: "Citigroup Reports Second Quarter 2013 Earnings per Share of 
$1.34; $1.25 Excluding CVA/DVA." There's a footnote after "CVA/DVA," and an explanation 
later on, but I still can't translate either term into language approaching English.  
I'm not blaming Citi's public relations or investor relations people for distributing gibberish 
and sowing confusion. They do what they're supposed to do, and what their superiors (and 
legal departments) are willing to sign off on. And presumably what Wall Street is interested in 
seeing.” 
Finally, I find sixteen articles that detail the logic behind DVAs and thereby provide 
constructive criticism. The vast majority does so by explaining that as a consequence of, for 
example, an increase in own credit risk, banks book DVA gains because they could 
“theoretically buy the debt back at a lower cost” (Associated Press 2011). The journalists 
behind these articles argue that DVAs make “some sense” (Eavis 2008) “as they seem to offer 
a clearer picture of to the actual value of a company's liabilities” (Phillips 2009) and that the 
regulation “was well intended” as it was “designed to let banks show investors changes in the 
fair value” (Elstein 2012). Three journalists explicitly refer to the respective accounting 
standard, FAS 159 (Landy 2009; Enrich 2009; Browdie 2012). Five of the articles focus on 
DVAs as a main topic and provide a thorough DVA discussion. Still, most of these articles 
also contain negative DVA critique. 
Appendix 4.5: Preparation of the article-firm-quarter observations sample and coding 
of financial press’ information enhancement variables 
To avoid a loss of information on DVAs from the articles, I link the 173 found articles to all 
firm-quarters about which they provide information. An example: The following excerpt is 
from an article in the newspaper “American Banker” from April 19, 2012. 
“[Bank of America’s] bottom-line results were skewed by a $4.8 billion accounting charge 
involving the performance of its debt, as well as from gains from equity investments and 
securities sales. Citigroup (NYSE:C) also reported profits that were similarly skewed by a 
negative debt-valuation adjustment.” 
For my sample, I code this article as two article-firm-quarter observations. One article-firm-
quarter observation on Bank of America’s first quarter of 2012 providing the DVA 
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information pieces Ment, Sign, and Amount, and a second article-firm-quarter observation on 
Citigroup’s first quarter of 2012 providing the information Ment and Sign. 
For each article-firm-quarter observation, I check whether all pieces of information 
provided by the press article are also provided in the respective firm-quarter’s earnings press 
release or not. In the latter case, I code the variable NewInfoDum as 1 and otherwise as 0. 
For the coding of Critique, I check whether an article’s tone towards DVAs is critical. 
If so, I code Critique for the article-firm-quarter(s) that the article refers to as 1, otherwise as 
0. For narrative examples of critical tone in financial press articles in the sample, see 
Appendix 4.4. Table 4.1, Panel C displays statistics on the linkage between the 173 used 
individual financial press articles and the 202 article-firm-quarters that constitute the sample 
of my tests of financial press’ DVA information enhancement. 
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5 Conclusion of the thesis 
5.1 Summary of major findings 
Based on three empirical studies, this thesis aims to improve our understanding of the informational 
benefits of recent accounting regulation changes. It takes issue with the decision usefulness of recent 
regulation on an aggregate level by examining the market-wide consequences of the introduction of 
a whole accounting regime. It further takes issue with the decision usefulness of a specific 
regulation change on a detailed level, examining the consequences for the adopting firms and their 
shareholders. To measure informational benefits, I apply market-based measures (liquidity, value 
relevance, market pricing) and disclosure based measures (hand-collected disclosure content 
measures). In all three studies, I use archival data from financial information databases. In the 
second study, I additionally use hand-collected data from financial reports. In the third study, I 
further use hand-collected data from earnings press releases and financial press articles. In sum, the 
thesis contributes firstly to the literature of the intended and unintended consequences of mandatory 
IFRS adoption (Brueggemann et al. 2013; Christensen et al. 2013) and secondly to the literature on 
the informational properties of recently introduced controversial debt value adjustments due to a 
change in own credit risk (DVAs) (Cedergren et al. 2015; Schneider and Tran 2015). Thirdly, the 
thesis adds to the literature on the role of the financial press as a financial information intermediary 
(Bushee et al. 2010; Miller 2006).  
 Concerning the first stream of literature, the first study of the thesis finds systematic changes 
in the underlying sample composition in economies after mandatory adoption of IFRS and 
concurrent enforcement regulation. Specifically, it finds evidence that especially smaller, less liquid 
firms opt out of the market or refrain from opting in, potentially due to costs that are associated with 
the regulation mandate. The study further introduces a Selection Exposure Index that measures a 
country’s proneness to changes in the underlying sample composition. Finally, the study finds that 
the Selection Exposure Index is able to explain post-regulation liquidity effects beyond the 
explanatory variables from prior literature of this stream. The study’s findings possibly reconcile so 
far inconclusive evidence on the informational benefits of mandatory IFRS adoption (Brueggemann 
et al. 2013). Specifically, the findings suggest that a part of the liquidity benefits after mandatory 
IFRS adoption found by prior literature (Daske et al. 2008) is not attributable to higher decision 
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usefulness of IFRS financial reporting but to less-liquid firms experiencing stronger pressure to 
leave regulated markets and therewith, the sample of such studies. 
Concerning the second stream of literature, the second study of the thesis finds that the 
proportion and reliability of related fair value assets moderates the value relevance, the market 
pricing, and the persistence of controversial debt valuation adjustments. Specifically, the study finds 
that large proportions of related fair value assets are only associated with value relevant DVAs if the 
assets are measured reliably, i.e. reflect quoted market prices. Furthermore, large proportions of 
unreliably measured related fair value assets are associated with a too conservative market pricing of 
DVAs by investors. Finally, I find that DVAs’ persistence is associated with large proportions of 
fair values whose measurement allows for managerial discretion. The findings are consistent with 
controversial DVAs having desirable informational properties mainly when investors are able to 
transparently assess the sources of the underlying changes in credit risk. 
Contributing to the second and third stream of literature, the third study of the thesis finds 
that managers provide more DVA relational information in quarterly earnings press releases when 
DVAs are negative and when opportunistic incentives motivate them to do so. The findings are 
consistent with a strategy of managers to emphasize and explain DVAs that decrease net income but 
to be relatively more silent about DVAs when they improve net income. The study additionally 
finds that more DVA relational information by managers is associated with a higher chance of the 
DVAs being covered by the financial press. This is consistent with the press picking up some of 
managers’ reporting spin. The study further finds that the financial press is more likely to provide 
new DVA information the less DVA information managers provide. Finally, a critical tone towards 
DVAs in financial press articles is more likely for positive DVAs than for negative DVAs. This 
finding is consistent with the financial press assuming a critical stance against DVAs. In conclusion, 
the findings imply that concerns from the public DVA debate about managers’ imbalanced DVA 
reporting could be warranted. At the same time, the findings are in line with the financial press 
fulfilling an information dissemination role and an information enhancement role regarding DVA 
information. 
Taken together, the findings of the thesis stress the importance of empirical research 
evidence for the assessment of accounting regulation quality and evidence based accounting 
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regulation (Leuz and Wysocki 2016). Therefore, they might be insightful for accounting standard 
setters. For example, the regulatory costs of IFRS implied by our findings and their impact on 
financial markets might be of relevance to the IASB in their further development of the standards. 
Also, IASB and FASB might take interest in the informational properties of DVAs whose 
accounting regulation both recently changed (FASB 2016; IASB 2014b). Also, the findings could be 
of interest for governmental bodies that are in charge of a potential adoption of IFRS, or of adoption 
of stricter accounting enforcement regulation, or of disclosure regulation in quarterly earnings press 
releases. The findings might also be of interest to a broader general public as both, IFRS and DVA 
accounting, are currently discussed with some controversy (Christensen et al. 2013; IASB 2009). 
Finally, the findings could be relevant for academics. For example, the inclusion of the Selection 
Exposure Index from the first study should be able to refine results on informational benefits of 
mandatory IFRS adoption in future studies. I point out some further avenues for future research in 
Section 5.3. While an impact of this thesis’ findings on the opinions or actions of individuals or 
interest groups is far from certain, their preparation, writing down, and publication introduces them 
in the global market for information and might prove decision useful.  
5.2 Limitations of the thesis 
As pointed out in the respective sections of the studies, there are several limitations to this thesis’ 
findings. First and foremost, the associations found in this study are mostly descriptive and therefore 
stand for themselves instead of establishing causal links. In the first study, for example, we observe 
that liquidity improvements in IFRS countries are moderated by changes in the underlying sample 
composition. However, we are unable to ascertain that the underlying changes in the sample 
composition reflect different exposure between countries to IFRS and enforcement cost. 
Furthermore, we are only able to show that, for example, a high decrease in the underlying country 
sample and improvements in liquidity are correlated in the sample, but so far do not causally 
connect the sample changes and the liquidity changes. 
Similarly, in the second study, omitted variables could drive both, a firm’s tendency to 
increase the proportion of reliably measured fair value assets and the value relevance of DVAs. For 
the third study, while my findings show an asymmetric reporting pattern by managers between 
positive and negative DVAs, I am unable to explain the reasons for the pattern. Therefore, whether 
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this is an attempt by managers “to trick the media and investors” (Milstead 2012) or rather an 
attempt to convey private information is beyond the scope of the paper. The same is true for the 
potential consequences of this reporting behavior apart from the associations with financial press 
reporting. 
 Additionally, the validity of my findings relies on the validity of the used measures and 
proxies. While the measures from the first two studies are relatively well-established in the 
literature, my disclosure and information measures in the third study are grounded in theory but 
novel. Therefore, several concerns apply to them. For example, my measure for DVA relational 
information in press releases and the financial press aggregates a set of DVA disclosures whose 
relevance I cannot objectively verify. Also, some DVA disclosures could be complements or 
substitutes (Leuz and Wysocki 2016). For example, if investors perceived a non-GAAP earnings 
figure excluding DVAs as a substitute for all additional DVA information, then a measure of DVA 
information should not increase with any information that is provided beyond such a non-GAAP 
figure. My measure does not account for this possibility. 
5.3 Avenues for future research 
The findings of this thesis point to several opportunities for future research. The first study argues 
that the increased regulatory costs, for example, through mandatory IFRS adoption and stricter 
accounting enforcement systematically influenced firms’ decision to opt-out of the regulated market 
respectively to abandon IFRS. However, the literature that provides evidence on such effects on a 
country level is still in its infancy (e.g. Hitz and Mueller-Bloch 2016; Fiechter et al. 2016). 
Considering the worldwide IFRS adoption and therewith the diversity of economies that adopted 
IFRS and are potentially prone to such selection effects, this stream of literature could provide many 
new insights. 
Furthermore, the findings of the first study indicate that research on the potential channels of 
liquidity benefits through IFRS adoption could provide further interesting results. For example, 
findings from prior literature do not rule out that positive IFRS adoption effects could partly be 
driven by a higher demand for professionally trained accountants and auditors or a better allocation 
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of such professionals’ service through the reduction of economic mobility barriers (Bloomfield et al. 
2017) 
 Future research could also consider combining the research settings of the second and the 
third study to enhance our understanding of DVAs. As mentioned in Section 5.2, the reasons for 
managers’ asymmetric reporting of positive and negative DVAs are unclear. An analysis of DVAs’ 
perception by financial markets depending on managers’ DVA reporting might be able to verify 
whether managers potentially emphasize DVAs that provide more informational benefits. Also, such 
research could test whether variations in the reporting of managers and the financial press influence 
investors’ perception of DVAs. 
While the third study examines short-term consequences of managers’ DVA reporting on the 
financial press DVA reporting, an examination of the reverse direction could yield interesting 
insights, too. Specifically, testing if critical DVA reporting by the financial press has a medium- or 
long-term impact on managers’ DVA disclosures, as prior literature finds for the reporting of pro 
forma earnings (Koning et al. 2010), would make a potentially interesting contribution to the so far 
thin literature of the financial press as a “watchdog” for good accounting and corporate governance 
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